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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
****** 
DANIEL S. GARNER and SHERRI JO ) 
GARNER husband and wife; NOLA GARNER, ) 
a widow and NOLA GARNER as trustee of the ) 
NOLA GARNER LIVING TRUST, dated 7-29-07, ) 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
BRAD POVEY and LEIZA POVEY, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
HAL J. DEAN and MARLENE T. DEAN, 
husband and wife, DOUGLAS K. VIEHWEG and 
SHARON C. VIEHWEG, husband and wife, 
JEFFREY J. NEIGUM and KATHLEEN A. 
NEIGUM as trustees of the JEFFREY J. 
NEIGUM and KATHLEEN A. NEIGUM 
REVOCABLE TRUST, dated 9-17-04; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a foreign title insurer with an Idaho certificate 
of authority; and FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
COMPANY, INC. an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, Idaho 83228 
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837 South 500 West, Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 533-0300 
Fax: (801) 533-0380 
Attorneys for the Povey Defendants 
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IN THE SIXTH .nJDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner, 
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and 
Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Garnet 
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. , 
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, 8..<; Tmstees 
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and KathIeenA 
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 
17, 2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. 
Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and 
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First 
American Title Insurance Company, a 
Foreign Title hlsuter with an Idaho 
Certificate of Authority; and First American 
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation. 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Case No. CV-08-342 
Judge Dunn 
51lb 
Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey ("Povey Defendants"), by and through undersigned 
counsel, hereby me this Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to Amend Second 
Amended Complaint. 
INTRODUCTION 
After a year of litigation in which the other party Defendants in this action did not assert 
any cross claims against the Povey Defendants, Plaintiffs claim that they are attempting to 
purchase those claims and if and when successful in that endeavor, may file claims that they are 
as yet unable to fully articulate. 
Plaintiffs, who no doubt see the writing on the wall with respect to the frivolous claims 
they filed against the Povey Defendants, have filed this premature motion to amend in an attempt 
to derail the Povey Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court should see the 
Motion to Amend Second Amended Complaint ("Motion to Amend") for what it is and dismiss 
it out of hand. In any event, the Motion to Amend does not articulate a cause of action upon 
which relief could be granted and therefore, the Court should exercise its discretion to deny the 
motion. In addition, because the Motion to Amend is an indefensible attempt by the Plaintiffs to 
prolong this case and cause urmecessary expense to the Povey Defendants, the Povey Defendants 
should be awarded their attorney fees in opposing this motion. 
ARGUMENT 
RuIe 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides for liberality with respect to 
amendments to a complaint, but there are limits to a party's right to amend. If an amended 
pJeading does not set out a valid claim, or if the opposing party would be prejudiced by the delay 
in adding the new claim, or if the opposing party has a valid defense such as a statute of 
2 
limitation, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the motion to file the 
amended complaint. Black Canyon Raguetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l B~ 119 Idaho 
171,804 P.2d 900 (1991); Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Fanners Ins. Co., 132 Id. 318, 971 
P.2d 1142 (1998). 
Plaintiffs admittedly cannot meet this standard, but instead ask the Court for "additional 
time to investigate the claims and file an amended complaint pertaining to the assigned claims." 
See, Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint, p. 2. In other words, 
the Plaintiffs want this Court to cause the Povey Defendants to incur additional fees while they 
decide what. if any, additional claims they may want to file. Obviously, the Plaintiffs cite no 
authority that would allow the trial court to impose such an unreasonable burden on the Povey 
Defendants. After a year of litigation, if the parties are not now able to articulate their claims 
against the Poveys, the Court is certainly within its discretion to not allow continued fishing by 
the Plaintiffs to try to come up with a valid claim. 
To the extent that the Plaintiffs have tried to articulate causes of action in the Motion to 
Amend, the Court can see that those claims have no chance of survival and therefore it would be 
in the interests of judicial economy to simply nip them in the bud before more unnecessary 
attorney fees have been squandered. 
I. THERE CAN BE NO BREACH OF WARRANTY CLAIMS BY THE 
OTHER DEFENDANTS. 
Plaintiffs opine that there may be breach of warranty claims by Some of the parties to 
whom the Povey Defendants conveyed property because the Povey Defendants warranted title 
"'Without disclosing the existence ofllie original access road despite their knowledge ofiC' See, 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint, p. 3. This claim suffers the 
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same defects as the Garner's direct claim against the Povey Defendants that they somehow had a 
duty to protect in the deeds they used to convey the servient estate what the Garners themselves 
never bothered to protect by language in any deed. This entire dispute could never have 
occurred had the Garners simply recorded a deed in which their supposed right of way is 
described. It is simply ludicrol1s for them to compJain that the Povey Defendants failed to record 
something that they themselves never bothered to record. And, to the extent that the right of way 
exists absent any recording of it, then the purchasers had just as much knowledge as the Povey 
Defendants since the "access road" is as visible on the ground today as it was when the Povey 
Defendants bought the property. 1 
II. PLAINTIFF'S UNARTICULA TED FRAUD CLAIM COULD NOT 
STAND. 
Plaintiffs admit that they do not have facts sufficient to particularly plead a fraud claim. 
The Court has the facts before it to detennine that the bare bones facts asserted in the motion to 
amend are not true. The supposed fraud claims pivot on Plaintiffs' erroneous assertion that the 
Poveys "knew that the prospective purchasers of their property did not know of the easement." 
See, Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint, p. 3. Such an 
assertion is patently false and not supported by a stick of evidence. The access road that nms 
past the Dean horne and continues to the canal crossing is visible upon the ground even today. 
Under Idaho law, the purchaser of property is put on inquiry notice by the existence of such a 
roadway. Farrell v. Bro""TI,111 Idaho 1027, 1033, 729 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Idaho App. 
1986)("[W]hatever is notice enough to excite the attention of a man of ordinary prudence and 
1 Of course, the access road now has a fence built across it, but since that fence was built by the purchasers long 
after the Povey Defedants left the scene, it could not be relied upon by the purchasers in a claim against the Povey 
Defendants. 
4 
prompt him to further inquiry, amounts to notice of all such facts as a reasonable investigation 
would disc1ose.")(Internal citation omitted). That inquiry notice imputes to the purchaser all the 
knowledge that a reasonable inquiry would have disclosed. Id. Because the Garners never 
bothered to record their eac;ement., the purchasers are deemed to have had just as much 
knowledge as the Poveys "With regard to this unrecorded easement. 
CONCLUSION 
As articulated in the motion for summary judgment pending before the Court, plaintiff's 
claims against the Poveys should never have been brought Now Plaintiffs want to compound 
the injury to the Poveys by delay allowing them to run up more fees for the Poveys while they 
fish for facts that might possibly support these currently unsupportable claims. The Court should 
not allow its processes to be used in such a manner and the motion to amend should be denied. 
DATED THIS 29th day of September, 2009. 
ATKIN LAW OFFICS, p.e 
Blake S. Atkin 
Attameyfor the Pavey Defimdants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of September, 2009, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR LEAVE 
TO AMEND SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT upon the follmving by the method of 
delivery designated: 
Gordon S. Thatcher 
Thatcher, Beard.. St Clair, Gaffuey 
116 S. Center 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Eric Olsen 
Racine, Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Ryan McFarland 
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Franklin County Court 
39 West Oneida 
Preston, Idaho 83263 
_ X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery X Fax: 
_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery X Fax: 
x U.S. Mail_Hand delivery X Fax: 
U.S. Mail _X_Hand delivery Fax 
Blake S. Atkin 
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Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903 
7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, Idaho 83228 
Telephone: (208) 747-3414 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.e. 
837 South 500 West, Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 533-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380 
Attorneys for the Povey Defendants 
IN THE SIXTH .ruDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
Daniel S. Gamer and Shem-Jo Gamer, 
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and 
Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola Garner 
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. 
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees 
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A 
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 
17,2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. 
Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and 
Leiza Povey, husband and Vvife; First 
American Title Insurance Company, a 
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho 
Certificate of Authority; and First American 
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
AFFIDAVITS OF HENRY POVEY AND 
DANIEL S. GARNER 
Case No. CV-08-342 
Judge Dlmn 
Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey respectfully move the Court for an order striking the 
affidavits of Daniel S. Gamer and Henry Povey on the grounds that the statements made in the 
affidavits would not be admissible at the trial of this matter and should therefore, under rule 
56( e) be stricken, This motion is supported by the memorandum filed in support hereof. 
Dated this 29th day of September, 2009. 
ATKIN I,A W OFFICS, p.e 
Blake S. Atkin 
Attorney for the Pavey Defond£Ints 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of September, 2009, I he caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVITS OF HENRY POVEY 
AND DANIEL S. GARNER upon the following by the method of delivery designated: 
Gordon S. Thatcher 
Thatcher, Beard, St Clair, Gaffuey 
116 S. Center 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Eric Olsen 
Racine, Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Ryan McFarland 
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Franklin County Court 
39 West Oneida 
Preston, Idaho 83263 
_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery X Fax 
_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery X Fax 
_ ~ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery X Fax 
U.S. Mail _X_Hand delivery Fax 
Blake S. Atkin 
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· Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903 
7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, Idaho 83228 
Telephone: (208) 747-3414 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C 
837 South 500 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380 
Attorneys for the Povey Defendants 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
FRANKLIN COUNTY~ STATE OF IDAHO 
Dame1 S. Garner and Shem-Jo Gamer, 
husband and wife; Nola Garner, a widow and 
Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Gamer 
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. 
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigurn, as Trustees 
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A 
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 
17,2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. 
Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and 
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First 
American Title Insurance Company, a 
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho 
Certificate of Authority; and First American 
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation. 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
AFFIDAVITS OF RON KENDALL, IVAN 
JENSEN, TED RICE, LORRAINE RICE 
AND JUDY PHILLIPS 
Case No. CV-08-342 
Judge Dunn 
~1 
Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby submit 
this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Ron Kendall, 
Ivan Jensen, Ted Rice, Lorraine Rice, and Judy Phillips. 
Plaintiffs have moved to strike the affidavits of Ron Kendall, Ivan Jensen, Ted Rice, 
Lorraine Rice and Judy Phillips. The motion is not well founded. The affidavits comply with 
Rule 56( e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and should not be stricken. 
I. RON KENDALL'S AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT CONTAIN INADMISSIBLE 
HEARSAY. 
Plaintiffs complain of Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Ron Kendall Affidavit ("Kendall 
affidavit") which relate statements made by Gary Garner, the husband of Nola Garner and the 
father of Daniel S. Gamer who unfortunately is now deceased. Plaintiffs' o~jection is that the 
related conversations are "hearsay." First, the statements are not hearsay at all, and if they were 
they would be admissible hearsay. The affidavit cannot be stricken. 
A. GARY GARNER WAS THE AGENT OF NOLA GARNER AND 
DANIEL S. GARNER WHEN HE MADE THE STATEMENTS. 
All of the Garner property owned on the west side of Twin Lakes Canal is now, and for 
many years has been operated as a single farming operation. In fact, it is well known in the 
community that the Garners operate the property, whatever may be the state of the legal title, as 
an integrated operation. See, June 3, 2009, Deposition of Nola Garner, pp. 70-71, 76-77,81-82, 
90, attached hereto as Exhibit A; See, June 3, 2009, Deposition of Daniel S. Gamer, pp. 9-10, 
attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
Before his death, Gary Gamer was the man in charge of that operation. And, most 
importantly, it was Gary Garner who, while Dan was away at school, negotiated the purchase of 
2 
the initial 40 acres from the McCullochs. See, June 3,2009, Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, pp. 
10-13, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
B. THE STATEMENTS AND ACTS OF AN AGENT OF A PARTY TO A 
LAWSUIT ARE NOT HEARSAY. 
Under Idaho Ru1es of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(I), "A statement is not hearsay if-- .... (2) 
The statement is offered against a party and is ... (D) a statement by a party's agent or servant 
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency .... " Gary Garner's acts in procuring the 
Rice right of way then telling officials of Twin Lakes Canal company that if they would allow 
his family to install the crossing at the Rice right of way he would allow them to rip out the 
crossing that is the subject of this lawsuit is admissible against the Garners in this case. Ron 
Kendall's testimony about those conversations is not hearsay and tlle affidavit needs to be 
considered by the Court. 
C. IF GARY GARNER~S STATEMENTS WERE HEARSAY, THEY FIT 
THE STATEMENT AGAI~ST INTEREST EXCEPTION AND ARE 
THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE. 
Even if Gary Garner's statements could be considered hearsay, which they shou1d not be, 
they would be admissible as statements against interest A statement against interest is 
admissible even though the declarant is unavailable. Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 804(b )(3). 
Unavailable includes when the 'witness is "unable to be present or to testifY at the hearing 
because of death .... " Rule 804(a)(4), Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
When Gary Garner told Ron Kendall that: 
the right of way he was using at that time went past the Povey's home, that the 
Poveys had little chlldren and that he thought it would be safer if he accessed his 
property at the new crossing so that the gravel trucks and farm machinery would 
not be going so close to the Povey's home" and that "if [Twin Lakes] would 
allow the installation of the new crossing that he would agree that we could 
3 
remove what his family had been using as a crossing that is located to the north 
and west of the Neigum property." 
See, Affidavit of Ron Kendall at Paragraphs 1-2. That was a statement against interest and is 
admissible even though, unfortunately, Gary Gamer has passed away and is no longer available. 
The statement was made at a time when Gary Garner held legal titIe to some of the property that 
is the subject of this lawsuit and when he was a manager of the common Gamer holclings on the 
west side of the canal. 
II. THE IVAN JENSEN AFFIDAVIT CONTAINS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. 
A. JENSEN'S REFERENCE TO THE RICE RIGHT OF WAY IS NOT 
VAGUE. 
Regarding Paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Affidavit of Ivan Jensen ("'Jensen affidavit"), in the 
context of this litigation, references to <'the Rice right of way" cannot be considered vague. The 
location of this "Rice right of way" is well known to the Plaintiffs, even if their lawyers feign 
ignorance of its location. See, June 3,2009, Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, pp. 16-18,40,222, 
226-227, attached hereto as Exhibit B. See, June 2, 2009, Deposition of Nola Garner, pp. 17-]8, 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. Jensen's reference to the installation of the Rice right of way "in 
the early part of 1999," Jensen affidavit at Paragraph 2, further identifies the location as that of 
the Rice right of way that Gary Garner purchased in 1999. Plaintiffs' lawyers refer to this "Rice 
right of way" at least twice in their Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and Daniel S. Garner refers to it in the affidavit he submitted. To argue that they do 
not know what Ivan Jensen wa.<> referring to when he told about a conversation witIl Ted Rice, 
Earl Ward, Ron Kendall and Gary Garner on the canal bank: near "what is now kno\vn as the 
Rice right of way" is, at the very least, disingenuous. 
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The discussion is not hearsay. As pointed out above in connection ",ith the affidavit of 
Ron Kendall, Gary Gamer's statements are not hearsay because they were made by the agent of 
parties to this action, and in any event would not be hearsay because when made they were 
statements against interest. Paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Jensen affidavit should not be stricken. 
B. JENSEN'S REFERENCE TO TWIN LAKE'S OPPOSITION TO NEW 
CROSSINGS IS NOT WITHOUT FOUNDATION. 
In Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Jensen affidavit, Ivan Jensen sets out that at the time of the 
conversation mentioned in Paragraph 2, he was employed by Twin Lakes and "in that capacity" 
he met with Mr. Ron Kendall, the water master, Mr. Earl Ward, another Twin Lakes employee, 
Mr. Ted Rice and Mr. Gary Garner. He further states that the purpose of the meeting was to 
discuss the installation of the Rice crossing. 
"[T]he actions of an agent are the actions of the corporation." Ostrander v. Farm Bureau 
Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650, 654, 851 P.2d 946, 950 (1993). One may conclude 
that an agent of Twin Lakes, sent by Twin Lakes to discuss a crossing installation, would be 
armed with knowledge of the company's policies with regard to crossings. In any event, his 
observations as an agent of Twin Lakes, about Twin Lakes being generally opposed to crossings 
because of the inherent difficulty each added crossing adds to the cleaning of the canal, are, 
under the Jaw of agency, observations of the Twin Lakes company because of his position as 
their agent, and were further confirmed by the water master. See. Affidavit of Ron Kendall at 
paragraph 1. 
C. GARY GARNER'S STATEMENTS ARE NOT HEARSAY A."ND ARE 
STATEMENTS AGAINST INTEREST. 
Regarding Paragraphs 4, 6, and 7 of the Jensen affidavit, as shown above with regard to 
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the affidavit of Ron Kendall, Gary Gamer's statements are not hearsay because they were made 
by the agent of parties to this action, and in any event would not be hearsay because, when made, 
they were statements against interest. There is nothing vague about Paragraph 6. Paragraphs 4, 
6, and 7 should not be stricken. 
III. THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE TED RICE AFFIDA VlT ARE 
ADMISSIBLE. 
In Paragraph 2 of the Affidavit of Ted Rice ("Rice affidavit"), as with the Affidavit of 
Ivan Jensen, Plaintiffs' feigned ignorance about the reference to. "the Rice right of way" does not 
make the reference vague. Even though Mr. Rice does not state the date of the meeting along the 
canal bank, he fixes it as a discussion about the installation of the right of way. It is an obvious 
reference to the same ruscussion attended by Ivan Jensen and Ron Kendall. 
Regarding Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the Rice affidavit, foundation is laid by a witness 
telling how he knows somefujng. The foundation need not be detailed-it may not even be 
believable-but for admissibility analysis it need only explain how the witness has personal 
knowledge of the matter to which he is testifying. Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 901(b)(2). Mr. 
Rice lays the foundation for his familiarity with the various roadways in his first paragraph in 
which he states that he has lived "adjacent to the property and the right of way ... for 82 years." 
The Rice affidavit is very specific as to its content and it is sufficient foundation for him to state 
that he has lived adjacent to the property for the past 82 years. 
IV. THE JUDY PHILLIPS AFFIDAVIT PROPERLY AUTHENTICATES THE 
MINUTES OF TWIN LAKES CANAL COMPAl\ry, 
The Affidavit of Judy Phillips makes no statements of fact. It simply authenticates, as a 
business record kept in the nonnal course of business of Twin Lakes Canal Company, a record 
6 
indicating that the Garners had approved removal of the bridge on the Garner property. If Ivan 
Jensen and Ron Kendall accurately remembered the discussions they had 'with Gary Gamer, in 
which he agreed to remove the Garner bridge, one would expect to find some mention of it in the 
minutes of a Twin Lakes Canal Company board of directors meeting. As expected, such a record 
is there. The Affidavit of Judy Phillips is admissible and necessary to establish the document as 
an authentic business record and exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 803(6), Idaho Rules of 
Evidence. There is no basis for striking the Affidavit of Judy Phillips, nor the attached business 
record of Twin Lakes Canal Company. 
Dated this 29th day of September, 2009 
ATKIN LAW OFFICS, P.C 
Blake S. Atkin 
Attorney for the Povey Defondants 
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1 A Thars correct. 
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I 
2 Q_ Okay. But that is anotherroad that 
3 you could have used to access -I'm not saying 
4 you wanted to, and we'll get to -whether you did or 
5 not in a minute, but that is a road - someone 
6 could have taken that road and it converged vvith 
7 the north road and -
8 MRBROWN: Couldyouclari:£yforfue 
9 witness what you mean when you say that is a road 
10 )lUU could have used. 
11 Q. (BY MR. ATKIN) Is that a road that you 
12 could have used to access the Cox or Povey parcel 
13 on the west side of the canal? 
I 
I 
I 
J 
I 
I 
I 
! j , 
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1 traded. who did that belong to before you traded 
2 it to the Rices? 
3 A. That belonged to -
4 Q. 'Who were the owners? 
5 A. I :really don't know. Maybe the best 
6 thing is to say I don't know, because I don't know 
7 whether it -...vas all on our property or some of it 
8 on Danny's. I don't know where the boundary line 
9 is there. 
10 Q. Okay. We're there deeds that were 
11 exchanged between the Garners and the Rices with 
12 regards to that property? 
13 A. May- I converse with my attorney? 
14 A We could have. 
15 Q. Did you ever use it? 
16 A I may have once. 1
114 Q. Sure. 
15 MR- BROWN: I believe there's a deed that's 
1
16 an exhibit to the complainL 
17 Q. Okay_ 17 TIlE WIlNESS: There's a warranty deed. 
18 A I really don't remember. 18 It's from Edward Rice - okay. Gary T. Gamer 
19 Q. Fair enough. And then 1he Rice 19 and Nola S. Gamer to Edward Rice and Helen Rice. 
20 right-of-way did not exist at the-time you 20 Q. (BY MR. ATKIN) Okay. So does that 
21 purchased the Povey and the Cox parcels, correct? 
22 A That is correct. 
23 MR ATKIN: Hold on a second. 
21 refresh your recolleCtion as to who the ovvners of 
22 the 30-fuot parcel that you conveyed to the Rices 
23 was? 
24 (Oifthe record..) 24 A. I guess it \'\-'as ours. 
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1 or the southern most access road that exists now, 1 A. It's a lull 
2 as I understand it you and yom husband purchased 2 Q. And it's close to the boundary with 
3 that in about 1990? 3 your son Danny? 
4 A That is not correct 4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Okay. Tell me how1hat came to be. 5 Q_ Let me ask you, -what was Danny's 
6 A It vvas trru:IetL it was not purchased. 6 involvement, if any, in the purchase or building 
7 Q. You traded a 30-foot strip of your 7 of what's now known as the Rice right-of-way? Was 
8 property that goes from that access road south to 8 he involved in that transaction? 
9 the Rice's gravel pit; is that correct? 9 A. He was not involved in the 
10 A It's along the west side of the gravel 10 transaction. 
11 pit. 11 Q. Okay. And ifI understan~ at least 
12 Q. Okay_ 12 one of ilie purposes - let me ask it this way. 
13 A. Over to the fence. 13 Was one of the purposes of building that 
14 Q. But it's - you traded a30-foot 14 right-of-way to provide a better access fur trucks 
15 access road to the Rices in exchange for this 15 hauling gravel out of the gravel pit that's up the 
16 30-foot right-of-way that's now called the Rice 16 mountaln from that right-of-way? 
17 right-of-way? V A] don't know how to answer that 
18 A No. 18 exactly. I don't know what Gary's purpose was. 
19 Q. Correct me where rm wrong. 19 Q_ All right Then Jet me ask this. 
20 A. We traded a 30-fuot strip of hillside 20 What, nany, was your involvement? 
21 for a 30-foot right-of-way road. 21 A. Anger. 
22 Q. Okay. And the 30-foot right-of-way 22 Q. Explain that to me, please. 
23 road is the one that we've - 23 A I could not see why we needed to give 
24 A Named Rices_ 24 away something more valuable fur - the property 
25 Q_ Okay. And the 30-foot parcel that you 25 that we traded fur that easement to me was more 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. (208) 345-8800 (fux) 
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1 vvhat those negotiations were; is that correct? 1 Gary bought either of yours, correct? 
2 A That's correct. 2 A. That is correct. 
Page 71 
3 Q. Have you since leamed anything about 3 Q. And he owns a 40-acre parceL And rm 
4 vvb.ai the negotiations were between Gary and Twin 4 . not sure, but he might O'WIJ. another 40 acres over 
5 Lakes Canal for the Rice crossing? 5 on the vvest side? 
6 A No, I haven't 6 A. Or 80. 
7 Q. I apologize. We've covered a lot of 7 Q. So he ovvns 80 total? 
8 this without me using my notes. Let me take a 8 A. I'm not sure, but I t:hlnk it's 80. 
g minute. . 9 Q. Okay. The complaint alleges that 
10 Have you ever - \\'e talked about your 110 through an oral agreement those properties have 
11 use of the northern road. Have you ever used the 111 been nm as a common - an integrated common 
12 middle road before it converges with the northern 112 operation is the phrase in the amended complaint 
13 road? Do you know VIIbat I'm mlking about? 113 A. His property or all of the property? 
14 A No. fm lost. I 14 Q. All. 
15 Q. The middle road goes from the Westside 115 A. They've all been n.m together 
16 Highway and eventually converges with the northern! 16 basically, yes. 
17 road. On that leg of the middle road have you 117 Q. Okay. It says through an oral 
18 ever used that? 118 agreement Was there an actual sit dovm. to work 
19 A I have used it when Leiza and Brad 119 out a negotiated. oral agreement or was that just 
20 lived where the Deans live. 120 kind of the arrangement that developed between you 
21 Q. Okay. On one occasion or more than 121 and your son? . 
22 One occasion? !22 A. lbe Garners never sit down and do 
23 A More than one. i 23 anything very organized. 
24 Q. Okay. And what prompted you to use 124 Q. I take that to mean--
25 that road:way? 125 A I don~ remember ever sitting: dawn and 
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1 1 A They asked me to. ! 1 having a conversation, but at some point there was 
2 Q. Okay. Tell me about that. When did I 2 an agreement 
3 they ask you to do that? II 3 Q. At least there was an understanding? 
4 A I don't know. 4 A. Well, yeah.. Danny has my cows with 
5 Q. Sometime when Btad and Leiza were I 5 his cows. 
6 living in the home that the Deans now live in? ! 6 Q. All right. Let me ask you about that. 
7 A. Yes. ! 7 VIbat are the uses to vvhlch the property, any of 
8 Q. And did they tell you why they wanted I· 8 the property on the west side of Twin Lakes Canal, 
9 you to use that road? f 9 that is accessed by any of these three roads that 
10 A I can't remember specifically why they 110 we've talked about, what uses has that property 
11 said. ! 11 been put to? We Jrnowtbat there's a gravel pit 
12 Q. Okay. 112 over there, and maybe three gravel pits over 
13 AQ Do you want me to guess? I. 1
14
3 there.. There's been some bauling of some gravel? 
14 . No. But do you think you know why? I A. Yes. 
15 A I think it was because they have· ! 15 Q. Okay. What else has been done there? 
16 little children too. 116 A. Grain bas been taken out. A.Ifalfa has 
17 Q. Okay. And was that okay with you to 1.[ 1178 than taken off. Used as pasture ground. 
18 use that road rather than the northern road? ! Q. When was the last time that any of the 
19 A. Yes. rm a mother and I want - I j19 Garners raised warn on any of that property? 
20 don't Vv-ant people driving past my children.. j 20 A. I don't know. I get a subsidy check. 
21 Q. Okay. Fair enough. Thecomplaint ! 21 I get a grain based check. whatever that's called. 
22 talks about the two properties that you and Gary 122 I don't know. 
23 bought on the west side of Twin Lakes Canal. And ! 23 Q. Let me ask: it this way. I kind of 
24 it also talks about tbeproperty that Danny i 24 assumed something I probably shouldn't have 
25 bouglrt. I think Danny bought his before you and I 25 assumed. Since buying the Cox or the Povey 
(208) 345-961 { M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. (208) 345-8800 (fax) 
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1 . parcel, did you and your husband ever raise grain 
2 on any of that property? 
3 A I don't know. 
4 Q. Do you know if Danny ever raised grain 
5 on any of that property since he bou""abt it? 
6 A I don't know. I don't get involved 
7 with what they're growing. 
8 Q. All right. So when you say that grain 
9 has been taken off the property, how do you know 
10 that? 
11 A. Because 1 get a grain pay check. 
12 Q. Okay. So at some point somebody 
13 raised some grain? 
r 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Page 75 
1 Q. They didn't want to go up the road? I 
2 have cows, I know how they act 
3 A. They're ornery. Sometimes more than 
4 others. 
5 Q. Typically did you haul the cows in a 
6 vehicle? 
7 A. Typically Danny hauls thellL 
8 Q. Okay. Do you know how many cows he 
9 runs up there? 
10 A. 1 don't know. 
11 Q. And what kind of vehicle does he use 
12 to haul the cows up in? 
13 A Most generally he uses a couple of 
14 A. At Some place, yes. . 14 trailers behind a pickup. 
15 Q. But thai; might have been the 
16 McCuIlochs or the Poveys or the Coxes? 
17 A I don't know. I know that Dennis 
18 Ralphs always claimed that he hauled grain down 
19 through there, but I really don't know. 
20 Q. You don't know whether any of the 
21 Garners have ever raised grain on any of that 
22 property? 
23 A I dontt know. 
24 Q. How about alfhlfa. have the Garners 
15 Q. Okay. Have you ever seen him use a 
16 semi trailer to haul cows up to that property? 
17 A You mean one of those cattle divider 
18 things? 
19 Q. Yeah.. 
20 A No, I haven't 
21 Q. You said that you run your cows with 
22 his cows. How many cows do you own? 
23 A I don't know. rYe been nnming mine 
24 with him for a long time. :Mine are the ones that 
.~~~mredru~ruw~~~UW~~~J~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.--
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A r don't know. 1 
2 Q. You know it has been used fur pasture 
3 because you told us you went up to look at the 
4 cows and have fed them up there sometimes? 
5 A Yes. it has been used for pasture. 
6 It's been used for skeet shooting. 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 A. I think it's been used for a lot of 
9 thi:ngs. 
10 Q. Do you know how many cows have been 
1I pastured up there? 
12 A ldon't. 
13 Q. Have the cows been hauled up to that 
14 pasture in vehicles or were they herded up the 
15 road? 
16 A Both. 
17 Q. Okay. Do you recall herding cows up 
18 any of the roads to that pasture? 
19 A. No, I haven't hauled any up. I helped 
20 herd them over there a month ago maybe. 
21 Q. You mean your cows wont stay off the 
22 road? 
23 A Ted Rice was very nice and said we 
24 could take the fence down and herd them through 
25 his place. 
1 problem oiles, so I don't know how many I have 
2 left. 
3 Q. Do you ever receive any payment from 
4 your son Danny with regard to the cattle that you 
5 own? 
6 A. Yeah, I do. 
1 Q. All right But you don't know how 
8 many you own? 
9 A No. But I get a lot of beefSteaks. 
10 Q. Okay. Who is in charge of managing 
11 the consolidated property, the common operation of 
12 those properties on the west side of Twin Lakes 
13 Canal? 
14 A. That we're referring to as the Pavey 
15 and Cox and Danny? 
16 Q. Yes. 
17 A Danny is. 
1
18 Q. Has he always managed it even before 
19 your ~band died? 
20 A. I think probably most of the time. 
21 Q. Does he consult with you with regard 
22 to the management of that property? 
23 A. He tries. 
24 Q. Okay. And before your husband died 
25 did he consult with your husband about the 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. (208) 345-8800 (fax) 
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management of that property? 1 A I think in the house. Probably in the 
2 A r imagine they consulted. 2 kitchen. 
3 Q. More than you do now? 3 Q. In your house? 
4 A Gary and I w-en/. on twu missions. At 4 A Yeah.. 
5 that time we were away there Vv'aS no consulting, 5 Q. And you were there and your husband 
6 Danny just handled things. But that is something 6 vvas there and Danny vvas there. Was anyone else 
7 that we do vrell. All of them probably got 7 there? 
8 together at different times and consulted about 8 A Not that I recall 
9 what they were going to plant or whatever. , 9 Q. Okay. What did your husband say 
10 Q. Okay. ! 10 during that conversation? 
11 A. And Wayne is usually included. That's 111 A. I don't know. 
12 an uncle. 112 Q. What did Danny say? 
13 Q. All right. So it's fu:ir to say that j13 A. I don't know what he said, but he was 
14 your husband, before he died, would have - when j 14 very upset. 
15 he \vasn't on a mission somewhere would have 115 Q. Why was he upset? 
16 consulted 'With Danny about fue operation of those ! 16 A. Because he didn't think his dad was 
17 properties? 117 ma1.d:ng a good decision. 
18 A. Yes. V&en they're standing around 118 Q. Do you recall any specifics of why he 
19 they - we kind of run everything together. If! 19 thought his dad wasn't making a good decision? 
20 you need grain, which is the best spot to put it 120 A No. 
21 Q. Okay. 121 Q .. And do you know - do you recall the 
22 A. Wayne and I have done that ail our 122 response that your husband had to any of Danny's 
23 life and the kids have just been included. /23 concerns? 
24 Q. All right. If~ fair.to say 1hat the 124 A. He was very exasperated that Danny and 
25 development aftre RICe ogbt.-of-way: wnnJd have i 25 T coutdn~ see tbe.wisdom that be bad 
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/ 1 is and would have been a benefit to Danny's I 1 Q. All right. Was this before the deal 
2 operation ofhis - of that property, right? 2 had been done to develop the Rice right-of-way? 
3 A. I don't know nit's it benefit. Danny 3 A I dontt remember.' 
4 did not:teel that it was, I do not believe. I 4 Q. Was it before you signed the docmnents 
5 don't know. I mean, I haven't talked to him. 5 on the Rice right-oF-way, exhibit I? 
6 Q. rn ask him about that. 6 A. I don't know nit was befure or 
7 A. So I don't lrnow. 7 after. 
a Q. Let me get to the point Do you know ,I 8
9 
Q. Okay. Let me ask you, if it was 
9 'Whether Gary talked with Danny about the before - iiit was after the deal was already 
10 development oftbe Rice right-of-way before he did 110 done, would there have been any reason fur the 
11 it? 111 conversation and the exasperation of your husband? 
12 A. Yes, I know he talked to Danny about I' 12 A. Yes. Sometimes 'We rehash what we've 
13 that. That is the only disagreement I think he ,13 already done. 
14 and his dad ever had. ! 14 Q. Okay_ So as you sit here you don't 
15 Q. And how do you know about that ,15 know, in relationship to the deal, when it was 
16 discussion, or those discussions? l 16 eli ussed? 
17 A. I was there. 117 Be A. No. 
18 Q. You were there? ! 18 Q_ In wbatregard did Dannytbink that it 
19 A. r was there. ! 19 was an unwise, decision to put in the Rice 
20 Q. Okay. Was there one or more than one f 20 right-oF-way? 
21 conversation between your husband and Danny with 121 A r don't remember anything he said 
22 regard to the Rice right-of-way? 122 about it so I don't really know wba1- well. I 
23 A. I don't know about that I was only i 23 don't know what he thought 
24 there for One. /24 Q. Was it because of the property that 
25 Q. Okay. Where were you? . j 25 was being traded for the Rice right-of-way? 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, ]NC. (208) 345-8800 (:fux) 
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1. A. It was probably the value. 1 Q. Sherri being Dan's wife? 
2 Q. All right. 2 A Yes. 
:3 A. But I don't know, because I don't 3 Q. As I've gone through the second 
4 remember Danny saying anything specifically. 4 amended complaint, one of the concerns that is 
5 Q. All right. Did there come a point in I 5 raised is that Brad and Leiza Povey didn't take 
6 time \vhen Danny became happy or reconciled to the \ 6 steps to protect legally you and your husband's 
7 idea of the Rice rigbt-of-\¥ay? I 7 rightto use the right-of-way, the north 
8 A I don't really know. 1 8 right-of-way. Is that correct? 
9 Q. Other than that do you remember 9 A Ye.g, that's correct. 
10 anything else about that conversation about the 1'10 Q. Okay. Let me ask you this, the only 
11 development of the Rice right-of-way, other than 11 document recorded with the county recorder, and 
12 Danny and you not seeing the wisdom in it and your 12 you know what the county recorder is? 
13 husband being exasperated because you couldn't see 13 A. Yes. 
14 howwise it was? 14 Q. You understand that in order to 
15 A. The only thing I saw was that Danny 15 have - in order to protect your rights in real 
16 regrets being what be considers disrespectful to 16 estate you record documents with the county 
17 his father. 17 recorder. co.rrect? 
18 Q. Anything else? /18 A That's correct 
19 A. No. 19 Q. Okay. And the only document that you 
20 Q. The complaint, as I say, alleges - we 20 have with regard to the Povey property, the 
21 talked about bow you fun this property as a common 21 property that you bought from the Poveys. and let 
22 operation.. That's pretty well known in the 22 me make sure the record is clear. You bought thai 
23 community of Clifton, that the Garners and the 23 property, )'UU and your husband bought that 
24 Smarts run alI of their properties in bmdem. 24 properly, not in a trust oranytbing else, just 
25 A Togetber We discuss it and work 
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1 together. yes. 
2 Q. And so the Poveys and Deans and the 
3 Neigums. they would have understood that 
4 relationship, that the Garners are a group that 
5 run their properties together, wouldn't they? 
6 :MR. MCFARLAND: Objection. Calls for 
7 speculation. 
8 Q. (BY MR AIKIN) I mean, it's commonly 
9 known that that's bow you opernte, isn't it? 
10 A. I think so. 
n Q. Do you have any reason to believe 
12 that - let's take them one at a time. Do you 
13 have any reason to believe that the Poveys knew, 
14 with regard to this property on the west side of 
15 Tv.in Lakes Canal. that Gaty and Nola Gamer and 
16 Danny and Sherri Gamer ran the property as an 
17 integrated common operation? 
18 A I think: that the Poveys would know a 
19 little bit more than most. And they would also 
20 know that Danny is definitely his own individual. 
21 Q. All right. And why is it that the 
22 Poveys would know a little bit more than most 
23 about the way that the Garners ran this as an 
24 integrated common operation? 
25 A Brad is Sberrits uncle. 
1 A. Everything was pureha..~d out of the 
2 trust. It was just Gary and I. 
3 Q. Right And you and Gary bought the 
4 property:from four Poveys, Brad and Leiza Povey 
5 and? 
6 A. Henry and Millie Povey. 
7 Q. Okay. And there's a deed from aU 
8 four Paveys.to Gary and Nola Gamer with regard to 
9 that property, right? 
10 A. Correct. 
11 Q. And that deed is attached to the 
12 second amended complaint as one of the exhibits, 
13 right? 
14 A. That's right. 
15 Q. And that one deed is the only document 
t 16 that -was recorded -with the county recorder's 
117 office with re1saro to that piece of property that 
I 
118 you and Gary bought from the four Poveys, correct? 
°j19 A I believe it is the only one. 
20 Q. Okay. And in that deed there isn't /21 any mention of a right-of-way fur any of these 
/
22 three roadways orright-of-ways that we've talked 
23 about? 
I 24 A. That's correct It's an implied one. 
I 25 We bought off of the people that owned the rest of 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE. INC (208) 345-.8800 (fax) 
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1 . to be, I j us! wonder if there are any other 
2 reasons? 
3 A.. I can't come down with any more. 
4 Q. Okay. Now, as a result of one of the , 
5 deeds that Brad Povey recorded, there now is 
6 recorded with the county recorder a deed -which 
7 describes a right-of-way fur Danny 'Garner to use 
8 to access that property on the west side of Twin 
9 Lakes Canal, right? 
10 A. Yes, there is. 
11 Q. And that description is that middle 
12 road that is now referred to as the-Neigum 
13 driveVtlay, correct? 
14 A Correct. 
15 Q. Okay. Before Brad recorded that deed, 
16 there weren't any other deeds describing a 
17 right-of-way for any of the Garners on the west 
18 side of the canal" right? 
19 A. I believe that's correct. 
20 Q. Do you know of anything filed by Brad 
21 or Leiza Povey with the co1lIl1:y recorder that tries 
22 to deny that the Garners have a right-of-way 
23 across what used to be the McCulloch property in 
24 order to access their property on the west side of 
? 
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I 1 A.. It does not say that, but it has been 
I 2 interpreted as that. 
f 3 Q. By whom? ! 4 A. I think by the Neigums. 
1 5 Q. Okay. As you sit here, are you aware 
I 6 of any docmnent that Brad or Leiza Povey caused to 
I, 7 be recorded? We talk about the Neigum deed and 8 your interpretation or the Neigums' 
I 9 interpretation.. Let's skip that fur a minute. 
I 10 Are you aware of any docmnent recorded that tries 11 to deny that Gary Gamer and Nola Gamer, or the 
12 Nola t:rust, have a right-of-way across what u..o;;eci 
13 to be the McCulloch property? 
14 A. No, none.. 
15 Q. Okay. And even the one we've talked 
16 about doesn't say they don't? 
17 A No, it doesn't. 
18 Q. Now, when the Deans bought their 
19 property from the Poveys, and r don't know - were 
20 you a\.V3re that the Poveys were selling the 
21 property to the Deans? 
22 A Probably somewhat. I was aware it was 
23 up fur sale, but who was buying I didn't know. 
24 Q. When the Deans bought that property, 
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1 A I think that the deed you refer to, 1 goes right past the Dean home, 1hat road was 
2 and this is my poor legal opinion.. 2 clearly visible on thegrol.lIld. wasn't it? 
3 Q. I understand. you're not a lawyer and 3 A. Very. 
4 I'm not asking you fur a legal opinion. rro 4 Q. And it was clearly visible all the way 
5 asking are YOll aware of any recorded deed? 5 to Twin Lakes Canal and the crossing at Twin Lakes 
6 A My understanding of the deed that was 6 Canal? 
7 recorded makes it so I have less of a right-{)f--way 7 A. Very. 
8 than any other way. because it vvas specifically 8 Q. And so anybody buying that property at 
9 said that Danny had one and excludes us. 9 that time would have seen that roadway? 
10 Q. Okay. 10 A. (Wrtness nodded her head..) 
11 A Am I right? That's the way I read it 1l Q. Right? 
12 Q. Here's my question.. I understand that 12 A Yes. 
13 that deed that Brad recorded specifically mentions 13 Q. They would have seen that it -went up 
14 ~ Garner's access to the property on the west 14 the bill and to the crossing ofnvin Lakes Canal? 
15 side? 15 A Yes. 
16 A.. Only Danny. 16 Q. And by that time the Poveys didn't own 
V Q. Okay. But as we've established, all 17 any property other than the west side of Twin 
18 of those properties have been run as a common 18 Lakes Canal; is that correct? 
19 enterprise, right? 19 A.. That's correct 
20 A Yes, they have been. 20 Q. And the Game.rs did own property on 
21 Q. Other than that, and I guess we can 21 the west side of Twin Lakes Canal at the end of 
22 look at that, but my question is that in that deed 22 that crossing that went across the canal, right? 
23 is there anything that says Nola Gamer and Gary 23 A. Yes. 
24 Garner do not have a right-of..wayto cross any of 24 Q. And anybody could have gone to the 
25 the formerly McCulloch property? 25 county recorder's office at that point in time and 
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1 . Gary and Nola Gamer bought from the four Poveys I 1 an attempt to unreasonably limit the buyer's free 
2 that I mentioned? I 2 access to his property. I 
3 A. Correct j 3 Q. Okay. As far as I can tell, that is 
4 Q_ And also provided access to a piece of I 4 the best description of the right-of-waytbat 
5 property thai you bought from the McCullochs? ! 5 you're claiming in this lawsuit Do you know of 
6 A. Correct. I 6 any better legal description,. any better 
7 Q. And provided access to a property that I 7 description oftbe right-of--way, than that one? 
8 Gary and Nola Gamer bought from the Coxes? I 8 A. No. sir, I don't believe so. 
9 A. Correct. 9 Q_ This is the only docmneut there is 
10 Q. And Gary and Nola Garner are your 10 that describes the right-of-way? 
11 mother and father? 11 A I think that's it 
12 A Correct. 12 Q. SO we're clear, this language that 
13 Q. And as I understand it from talking to 13 you've just read out of this exhibit A, this 
14 Nola yesterday, and from some of the allegations 14 con1nlCt of sale, did not ever get incorporated 
15 in the complaint; those three properties thai rve 15 into a deed with respect to the property, correct? 
16 descnDed have basically been run as one 16 A. Correct 
17 consolidated fimn since you've owned fuem; is that 17 Q_ Okay. At some point you completed the 
18 right? 18 purchase pursuant to the contract of sale? 
19 A. Can you c1ar:ilY that? You're talking 19 A (Witness nodded his head.) 
20 the three properties - the piece I bought from 20 Q. You need to answer audibly. 
21 McCullochs was nm separately UIItil my parents 21 A rm sorry. Pmsuant means after? 
22 bought the other two, do I understand that right? 22 Q. Let me rephrase it At some point you 
23 Q. Yes. 23 :finished paying for the property as descnDed in 
24 A. Correct 24 theconhactof~e? 
Page 10 Page 12 
1 continuous farm? 1 Q. Okay. And at some point you were 
2 A Correct 2 given a deed by the McCullochs for the property? 
3 Q. Okay. Now, let me have you look at 3 A. Correct 
4 What is marked as exhibit A to the second amended 4 Q. But in 1ha.t deed it mdn't include 
5 complaint I'm not going to mark a new copy for 5 this language that we've just read describing the 
6 the deposition because it's already in the record. 6 right-of-Vlay? 
7 Exhibit A to the second amended complai:nt, as I 7 A. The lawyer that did the sale said it 
8 understand it,. is the contract of pure base tbs.t 8 wasn't - that that was perfectly legal and 
9 you had with the McOillocbs when you bought the 9 insisted on leaving it in there at closing. 
10 original 40 acres of gro~? . 10 Q. Okay. 
11 A Correct. 11 A So, yes. 
12 Q. Okay_ And in that contract there is a 12 Q. I'm not arguing. The deed that you 
13 description of a right-of-way. Do you see that? 13 received did not have that language in it? 
14 A. Yes, sir, I do. 14 A. No. 
15 Q. Could you read it so we have it clear ]5 Q. Okay. Do I understand correctly--
16 on the record what vve're refurring to? 16 your mother told us yesterday that vvhen you were 
17 A. Together with the rights to all vvater 17 buying this property that you had talked with the 
18 from all existing springs on said property, and a 18 seller, the McCullochs, and tried to get them to 
19 right-of-way across seller adjacent property aJong 19 agree to moving the right-of-way to a different 
20 an existing roadway. The right to use said 20· location.than what we've been -
21 roadway sball be limited to the times and in a 21' A. Than what is referred to there? 
22 manner as not to interrere with the sellers 22 Q. Yeah. 
23 sprinkler pipe that may from time to time be 23 A. I have no knowledge of that. 
24 placed across the roadway. Likewise, seller shall ,. 24 Q. Did you ever have any discussions -with 
25 not place his sprinkler pipe across the roadway in 25 the McCulIochs about where the right-of-way would 
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1 cross? 1 property or the Daniel Garner property. 
2 A No" sir- I Vt1aS in college at the time 2 A. Okay. 
3 and most of it was done on weekends. 3 Q. There are three roadways that at one 
4 Q. Okay. Did your father or mother 4 point or another could have been and have been 
5 assist you in negotiating the purchase of the 5 used to access that property. The first one is 
6 property? 6 what we've been referring to as the northern 
7 A Yes. 7 roruhvay. That's the roadway that goes past what 
8 Q. SO what your mother told us you may . 8 is now the Dean home, very close proxllnity to the 
9 not have been involved in because they were I 9 Dean home, and goes up the hill to a bridge that 
10 helping you with it? ! 10 crosses Twin Lakes CanaL You're :familiar with 
11 A. Yes. III that road? 
12 Q. SO the best infunnation we have about j 12 A. Yes. 
13 those negotiations would be what your mother told 113 Q. And if I refer to that as the norIhem 
14 us yesterday? 114 roadway, you'll know what I'm talking about? 
15 A. Correct. ! 15 A. I will now. 
16 Q. All right. Now, did you ever have any 116 Q. Okay. And then the middle roadway has 
l7 discussions with the sellers about 1his language ! 17 sometimes been referred to as the Neigum driveway. 
18 in exhibit A that we just had you read? 118 Are you fumiliar with that roadway? 
19 A. Yes. : 19 A Yes. 
20 Q. What discussions did you have? i 20 Q. And that road starts on the Westside 
21 A. My dad pushed - my dad approached me ! 21 High-way,like the northern roadway does, about a 
22 that the McCullocbs fult like they should get paid 122 quarter of a mile south of the northern roadway_ 
23 extra money because we vvanted to extract gravel ,23 Is it not a quarter of a mile? 
24 down the right.-of-way. Ralph was there at the 124 A. Shorter . 
..25 time. Ralph McCullocb, at the time:that we agreecL .! 25 Q Okay I.ess than a quarter nfa roUe 
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1 to pay him that extra money. 1 Anyway, some distance south of the northern 
2 Q. Okay. And so you did pay him extra 2 roadway. And it goes up and over and eventually 
3 money? 3 converges with the north roadway and then 
4 A. Correct ! 4 continues on up the hill to the bridge that 
5 Q. How much, do you recall? I 5 crosses Twin Lakes Canal, right? 
6 A. 6,000. I 6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Any other discussions with the seUers i 7 Q. And I'm going to refer to that as the 
8 about the meaning of the language in exhibit A? ! 8 middle roadway or Neigum driveway. 
9 A Yes. <Ii 109 A. Okay. 
10 Q. What discussions did you have? Q. And the third access road is what 
11 A. At the same time we discussed the pipe 111 we've been referring to as the Rice right-of-way, 
12 being across the road and -what was meant by that. 112 a road that your father and mother traded some 
13 And what he would do to facilitate access to the i 13 property fur in about 1990. It's a roadway that 
14 property and to help. And if the pipes weren't 114 goes on farther south from Westside Highway and up 
15 running he said that we could separate the main .115 and crosses Twin Lakes Canal at a different 
16 line and go up. j 16 crossing onto the property. Are you familiar with 
17 Q. Now, let me see if I can get a feel ! 17 that roarlway? 
18 for where this pipeline crosses the road. r need ! 18 A. I don't believe tbere was any road 
19 to back up a little bit There are three roads - j19 there in 1990. 
20 I just -want to identify the roads SO we know what I 20 Q. Okay_ When was that put in? 
21 road we're talking about There are three roads 121 MR BROWN: If I can interject briefly, in 
22 that at one point or another could be used to 122 your characterization of the Rice roadway you 
23 access your property. And when I say your 123 referred to it as a right-of-way, 
24 property, unless I say differently. I mean any of ! 24 l\1R. A TKJN: I understand. It's a deeded 
25 the properties, the Povey property, the Cox i 25 roadway. 
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1 MR. BROWN: There's actually a warranty 1 pieces that the Deans own now? 
2 deed containing a legal description.. It is a 2 Q. Correct. Or I believe that's correct. 
3 roadway, but for clarity I don't want an 3 A Yes, I'm fiuniliar then. 
4 implication that it's an easement or 4 Q. Okay. And identified in exhibit Mis 
5 right-of-way. 5 segment A of the original access road. If I 
6 MR. ATKJN: I understand. It was a trade 6 understand it, this red line is a part of that 
7 of property. I appreciate that clarification. 7 oorthem roadway that we've descn"bed? 
8 Jl Conrect 8 Q. (BY MR. ATKIN) Apparently it was in 
9 about 1998 that that was established, or do you 9 Q. And that would continue on up the 
10 know when it was established? 10 mountain to the bridge across Twin Lakes Canal? 
11 A. I do not. 11 A. Correct 
12 Q. At some point, and I think I've got an 12 Q. And it's not shown on exhibit ~ but 
13 exhibit here. Ok:ay. It looks like it was 1998 
14 that the properties were exchanged. between your 
15 parents and the Rices. Does that sound about 
13 currently the middle roadway goes basically along 
14 the southern edge of the Viehweg property to the 
15 point where it converges with the northern 
16 right? 16 roadway? 
17 A. If that's what the title says, yes. 17 A. Correct. 
18 Q. Exhibit I to the second amended 18 Q. Okay. Now, on this exhibit M show me 
19 complaint is the deed by 'WIDell your parents 
20 transferred a 30-acre strip to the Rices. And 
19 v",here this main line crossed the roadway? 
20 A. It's up here, not on the exhibit 
21 then exln"bit - . 121 Q. Okay. So it's up beyond this exhibit? 
-22 MR. BROWN: Just fur the record, 30 feet, I 22 A. Correct. 
23 believe. 23 Q. Beyond the convergence of the two 
24 MR. ATKIN: Yes. A 30-fuotwide strip to 24 roads now? 
. '" .. . 
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1 30-foot strip that is now referred to as the Rice 1 Q. Okay. Was it just one line that\vent 
2 roadway_ Does that sound accurate? 2 across the road? 
3 A. What's your question? 3 A. One portable main line. 
4 Q. Are you familiar with that Rice 4 Q. One portable main line. And did it 
5 roadway? 5 run in a north-south direction or how did it nm? 
6 A. Yes. 6 A. My directions are poor? but rd say 
7 Q. Okay. And ifI refer to it as the 7 north southerly. South to north. 
8 Rice roadway you'll know what fm talking about? 8 Q. From the Westside Highway to the canal 
9 A I do now. 9 is basically a westerly direction.. 
10 Q. Okay. Now,thepipelinesthatare 10 A The highway runs west? 
11 described in exhibit A, are those sprinkler pipe 11 Q. No, the bigb\Vay runs north-south. 
12 that "\iVere - portable sprinkler pipe that ::from 12 A So the main line would run 
13 time to time were placed across the main line? 13 north-south, basically. 
14 A. Portable main line. 14 Q. And its purpose was to - where did it 
15 Q. A portable main line? 15 take water from and deliver it to? 
16 A. Yes. 16 A It took 'Water from the Twin Lakes 
17 Q. Okay_ And let me see if I can find a 17 Canal and delivered Vvater to two fields. 
18 map oftbat. Let's look at exhibit M that is 18 Q. TImt were south of the road? 
19 attached to the second amended complaint. The 19 A That are v.rest of the canaL 
20 some orientation, it descnbeS a Povey tract 2 and 20 Q. West of the canal? 
21 a Povey tract I; a Viehweg .property tract 1 and a 21 A No, east of the canal. Yeah. east of 
22 Viehweg property tract 2. Are you generally 22 the canal. And one was on the - north of the 
23 fumiliar with the property enough to know what 23 right-of-way road and one south of the 
24 this is referring to? 24 right-of-way road. That's why it crossed the 
25 A Just to cIarl1Y. are these the two I 25 road.. 
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1 A No. 1 30-foot roadway ends, and it continues south to 
2 Q. Why not? 2 what is the Rice gravel pit, correct? 
3 A Because I wasn't involved in hauling 3 A Correct. 
4 gravel at that time. 4 Q. Okay. And do you have any 
5 Q. Okay. 5 understanding as to what the Rices planned to do 
6 A I didn't own a truck and I didn't - I 6 with that 3D-foot wide strip of property? 
7 used 1he other road to access. 7 A Extend the gravel pit. I don't know. 
8 Q. Okay. So the gravel that was being 8 Q. You're not aware that 1he Rices wanted 
9 hauled, was that not out of your gravel pit? 9 to acquire that property so that they could access 
10 A- rt Vias out of my pit. I loaded it and 10 their gravel pit through that direction? 
11 sold it 11 A. No, rm not aware of that 
12 Q. Okay. You loaded it and sold it, hut 12 Q. Okay. In order to cross Twin Lakes -
13 people had to use their 0~'TI truck? 13 at the time your father and your mother did this 
14 A Correct. 14 transaction to acquire the Rice roadway, there was 
15 Q. All right Would you, if you had had 15 not a crossing of Twin Lakes Canal at the west 
16 a gravel truck. have used that road? 16 ends of that roadway, was there? 
17 A No. 17 A No. 
18 MR. BROWN: rll ol:Yect that: it calls for 18 Q. Okay. And in order to cross Twin 
19 speculation. 19 Lakes Canal, your father would have had to 
20 MR. ATKIN: It does. I-was trying to 20 negotiate an agreement with the Twin Lakes Canal 
21 :figure out a way of as1cing it o1herwise. 21 Company to do that? 
22 Q. (BY MR.. ATKIN) So at the time you 22 A. I don't know. I wasn't involved. 
23 didn't have any reason to object because you 23 Q. Okay_ You had no involvement in the 
24 didn't have any gravel trucks? 24 discussions with the Twin Lakes Canal Company? 
25 A Correct 25 A It:was a done d~l befure I fulmd out 
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1 Q. You didn't tell your bro1her not to 1 Q. Are you aware that in order to get 
2 use the new alternate road? 2 Twin Lakes to agree to allow the crossing at the 
3 A. No. 3 Rice roildway. your futher had agreed with Twin 
4 Q. The roadway that's been referred to as 4 Lakes to allow 1hem to remove the crossing on what 
5 the Rice roadway came about as the result of an 5 is referred to as the northern roadway? 
6 exchange between your parents and Ted Rice; is 6 A. That came up once and he adamantly 
7 that right? 7 carne down and we almost sued the canal company 
8 A. I believe so. 8 over it. 
9 Q. Were you involved in any of those 9 Q. Okay. Tell me what you know about 
10 negotiations? 10 that. Well, you were not involved in the original 
11 A. No, sir. 11 negotiations thatresulted in the installation of 
12 Q. Were you involved in 1he creation of 12 the crossing at 1he Rice right-of-way? 
13 the roadway on 1he Rice parcel? 13 A. Correct 
14 A. No, sir. 14 Q. You don't have any knowledge of that? 
15 Q. If you'll look at what is marlred as 15 A. No knowledge. 
16 exhibit B6 to the second amended compIamt, it 16 Q. Okay. Tell me what you know about his 
17 shows the 30-foot vvide access road acquired from 17 agreement or discussions with Twin Lakes Canal 
18 the Rices in red. Do you see that? 18 about removing the CfOSsillg at the northern 
19 A. Yes, sir. 19 roadway. 
20 Q. And you're :fumiliar with the property 20 A. All I know is I was driving do~ the 
21 enough to know that that's an accurate depiction? 21 highway one day and I looked up there and they 
22 A Yes, sir. 22 were tearing out the bridge. I turned around and 
23 Q. And the property that was exchanged 23 went back. 
24 for that roadway is a 3D-fuot wide strip that goes 24 Q. When you say they, do you know who the 
25 from the west side ofT win Lakes Canal 'Where the 25 they were? 
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1 Q. \Vha1 do you mean when you say you 
2 don't have adequate access? You have a right of 
3 access to your property, that section 34 property, 
4 today, don't you? 
5 MR BROV1.N: Are you referring to the fuet 
6 that there's a stipulation entered that allows 
7 him to use it during the pendency of the action? 
8 MR. MCFARLAND: I'm asking ifhe 
9 understands he has a right of access to his 
10 property right now. 
11 THE WITNESS: As I understand it now, 
12 they're saying that I have no right-of-way 
13 through Neigum, Viehweg or Dean at any place, is 
14 how I understand it. 
15 Q. (BYMR..MCFARLAND) Well, we haven't 
16 mentioned at all the Rice road, so maybe we should 
17 talk a moment about that You have the right of 
1B access to your property from the Westside Highvvay 
19 via the Rice road? You have a Jegal right to 
20 cross the Rice road, to cross the Povey property, 
21 as we've referred to it, to get onto your 
22 property. don't you? 
23 A. Because (}fthooe deeds that I found 
24 out about today. probably. But I can't get up 
25 there jn the :winter 
1 Q. I'd like to refer to the second 
2 amended complaint. Pve got a copy here. I don't 
! 3 know that we need to introduce thls into the ! 4 record since we've already referred to it multiple 
I 5 times in the deposition. It is, of course, part 
6 of the court record. 
7 At the very begimring of this 
i 8 deposition.. almost the first question, Mr. Atkin 
I 9 asked you about the verification and you testified 
110 that you bad read this second amended complaint 
! 11 and it was true to the best of your knowledge at 
112 the time; is that right? 
i 13 A Correct ,
114 Q. And you did read this before you I 15 signed it, right? 
i 16 A. Yes. Ifs been some time ago. 
117 Q. Sure. Recognizing that time has 
118 elapsed" you believed it was accurate at the time? 
119 A Correct ! 
\20 Q. Okay. rm banding you Mr. Gamer, 
j 21 . that second amended complaint I'm referring YOll 
'22 to parilgraph 13. I'd like you to read the first 
I 23 full body of that paragraph. You don't need to 
. i 24 read the legal description, but read that into the 125 record and thtm just exphrin what property we're 
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1 Q. So there may be some physical problems 
2 to access? 
3 A. Yea.h. That access is not available in 
4 the winter. 
5 Q. At least not after you drive across 
6 after the first snow fall? 
7 A. Correct 
8 Q. And drawing from yaur testimony' 
9 earlier, and your mother's testimony yesterday, 
lO there may he some physical problems to your 
11 access, but you have a legal right to go from the 
12 Westside Highway to your property? Nobody can 
13 legally stop you :from doing that if you're 
14 physically able to do it? 
15 A. That was news to me today. Like I 
16 said, I didn't know those existed. 
17 Q. Now that you've talked to your 
18 attomey-
19 A. I have taIked to biro. I assume that 
20 with that it's okay. 
21 Q. Through the course of the deposition 
22 today you've come to understand that you do have a 
23 right - you have some ownership interest in the 
24 Rice right-of-way? 
25 A Correct. 
I 1 talking about. I 2 A.. By warranty deed fr(}m Edwanl Rice and I 3 Helen S. Rice, the Rices, as grantors to Gaty T. 
, 4 Gamer and Nola S. Gamers as grantees, Gary and I 5 Nola. recorded on November 3nl1998. as 
l 6 instrument number 204046, records of Franklin I i 7 County, Idaho, the following described property 
i 8 for use as an access road, including as the prime . 
'
I 109 purpose to haul extnicted gravel in the non-winny 
! months, it was not usable in the wintry moDtbs. 
111 Q. Is that paragraph referring to this i 12 Rice road that we've talked about repeatedly 
113 today? 114 A. Yes. 
! 15 Q. That's my understanding too. I wanted 
j16 to confirm that I was right. I'd like now for you 
! 17 to skip dovm. and read paragraph number 14. ! 18 A. Gary died on December 1st, 2005. The 119 property of Gary and Nola involved in this case 
120 was distributed:from the estate of Gary with an 
i 21 undivided 65 percent interest to Nola and Daniel 
j22 received 35 percent from the estate distribution 
t 23 and by exchanges with his siblings. 
124 Q. I'm going to stop you there. I should 
I 
i 25 have warned you I would do that. Those first few 
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1 . lines of paragraph 14, that is stating that after 
2 your father's death you received a 35 percent 
3 interest in ali of the property referenced in this 
4 lawsuit, is that what that is saying? 
5 A No. 
6 Q. What is that saying? 
7 A That's saying that I received 35 
8 percent - as I understand it, that I received a 
9 35 percent interest in the property referenced in 10 this lawsuit, except the Rice road because it's a 
11 lower percentage, as I understand from reading 
12 those two deeds. 
13 Q. Well, you're understanding comes from 
14 the deed, but the complaint doesn't actually say 
15 you have something less than 35 percent in the 
16 Rice Road; is that right? 
17 A rmlost 
18 Q. If you're not sure that's okay. 
19 A. fm not sure. 
20 MR. BROWN: Ifwe can go off the record 
21 again I think I could point him in the right 
22 direction to help more clearly answer the 
23 question. 
24 MR. MCFARLAND: Let's do that in a second.. 
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1 from. 
2 Q. (BY MR. MCFARLAND) 1£1 told you, Mr. 
3 Garner. that yesterday your mother testified that 
4 you bad approximately a 44.796 percent interest in 
5 the Cox property, the Povey property, and the Rice 
6 road, would you have any reason to disagree or 
7 disbelieve that? 
8 A. I'll be right honest, we went to the 
9 estate. And befure 'We went there I infonned my 
10 parents that it was their property, or I mean my 
11 mother, that it \VaS their property and they can do 
12 what they wanted with it. Yes, I was there j but I 
13 didn't really listen to percentages and whatnot. 
14 I felt like it '\\laS their's to give where they 
15 wanted. 
16 Q. SO you're not sure as you sit here 
V today what percentage of property your mother 
18 caused you to receive at any time? 
19 A. Correct. I'mjust relying on whatever 
20 the document says I have. I haven't seen any, you 
21 know - I don't receive something that says this 
22 is what you've got 
23 Q. But you do agree that you have some 
24 proportionate interest in the Rice right-of-way? 
25 A. Yes. 
1 Q . Or the Rice road? 
2 A- Yes. 
3 Q. Okay. Because you have a 
4 proportionate interest in ownership to the Rice 
s road, you llave a legal right to use the Rice road? 
I 6 A. I hope so. 
I 7 Q. You believe that you have the legal a right to use the road? I 9 A Yes. 
110 Q. Is there anyone - given that we've 11 established iliat you have some ownership interest 
112 in that road" is there anyone who has a legal /13 right to stop you from using that road? 
114 A. I don't know how that works.. If 
1
15 someone bas a higher percentage do they have 
li6 control? I mean -
17 Q. That's a :filir question.. Tbafs 
18 something you can talk: to your lav.ryer about Has 
19 anyone med to stop you from using the Rice road 
20 at anytime? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Okay. You have in filet accessed your 
2J section 34 property by crossing over the Rice road 
24 and through the Povey property. have you not? 
? 
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1 Q. This section 34 property here. 
2 A No. 
3 Q. You have in fact accessed your gravel 
4 pit, the triangle area in section 27, by the Rice 
5 road? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Okay. And you have a legal right to 
8 go from your section 27 gravel pit to your section 
9 34 property. do you not? 
10 A. 1bere's not a road, but, yeah. 
11 Q. VOU have the legal right and nobody 
12 can stop you from going to your section 27 
13 property to your section 34 property? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q. SO you have access to your property. 
16 It may not be the one that you want, but you have 
17 legal access to your property, right? You have a 
18 legal right to access your property via the Rice 
19 road, right? 
20 A I vvould say yes, but not adequate. 
21 Q. Not one that - maybe not your choice 
22 access, but you have a legal right? 
1
23 A Yes.. 
24 Q. Okay. Did you talk to your mother 
25 between the time she finished her deposition 
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MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
AFFIDAVITS OF HENRY POVEY AND 
DANIEL S. GARNER 
Case No. CV-08-342 
Judge Dunn 
Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey respectfully move the Court for an order striking the 
affidavits of Daniel S. Garner and Henry Pavey on the grounds that the statements made in the 
affidavits would not be admissible at the trial of this matter and should therefore. under rule 
56( e) be stricken. This motion is supported by the memor~dum filed in support hereof. 
Dated this 29th day of September, 2009. 
ATKIN LAW OFFICS, p.e 
Blake S. Atkin 
Attorney for the Pavey Defendants 
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Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Gamer 
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon e. 
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey 1. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigurn, as Trustees 
of the Jeffery 1. Neigum and Kathleen A 
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 
17, 2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. 
Neigurn, husband and wife; Brad Pavey and 
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First 
American Title Insurance Company, a 
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
AFFIDAVITS OF HENRY POVEY AND 
DANIEL S. GARNER 
Case No. CV-08-342 
Judge Dunn 
Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby submit 
this memorandum in support of their Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Henry Povey and Daniel 
S. Gamer. 
INTRODUCTION 
Witness testimony provided through affidavits is subject to the same competency 
standards as witness testimony presented in trial. KolIn v. Saint Luke's Regional Medical 
Center, 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997). A person must be competent to be allowed to 
offer testimony. It is elementary that a lay person may riot testify about a matter of which he has 
no personal knowledge. See, Rule 602 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The competency 
standard for affidavits is summarized in Rule 56( e) in which it states that "affidavits shall be 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. See, 
Rule 56( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Affidavits may not be based on hearsay or contain any other matter that would not be 
admissible at triaL State v. Shama Resources. Ltd., 127 Idaho 267, 271, 899 P. 2d 977, 981 
(1995). In addition, "a non-moving party may not create an issue of fact for summary judgment 
purposes by means of an affidavit contradicting that party's prior deposition testimony." Addisu 
v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1138 n.6 (9th Cir. 2000)(internaI citation omitted)(emphasis 
added). The hvo affidavits submitted by the Plaintiffs in opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment do not meet these requirements and should therefore be stricken. 
I. THE AFF,IDA VIT OF HENRY POVEY HAS NO FOUNDATION. 
Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit of Henry Povey dated September 22, 2009, in which the 
2 
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only foundation laid is that he is over eighteen years of age and that approximately fifteen years 
ago he participated in a joint fanning operation with his father Leonard Povey and brother Brad 
Povey, during which time they farmed land adjacent to the access road to the Garner property 
lying west of Twin Lakes canal. 
1be affidavit, with only this foundation, then states that there are two photographs from 
which he can identifY the access roadway "as it previously existed" and the area where the access 
roadway used to be but has clearly been damaged or farmed over in some manner. The affidavit 
does not answer the question "previous to what or when." Likewise, the affidavit does not 
purport to identifY when the photographs were taken or what they depict. Without this 
information it is impossible to tell whether the knowledge of Henry Povey has any relevance to 
the issues in this case. Surely action on something that occurred fifteen years ago has long since 
been barred by the statute oflimitations. 
II. THE AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL S. GARNER LACKS FOUNDATION FOR 
TIlE ASSERTIONS MADE THEREIN AND CONTAINS STATEMENTS 
THAT ARE INADMISSIBLE IN TmS CASE. 
A. DANIEL S. GARNER'S TESTIMONY ABOUT A TERM OF A 
CONTRACT OF SALE THAT DID NOT SURVIVE THE DRAFTING 
OF THE DEED IS INADMISSIBLE. 
In Paragraph 3 of his affidavit, Daniel S. Gamer attempts to testifY about an easement he 
claims to have purchased when he purchased a forty-acre parcel of real estate from Mr. and Mrs. 
McCulloch. Curiously, the affidavit does not attach the documents supporting this important 
assertion. The reason that the documents are not attached is because, while there may have been 
negotiations for the purchase of an easement, the final deed transferring the property to Daniel S. 
Garner does not contain any mention of an easement. See, Copy of May 22, 1987 Warranty 
Deed, attached hereto as Exillbit A. Therefore, this claim of easement by purchase is barred by 
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the doctrine of merger. Estes v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82, 85, 967 Pold 284, 187 (1998)("When a 
deed is delivered and accepted as perfonnance of the contract to convey, the contract is merged 
in the deed. Though the tenns of the deed may vary from those contained in the contract, the 
deed alone must be looked to to determine the rights of the parties .... \Vhere the right claimed 
under the contract would vary, change, or alter the agreement in the deed itself, or inheres in the 
very subject-matter with which the deeq deals, a prior contract covering the same subject-matter 
cannot be shown as against the provisions of the deed )(Emphasis in original)(intemal citations 
omitted). It is important for the Court to strictly apply the doctrine of merger in this case 
because it does not appear that the failure to include any easement language in the deed was 
inadvertent. 
The Garners, when they were negotiating the purchase of the property from the 
McCulloch's did not want the easement to pass in front of the house with small childrell, but 
wanted it moved to a more suitable location: 
Q. Okay. You said that when you bought -- when Danny bought his parcel from 
the McCullochs, that you and your husband, and I'm not sure I understood, but was it 
Gary that gave him advice about paying some money for a right-of-way across the 
McCulloch's property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And he told him to pay for a right-of-way across the property so that 
you won't have future complaints about the use of the right-of-way? 
A. That's basically what I l.mderstood. 
Q. Okay. And you said that you had tried to get the McCullochs to move the 
right-of way, do you recall that? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And did you have an idea of where you wanted them to move the right-of-way 
to? 
A. It didn't matter where they moved it. We just couldn't imagine them wanting 
us to go past their house. 
Q. Okay. So it wouldn't have mattered where? 
A. No. 
See, June 2, 2009, Deposition of Nola Garner, pg. 215, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
The parties therefore did not include language in the deed that would describe the 
easement as "along an existing roadway." See, Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment at page 7. 
Furthermore, because the Garners' claim against the Poveys is that the Poveys interfered 
with what they knew were the Garners rights in the easement, the merger doctrine would prevent 
the Garners from being able to argue that the 'Poveys knew about a11 easement that is nowhere 
mentioned in the deeds recorded by the Garners. 
F or all these reasons, the merger doctrine will prevent any mention of the contract of sale 
and its language concerning an easement that never found its way into the deeds. Because this 
evidence ""ill be inadmissible at trial, it should be stricken from the affidavit of Daniel S. Gamer 
and not considered by this Court on the motion for summary judgment. 
B. DANIEL S. GARNER'S ASSERTIONS ABOUT THE KNOWLEDGE 
OF THE POVEY'S CONCERNING HIS SUPPOSED EASEMENT IS 
WITHOUT FOUNDATION. 
In Paragraph 4 of his affidavit, Daniel S. Garner states that from 1990 until the 
commencement of this actio~ the Poveys have "known of my interest in the original access 
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road." There is not one stick of foundation to support this assertion. Particularly in light of the 
merger doctrine that will prevent Daniel S. Gamer from trying to prove at trial that he had a 
purchased easement, there is no admissible evidence that the Poveys knew of Daniel S. Garner's 
interest in the original access road. Therefore, Paragraph 4 must be stricken. 
Likewise, Paragraph 5 is without foundation. In Paragraph 5, Daniel S. Gamer states that 
for a period of time between 1990 and 1992, the Poveys accessed property they owned lying 
west of the Twin Lakes Canal via the original access road. There is no affirmative sho~IDg in 
the affidavit that Mr. Garner has personal knowledge of the way the Poveys accessed their 
property. Paragraph 5 must be stricken. 
C. DANIEL S. GARNER'S ASSERTION THAT THE ORIGINAL 
ACCESS ROAD IS 30 FEET WIDE LACKS FOUNDATION AND 
CONFLICTS WITH IDS DEPOSITION TESTIMONY. 
In Paragraphs 6 and 9 of his affidavit, Daniel S. Garner takes the position that the original 
access road is thirty feed wide, but there is no fowldation to support tins assertion that is contrary 
to his deposition testimony. It is clear from the deposition testimony that along most of its 
length, the original access road is two tire tracks on the ground. 
Q. All right. Now the roadway, I've seen some pictures of it as it currently exists. It 
appears to be a two-track road like a typical farm road, with two tire tracks going down the road. 
Is that how it was when you purchased the property? 
A. No. 
Q. How was it when you purchased tile property? 
A More of traveled. 
Q. More traveled? 
A Vh-huh. 
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Q. Describe it to me. 
A. Not two tracks. You got to remember that McCullochs ran a dairy and the milk 
truck was picking up milk every other day, I assume. 
Q. Okay. So down closer to Westside Highway is--
A. Up to the hay bam is "Was used. And cattle above that that he fed. Like I said, it 
was a dairy operation with corrals. 
Q. SO up to the hay bam it wasn't a two-track road? 
A. Correct. 
Q. How about beyond that? 
A. Beyond that itwas a two-track road, like what you would see in the picture, or the 
exhibit. 
See, June 3,2009, Deposition of Daniel S. Gamer, pp. 24 - 25, attached hereto as Exhibit 
c. 
That hardly adds up to thirty feet. Moreover, when he was questioned about the widest 
piece of machinery that he took up the road, Mr. Gamer testified that it was less than 20 feet 
wide. See, June 3, 2009, Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, pg. 98, attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
And, that would have to be the case, because the posts that Mr. Garner put in for the gate going 
across the canal are only 19 feet, 7 inches in width. See, Affidavit of Brad Povey in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
The Court can take judicial notice that a gravel truck cannot exceed nine feet in width. 
Furthennore, the assertion of the Plaintiffs is that the right to use the original access road arises 
by purchase. Therefore, the detennination of the width of that access road would need to be 
established by proof of the use to which the Garner's predecessor in title put to the property. The 
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Poveys never used the access road in any way that required more than the twenty feet reserved to 
Daniel Gamer in the replacement road. See, Affidavit of Bmd Povey in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, attached hereto as Exhibit D. Therefore, there is no foundation for Daniel 
S. Gamer's claim that the original access road was thirty feet in width and Pamgraphs 6 and 9 
must be stricken. 
D. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PREVENTS PROOF OF A 
PLOWING THAT OCCURRED IN THE EARLY NINETIES AND IN 
SPRING 2005. 
Plaintiffs, in their response to Summary Judgment, appear to be arguing that they are 
entitled to damages for their "plowing" claim, making it some form of trespass claim. The 
statute of limitations on a trespass claim is three years. Idaho Code § 5-218(2). The complaint 
in this matter was filed on September 17, 2008. Therefore, the actions complained of would 
have to have occurred after September 17, 2005, to be actionable. Obviously, a claim arising 
from a plowing that occurred in the early nineties would be barred by the statute of limitations as 
would such a claim that occurred in the spring of 2005, so that evidence on such a claim would 
not be admissible. Moreover, in order to be actionable there would need to be some proof that 
the plowing was done by the Poveys. There is none. This lack of evidence probably stems from 
the fact that Gary Garner who was in charge of the Garner farming opemtion in that area did not 
think it was a big enough deal to even say anything to the Poveys about it. 
Q. Okay. When did the plowing occur? 
A. Early nineties, late eighties. 
Q. Okay. While the Poveys still O\VIled the property? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And again, you didn't see the plowing occurring, but you got stuck in it as you 
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tried to drive through it? 
A. Correct. It was done and I went up to access my property and got stuck. 
Q. Okay, do you know who did the plowing? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever talk to anyone about the ploVvipg on the road? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who did you talk to? 
A. My father. 
Q. What did you say to your father? 
A. He came and pulled me out. He told me -- I wanted to go -- I was quite upset. He 
calmed me down and told me not to worry about it. Once the field was planted it would be 
accessible again. That was the end of it. 
Q. Okay. So did you talk to anyone else about it? 
A. No. 
Q. SO your father considered it not a big deal, wasn't that big of a deal, you shouldn't 
get upset about it? 
A. I don't know what he considered sir. 
Q. Okay. Fair enough. He told you don't worry about it, the field will be planted 
and once it's planted you'll be able to access the property again? 
A. That's what he told me. 
See, June 3, 2009, Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, pp. 62 - 63, attached hereto as Exhibit 
C. 
Paragraph 7 should be stricken. 
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E. DANIEL S. GARNER'S STATEMENT THAT HE "NEVER" AGREED 
TO ACQUIRE OR USE THE "RICE ROAD" IS CONTRARY TO HIS 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE 
STRICKEN. 
In Paragraph 11, Daniel S. Gamer states that he "never" agreed to acquire or use the 
"Rice road." In fairness to Mr. Garner, it appears that he may have amended an original version 
of his affidavit since the sentence as now written states that he "never" agreed "at the time it was 
"negotiated and acquired." In ally event, in his deposition, Mr. Garner admitted that he is an 
owner of the Rice Road and that he does use it to access his property west ofT'NID Lakes canal. 
Q. (BY MR. ATKIN) So, Daniel now knowing that you Ov\-TI an undivided interest in 
the Rice roadway, does that change your view as to whether you have the legal right to use the 
Rice roadway? 
A. It makes me feel a lot better. 
Q. You understand that being an undivided owner of a portion of that property, that 
you have the right to use that roadway? 
A. Yes. 
See. June 3, 2009, Deposition of Daniel S. Gamer, pg. 124, attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
F. THERE IS NO FOUNDATION FOR THE ASSERTION THAT THE 
RICE ROAD DOES NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE, SAFE ACCESS TO 
THE GARNERS' PROPERTY IN THE WINTER MONTHS. 
In the second Paragraph 11 of Daniel S. Gamer's affidavit, in conclusory fashion, Mr. 
Gamer states that "the Rice road does not provide adequate, safe access to the Garners' property 
in the winter months." In order for a vvitness to make such a statement at trial it would be 
necessary for him to explain the basis for that conclusion and how he knows it. The affidavit of 
Daniel S. Garner is devoid of any such foundation; therefore, the second Paragraph 11 must be 
stricken. 
10 
G. DANIEL S. GARNER CANNOT PROVIDE THE AUTHENTICATION 
FOR THE AERIAL PHOTOS ATTACHED TO HIS AFFIDAVIT. 
Plaintiffs attempt to authenticate the aerial photos attached to his affidavit falls short of 
the mark Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 902, requires authentication of a public document by a 
certificate under seal. The documents attached to the Garner affidavit fail in that regard and 
must therefore be stricken. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the affidavits of Henry Povey and Daniel S. Garner should be 
stricken. 
DATED tIus 29th day of September, 2009. 
ATKIN LAW OFFICS, P.C 
Blake S. Atkin 
Attorneyfor the Povey Defondants 
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method of delivery designated: 
Gordon S. Thatcher 
Thatcher, Beard, S1. Clair, Gaffney 
116 S. Center 
P.O. Box216 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Eric Olsen 
Racine, Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello. Idaho 83204-1391 
Ryan McFarland 
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Franklin County Court 
39 West Oneida 
Preston, Idaho 83263 
_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery X Fax 
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1 Q."What is it? 
2 A They said they would testify fur lL"-
3 Q. Who did? 
4 A Hank and Melanie. 
5 Q. Okay_ They told you that they -would 
6 testify - okay_ I understand that might have 
7 added to your reasons for not naming them as 
8 parties. My question is, your breach of'Vvammty 
9 claim against Brad and Leiza Povey -
10 A. That's to the right-of-way. 
11 Q. The beach of the warranty. When they 
12 sold the property to you by warranty deed you're 
13 claiming that they breached that warranty, right? 
l4 A. (WitneSs nodded her bead.) 
15 Q. I'm just trying to understand that. 
16 What is your claim 1bat they breached the 
17 wa:mmty? You said befure that Brad and Leiza 
18 sold theproperty to the Deans, the Viehwegs and 
19 the Neigums.. It's a simple question. 
20 A Well-
21 Q. Does your breach of the warranty claim 
22 arise out oftbe sale by Brad and Leiza to the 
23 Deans, the Neigums and the Viehwegs? 
24 A. I think it does. For me I no longer 
; 
i ! 1 A I believe that's correct 
f 2 Q. Okay. You said that when you 
i 3 bought when Danny bought his parcel from the 
4 McCullochs, that you and your husband. and rm not 
5 sure I understood" but was it Gruy that gave biro 
6 advice about paying some money fur a right-of-way 
7 across the McCullochs' property? 
! B A Yes.. i 
I 9 Q. Okay. And he told him to pay for a 
\ 10 right-of-way across the property so that you won't 
111 have future complaints about the use of the 
112 right-of-way? 
i 13 A That's basically what I understood. 
i 14 Q. Okay. And you said that you bad tried I is to get the McCullocbs to move the right-of-way, do 
!I6 you recall that? 
117 A Yes. 
! 18 Q. And did you have an idea of v.here you 
119 'Wanted them to move the right-of-way to? 
120 A 'It didn't matter where they moved it. 
l 21 We just couldn't imagine them wanting us to go 
! 22 past their house. ' 
123 Q. Okay. So it wouldn't have mattered 
124 -where? 
l25 A No. 25 have a right-of-way through there 
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1 Q. Okay. Let me ask you this. You don't j 1 Q. It could have followed basically 1he 
2 thinIc that Hank and Melanie did anything that I 2 route ofwhat's DDWthe Neigum driveway and that . 
3 breached their warranty to you? That you bad ! 3 would be okay? . 
4 whatever rights you had to the property fuey sold I 4 A That would be okay. 
5 you; is that correct? I 5 Q. Okay. So basically what you're 
6 A I believe because they didn't - they 6 talking about isn't necessarily the route ofilie 
7 no longer owned it. 7 northern roadway, but some roadway through the 
8 Q. Okay. So as of the time - you're not 8 McCulloch property? 
9 claiming that any of the Foveys, Brad and Leiza or I 9 A Just some place, yes. 
10 Hank and Melanie, did anything to breach their J 10 MR. ATKIN: Okay. That's all I've got 
11 warnmty to you until after they sold the property III THE WITNESS: That wasn't bad at alL 
12 to yOU; is that correct? 112 .MR BROWN: I have a rew questions. 
13 A I don't think that they have done 113 EXAMINATION 
14 anything deliberately to hurt, tbeyjustneglected !14 BYMRBROWN: 
15 to take care. Does that answer the question? i 15 Q. Nola, I want to go back and c1a.rifY a 
16 Q. I think so. I'm just tying to \16 couple of parts on the record with respect to some 
17 understand how they neglected. They neglected to ! 17 of the questions the attorneys have asked you 
18 take care of your interests in the deeds that they /18 today. 
19 gave to the Deans and the Viehwegs and the 119 Going back to some questions asked by 
20 Neigums, is that 'What you're saying? i 20 Mr. Atkin. he asked you questions about why the 
21 A That's righL 121 Deans were upset I believe that you testified 
22 Q. And since Hank and Melanie weren't 122 that they were upset about the existence of a 
23 parties to those deeds that went to the Deans, the I 23 right-of-way going in front of their home and they 
24 Neigums and the Viehwegs, you don't have any 124 didn't know about it until after they'd purchased 
25 breach of warranty claim against them? I 25 the property; is that right? 
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1 Q. And those were fields that \'Iere being 
2 farmed by the McCullochs? 
1 gravel and then from there on up it was a dirt 
2 roadway? 
3 A Correct. 
4 Q. And later by the Poveys? 
5 A Correct. 
6 Q. And ifwe look at exhibit M again. 
7 would the Viehweg tract 1 and Viehweg tract 2 be 
8 part of those fields that were being watered using 
9 that main line? 
10 A I would assume. 
11 Q. Okay. And then there were -
12 A There were other tracts. 
13 Q. More fields that were also watered? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q. So when you brought your property from 
16 the McCullochs and you talked to them about this 
17 access road, you understood that they were fanning 
18 on both sides of the road? 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q. And that tills was an access road that 
21 went tmough an operational farm? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q. And that there would be the normal 
24 kind offimning activities with regard to the 
25 road, both sides of the road? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Okay. What was the condition of the 
5 road at the time that you purchased your property? 
6 A It was a good gravel road up past -
7 shortly past the hay bam that's there on the 
8 Neigum piece. 
I 9 Q. Is the hay barn still there? 110 A Yes. In Q. Okay. So ifwe went out there we 
112 could see where that is? 
h3 A Y ! es. 
i 14 ;L. I Q.o.1'>.ay. 
i 15 A And then from there on up there was 
116 gravel On the road but just not enough to support 
117 like a big tanker truck or a milk truck. But to 
118 the bam it was able to support large vehicles. 
! 19 Q. And 1hen from there on up it was more 
120 of a typical funn dirt road? 
121 A With gravel spread, but not as thick. 
I 22 Not as good as base. 
123 Q. Okay. Now, was that gravel that had. 
124 been spread on the road - or I understand that 125 that area is kiDd ofa gravelly area anyway Was 
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1 A. Correct. I 1 it gravel that had been put there or was it just 
2 Q. Okay. And from time to time that ! 2 nann-al gravel? 
3 would interfere ~ith your ability to access the I 3 A. It was my understanding that the 
4 property? .1 4 McCullochs would every now and then spread a 
5 A. What would interfere? i 5 little gravel with. a from-end loader. 
6 Q. The pipeline? I 6 Q. You never saw them do that? 
7 k The pipeline, when it was pumping, was ,I, 7 A. Just Scott McCulloch referred to it 
8 running, it would interfere. Other than that it 8 once. 
9 wouldn't. j 9 Q. And Scott is? 
10 Q. Let me ask you this. Were there times 110 A. Ralph and Thelma's hoy. 
11 when the watering made the roadway wet? III Q. All right. Now, the roadway, rve 
12 k Wet! 112 seen some pictmes ofn as it currently exists. 
13 Q. Yeah. Did they water - i 13 It appears to be a two-track: roadIike a typical 
14 A 1'\__ i 14 
• JJ<l.LllP, yes. I farm road, with two tire tracks going down the 
15 Q. Did that make the roadway difficult to 115 road. Is that how it was when you purchased the 
16 navigate? What effect did that have on the use of 116 property? 
17 the road? .! 17 A No. 
18 A. You could still navigate it., it was 118 Q. How was it ""Den you purchased the 
19 just slippery. 119 property? 
20 Q. All right. Now, this roadway, the i 20 A More of traveled. 
21 northern roadway, at the time you bought the 121 Q. More traVeled? 
22 property was it - as I understand it there was j 22 A Uh-huh. 
23 gravel on the roadway from about Westside Highway t 23 Q. Describe it to me. 
24 up to some point, probably on exhibit M here it 124 A Not two tracks. You got to remember 
25 would have passed the two Povey tracts. It was ! 25 that McCullochs ran a dairy and the milk truck was 
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1 picking up milk every other day, I assume. I 1 see that that gate there is not adequate and rYe 2 Q. Okay. So down closer to Westside I 2 talked with my mother about it. It's been bit two 
3 Higbwayis- I 3 or three times. 
4 A Up to the hay bam is was used. And ! 4 Q. Okay. 5 cattle above that t:bat he fed Like I said, it i 5 A It's not on the hinges 3lljIDore. f 
6 was a dairy operation with corrals. I 6 Q. It was not me. rve not driven that 7 Q. SO up to the hay bam it wasn't a 7 road. 
8 two-track road? I 8 A. m remember that. 
9 A Correct. I 9 Q. Again, rm not going to mark this as 
10 Q. How about beyond that'? 110 an exhibit, but I have a copy if you need to look 
11 A Beyond that it was a two-track. road, 11 at it of the second amended complaint in this 
12 like what you would see in the picture, or the 12 matter. At the tend of the second amended 
13 exlu"biL 13 complaint there is 'What's called a verification. 
14 Q. Okay. And I understand that currently 14 Do you wderstand what that is? 
15 1here is a gate at the end of the road where - 15 A. I believe that to be me signing to say 
16 jUst before it crosses Twin Lakes Canal? 16 that what's in the complaint is accurate to the 
17 A Correct. 17 best of my knowledge. 
18 Q. You installed that gate? is Q- Okay_ 
19 A. Yes, I did. 19 A Is thai what it is? 
20 Q. When did you install that gate? 20 Q. That's fair enough. And that is your 
21 A Ob, how close do I need to be? 21 signatt:rre on page 32 of the second amended 
22 Q. 'The best of your recollection is all 22 complaint? 
23 we can ask. 23 A. Correct 
24 A Roughly two years after Neigums 24 Q. Did you read the second amended 
25 pm:c.based ! 25 complaint hPjbre ¥OJ) signed ii'? 
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1 Q. And what was your reason in installing 1 A. Correct. 
2 the gate? 2 Q. And the information contained in the 
3 A The gate that was across there had 3 second amended complaint was true and accurate to 
4 been destroyed. 4 the best of your knowledge? 
5 Q_ SO there had been a gate - was there 5 A Correct. 
6 a gate >Vhen you bought the property? 6 Q. Now let me talk to you about this 
7 A Yes. 7 middle road, that is also referred to as the 
8 Q. And it had been destroyed? 8 Neigum driveway. At the time you purchased the 
9 A. Yes. 9 property what was the condition of thai road? Was 
10 Q. Do you know how it was destroyed? 10 it also a gravel road? 
11 A. It was barbed wire gate and had just 11 A. There was no road there. 
12 been- 12 Q. Okay. 
13 Q. Deteriorating over the years? 13 A. It was a field. 
14 A. Yeah. 14 Q. I've seen - at least there was a 
15 Q_ \Vhe.p you installed 1he new gate - how 15 roadway in that same area that went up into the 
16 wide is the new gate you installed? 16 field and ultimately converged with the northern 
17 A ~ the new gates were two 12-£oot 17 roadway, although it may not have taken the same 
18 gates that my mother purchased. They overlap a 18 course that the Neigum driveway now takes. Do you 
19 little. My rough guess would be 20 to 21 :fuet. 19 recall that? 
20 Q. The gate that you replaced,. how wide 20 A. Can you show me on a picture? 
21 was it? 21 Q. rm not sure I have a picture that 
22 A. Ob, it would have been 25, 26 fueL 22 shows that. Let me ask you, based on your 
23 Q. It "WaS wider than the gate you 23 recollection. do you recall there being a roadway 
24 :replaced it with? 24 to the south of what -
25 A. Correct If you go up there you'll 25 A. At the time that I purchased it? 
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1 A. Right. 1 A My futher. 
2 Q. Okay. Now, there is an allegation in 2 Q. \Vbat did you say to your father? 
3 the complaint in this matter that the Poveys at 3 A He came and pulled me out. He told 
4 SOme point plowed the roadway. You're familiar 4 me - I wanted to go -- I was quite upset He 
5 with that allegation? 5 calmed me doVlll and told me noi to worry about it. 
6 A Yes. 6 Once 1he field was planted it ,vould be accessible 
7 Q. What do you know about that? Did you 7 agai:rL That was the end of it .. 
8 see the Poveys plowing the roadway? 8 Q. Okay. So did you talk: to anyone else 
9 A. Which time? , 9 about it? 
10 Q. Well, was there more than one time \10 A. No. 
11 that the roadway was plowed? i 11 Q. So your father considered it not a big 
12 A. Plowed, tilled. ! 12 deal, wasn't that big of a deal, you shouldn't get 
13 Q. Well, maybe you can help me out The 113 upset about it? 
14 allegation in the complaint is that the roadway i 14 A I don't know what he considere~ sir. 
15 was plowed. Was the roadway ever plo'Wed? \15 Q. Okay. Fair enough. He told you don't 
16 A. Yes, sir. 'I 16 worry about it, the field will be planted and once 
17 Q. Do you know what a plow is? i 17 it's planted you'll be able to access the property 
18 A Y . !,118 "C) es, SlI. agarD. 
19 Q. Okay. %at kind of plow was used to 119 A That's what he told me. 
20 plow the road? i 20 Q. Okay. I guess the field was 
21 A. A three bottom. ! 21 eventually planted? 
22 Q. Anddidyouseetheroadvvaybeing 122 A Yes. 
23 plowed? 123 Q. And after that you were able to access 
24 A No. ! 24 your property again? 
25 Q How do yuu know it Vlf'aS plowed by a ; 25 A Yes 
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1 three bottom plow? 
2 A. I know what a plowed field looks like, 
4 Q. SO you saw the roadway after it bad 
5 been plowed? 
6 A. I got stuck in it" sir. 
7 Q. You got stuck in it with what? 
8 A. A green GMC pickup. 
9 Q. Okay. When did the plovving occur? 
10 A. Early nineties, late eighties. 
11 Q. Okay. While the Poveys still owned 
12 the property? 
13 A. Correct 
14 Q. And again, you didn't see the plowing 
15 occurring, but you got stuck in it as you tried to 
16 drive through it? 
17 A. Correct. It was done and I went up to 
18 access my property and got stuck. 
19 Q. Okay. Do you know who did the 
20 plo\.ving? 
21 A No. 
22 Q. Did you ever talk to anyone about the 
23 plowing on the road? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q. Who did you talk to? 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
1 Q. Did you talk to anyone else about that 
2 plowing incident? 
3 A No. 
4 Q. And the roadway was reestablished 
5 after the planting occurred? 
6 A Correct. 
7 Q. Now, this plowing didn't occur along 
8 the full length of the roadway? 
I 9 . A. No. 
110 Q. About how much of the roadway was 
III plowed? 
! 1.2 A.Hi:nm, from the hay bam np. 
113 Q. All the way up to the canal? 
114 A. Yes. 
115 Q. And as I lIDderstand it, at that 1ime 
1 16 the ground on both sides oftb.e roadway was being 
; 17 fanned? 
j 18 A Correct. i 19 Q. And when the field vvas planted do you 
120 know what it was planted with? 121 A I don't. I went back to college, or 
1 22 wherever I went 
123 Q. So this was \Aririle you were still in 
124 college? 
I 25 A Early nineties, late eighties, yes, 
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11 implements through? 
I 2 A Correct. I 3 Q. Any other implements that you used up I 4 there that are - I guess you said the widest one 
j 5 was the disk? 
1. A Tilled it up. 
2 Q. Okay. Did you plant anything in it? 
3 A We were going to and decided to plant 
4 grass instead of grain. 
S Q. Okay. But you did plant grass? 
Page 99 
I 6 A. That vvould be the widest one. 
iii 7 Q. And it's a 20-:root offset, but you 
8 don't know exactly how 'Wide that is? I 9 A It would be less. 
6 A We did plant grass. 
7 Q. Okay. So what kind of - fur 
8 harvesting the hay you used a swather? 
9 A Co~t. 
1
10 Q. Okay. By how much? 
11 A I dou't know. 
10 Q. Whatkindofswatherdidyouhave? 
11 A A Hesston. 
12 Q. How wide was that swather? 12 Q. Do you still own that implement? 
13 A The cutting bar was 14. 13 A Yes. 
14 Q. I think I knowtbat swather. 14 Q. So we could inspect it and measure it 
15 A You do know that swather. 15 ifwe need to? 
16 Q. And then a baler? 16 A. Yes. 
17 A A baler. 17 Q. I'd request permission to be able to 
18 Q. Is that a small baler or what kind of 18 dothat 
19 baler was it? 19 MR.. BROWN: Okay. 
20 A A small one. 20 Q. (BY MR. ATKIN) Now, what kind ofuses 
21 Q. That's before you did ton bales? 21 have you put the road to? Let's talk about the 
22 A Correct 22 north road first. You've driven tractors up 
23 Q. And so width wise fue widest implement 23 theie? 
24 you were using was the 14-footsvvatlrer? 24 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. \\!hat was wider than that? 1 the implements that we've described? 
2 A. The disk. 2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Ob.. So when you plowed it up to plant 3 Q_ Taken a backhoe up there and hauled 
4 grass? 4 hay? 
5 A. Correct. 5 A Yes. 
6 Q. How wide was tba:I:? 6 Q. You've hauled cattle up the road in a 
7 A A 20-foot disk. 7 trailer hooked behind your pickup? 
8 Q. Does it have wings on it? S A. Yes. 
g A. No. 9 Q. Did you ever haul any cattle up there 
10 Q. It's 20 foot 'Without any wings? 10 . in a semi trailer? 
11 A. It's what they classifY as a 20 foot 11 A Cattle. 110. 
12 offSet. 12 Q. Have you ever hauled anything in a 
13 Q. All right. So is it 20 .feet wide or 13 semi trailer. 
14 lessthan20feetwide? 14 A. Yes. 
15 A The way they run an o:ffSet is you turn 15 Q."What have you hauled? 
16 the~ SO it would be less. 16 A. Feed hunks. 
17 Q. When you're pulling it down the road 17 Q. And you used the north road to do 
18 to get to the field, how wide is it? 18 that? 
19 A. rve never measured it. 19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. What roadway did you use to access 20 Q. When did you do that? 
21 your property using those implement.';? 21 A. After Neigums had purchased but before 
22 A The northerly road. 22 they built 
23 Q. Thenorthroad? 23 Q. Okay. Any other uses you've made of 
24 A Yes. 24 the north road? 
25 Q. And it was wide enough to get those 25 A. Yes. 
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1 . didn't sign it 
2 Q. Was there a place fur you to sign that 
3 deed? 
4 A Not on the deed. I don't believe. But 
5 on the other paper there was. 
6 Q. How do you know it was the Neigum 
7 deed? Did you read the Neigum deed at that point? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q. SO he showed you what - was this 
10 before or after the deed had been executed? 
11 A Now that I don't know. 
12 Q. Had it been signed by Brad at that 
13 point? 
14 A I don't know. I didn't look. 
15 Q. All right. How do you know it W3S the 
16 Neigum deed? 
17 A The fust part of it, of the deed, 
18 said-
19 Q. -Named file Neigut1lB? 
20 A Correct 
21 Q. Did youknowtheNeigums at that point 
22 intime? 
23 A.. No. And then shortly after that Steve 
24 Fuller called and told me that the paper 'WaS ready 
Page 122 
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1 the deposition both my client and I represented 
2 it was our belief that Daniel Garner does not 
3 own - does not have an o\Vnership mterest in the 
4 Rice road. rYe since had the opportunity to 
5 review same deeds -which caused me to need to 
6 correct the statement that we earlier made. It 
7 does appear, based on the deeds, that Daniel does 
8 have a small, less than five percent, fractional 
9 interest in the Rice roadway as the result of 
10 gift deeds that were given to him by the Nola 
11 trust. 
12 MR. ATKIN: Why don't we mark those deed..<;., 
13 uyou have copies. 
14 MR BROWN: Thafs fine. And these were 
II· 15 provided to counsel as part of the supplement to 
16 our discovery response.. 
17 MR. ATKIN: Are you okaywithmarldngthe 
18 copy that you have there? 
19 :MR. BROWN: That's fine, yes. 
20 MR.. SMITH: For the record, can you read 
21 the instrument number as well? 
22 MR.. BROWN: Yes. The fust instrument 
23 number is 238036. And that relates to the 
24 comments I just made, it conveys a 2.449 percent 
Page 124 
1 it. We14 bis secretary called, I should say. 1 the deed, which is the Rice roadway. 
2 from his office. 2 The second instrument is number 
3 Q. Okay. Any other conversations on the 3 243758, likewise conveying a 2.449 percent 
4 subject of putting together in writing a 4 interest in parcel eight, wbich is the Rice 
5 description of the right-of-way across what Wcl!? 5 roadway. 
6 then the Povey property? 6 MR. ATKlN: Let's mark those as exhibits 7 
7 A Not that I recall. 7 and 8. 
8 Q. Okay. While the Poveys owned the· 8 (Exhibits 7 and 8 marked) 
9 property VIas there ever a time when they tried to 9 Q. (BY 1v1R. ATKIN) So, Daniel now knowing 
10 interfere with your use of any of the roadways 10 that you own an undivided interest in the Rice 
11 going to your property? 11 roadway, does that change your view as to whether 
12 A Other than the ones we've discussed? 12 you have the legal right to use the Rice roadway? 
13 Q. The plowing and the planting? 13 A It makes me feel a lot better. 
14 A tJh...huh. 14 Q. You understand that being an undivided 
15 Q. Other than those two instances., 15 owner of a portion of that property, that you have 
16 there's nothing else? 16 the right to use that roadway? 
17 A. Correct 17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And even on those two events. nobody 18 MR. ATKIN: Okay. That's all I bave. 
19 ever told you that that was done to try to prevent 19 MR. SMITI:I: Is anyone interested in having 
20 you from using the roadway, correct? 20 lunch before we go on? 
21 A Correct. 21 MR. MCFARLAND: I'm happy to woik through 
22 MR.. ATKIN: Let's take a:few minutes. I 22 if we're going to go with Mrs. Gamer still. 
23 might be finished. 23 MR. ATKIN: Maybe we'll take a lunch break 
24 (Recess.) 24 as we trade witnesses while she's coming. 
25 MR.. BROWN: For the record, previously in 25 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
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husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and 
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Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
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Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. 
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees 
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A 
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17, 2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF BRAD POVEY IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. CV -08-342 
Judge Dunn 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
SS: 
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN ) 
Brad Povey, having been first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein. 
2. On September 25, 2009, I went to the bridge where the right-of-way in question in 
this case crosses the Twin Lakes Canal. I measured the posts for the gates that Daniel 
Gamer testified that he installed on the Gamer side of the canal. The distance 
between the two posts is 19 feet 7 inches. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a photograph that I took of the posts on that day. The 
photograph accurately reflects the location of the posts. 
4. I also measured the distance between the grain bins on the south side of the old access 
road and the line of the fence that used to border the access road on the north. That 
distance is 22 feet. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a photograph that I took on that day. The photograph 
accurately reflects the grain bins and the line of the fence that existed along the north 
of the road. 
6. While we owned the property on the west side of Twin Lakes Canal we never used it 
for any purpose that would have required more than a normal nine foot right of way. 
DATED this.d!2 day of September, 2009. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me this~ day of September, 2009. 
&~h>~) 
Notary P lie 
-
-
My Commission expires: /tJ-/(/rl.:2., 
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correct copy of AFFIDA VIT OF BRAD POVEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT upon the following by the method of delivery designated: 
Gordon S. Thatcher 
Thatcher, Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney 
116 S. Center 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Eric Olsen 
Racine, Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Ryan McFarland 
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Franklin County Court 
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DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO 
Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Garner, 
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow; 
and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola 
Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife; Douglas K.. Viehweg and Sharon 
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and KatbleenA. Neigum, as 
Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and 
Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust, 
dated September 17 2004; Jeffery J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband 
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey, 
husband and wife; First American Title 
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title 
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of 
Authority; and First American Title 
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-342 
REPLY TO POVEYS' 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
The plaintiffs (collectively the Garners), through counsel of record, Thatcher Beard St. 
Clair Gaffney Attorneys, respectfully reply to the defendant Poveys' memorandum in opposition 
Rl:J)iy to Povcys' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint - Page I 
10-02-09;04:27PM; 
to motion for leave to amend second amended complaint. This reply brief is supported by the 
pleadings already filed in this action and the second affidavit of Michael W. Brown, filed 
concurrently with this brief 
INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this litigation is on an easement that Garners claim over property formerly 
owned by the defendants, the Poveys, and now owned by the defendants, the Deans, Neigums, 
and Viehwegs. At the time the Garners moved to amend their second am~nded complaint, they 
were in the process of finalizing a settlement agreement with the Deans, Neigums, and 
Viehwegs. The Garners have now formally settled their claims against the Deans, Neigums, 
Viehwegs, and both First American entities, and a stipulation for dismissal of those claims is 
forthcoming. In connection with settlement of those claims, the Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs 
assigned all causes of action they have against the Poveys, including those asserted in their 
motion to amend their second amended complaint. The court should grant the Garners' motion. 
ARGUMENT 
The Poveys ask this Court to exercise its discretion to deny the Garners' motion for leave 
to amend their second amended complaint. Defs.' Brief at 2, 5. However, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has clearly articulated the standard for granting leave to amend a complaint. 
Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend "shall be freely given where justice so 
requires"; this mandate is to be heeded. if the underlying facts or circumstances 
relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of.relief, he ought to be 
afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any 
apparent or declared reason--such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on 
the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the 
allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.~-the leave sought should, 
as the rules require, "be freely given." Of course, the grant or denial of an 
opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright 
refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is 
not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent 
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with the spirit of the Federal Rules. 
Idaho Sch.for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. ofEduc., 128 Idaho 276, 284,912 
P.2d 644, 652 (1996). The circumstances underlying the claims the Garners seek to assert justify 
this Court's granting leave to the Garners to amend their complaint. 
I. The Garners have not sought to create undue delay in bringing their assigned 
claims. 
Based on fuis standard applicable to motions for leave to amend a complaint, this Court 
should grant the Garners' motion. The Garners negotiated with and gave consideration to the 
Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs for their claims against the Poveys. The Garners are not guilty 
of undue delay, bad faith, or some other dilatory motive because they only formally acquired 
ownership of the causes of action they now seek to assert yesterday, October 1,2009. Second 
Aff. Michael W. Brown ~ 7. It could not possibly be argued that the Garners sought to delay 
asserting these claims. 
II. The Garners have made a tolorablc claim for breath of warranty as owners of the 
claims assigned by Neigums and Viehwegs. 
The Poveys appear to argue they could not have breached the warranty they made when 
conveying property to the Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs because they never had a duty to 
protect the Garners' easement in the conveying instrument. Defs.' Bnef at 4. Although the 
Garners have argued the Poveys did have a duty to protect the Garners' easement elsewhere in 
this litigation, the analysis is somewhat different with respect to the claims of the Neigums and 
Viehwegs. Here, the question is not whether the Poveys owed a duty to the Garners, but 
whether the Poveys owed a duty to the Neigums and Viehwegs. It is clear the Poveys did owe a 
duty to convey title to the Neigums and Viehwegs free from encumbrances, for in the warranty 
deeds in which the Poveys conveyed real property to those parties the Poveys expressly stated 
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that the properties were free of all encumbrances. Second Aff. Michael W. Brown ~~ 10 and 11. 
"The general effect of a covenant of warranty is that the grantor agrees to compensate the grantee 
for any loss which the grantee may sustam by reason of a failure of the title which the deed 
purports to convey, or by reason of an encumbrance on the title." Powell on Real Property § 
81A.06[2)[d)[i] (citing R. Natelson, Modem Law of Deeds to Real Property § 12.7 (Little, 
Brown 1992)). The Neigums, and Viehwegs sustained loss by reason of an encumbrance on the 
titles they received from the Poveys. Each of those parties.was sued by the Garners, who 
asserted their interest in their easement, which was an encumbrance on the titles given to the 
Neigums, and the Viehwegs. Because the Garners have resolved their claims against the Deans, 
Neigums, and Viehwegs, the court will not have occasion to rule on those claims. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the Deans, Neigums, Viehwegs, and the title company settled the claims brought by 
the Garners is instructive when considering whether the Garners' claimed easement was 
meritorious in the first instance. 
The Poveys appear to concede the possibility that the Garners' easement existed when the 
Poveys conveyed to the Deans, Neigums. and Viehwegs. According to the Poveys, "To the 
extent that the right of way exists absent any recording of it, then the purchasers (Deans, 
Neigums, and Viehwegs) had just as much knowledge as the Povey Defendants since the 'access 
road' is as visible on the ground today as it was when the Povey Defendants bought the 
property." See Defs.' Brief at 4. This statement overlooks the fact that the Poveys had 
significant independent knowledge of the Garners' interest in the right of way. This knowledge 
was plainly exhibited when Brad Povey approached Daniel Garner and asked him to relinquish 
his right in the right of way. Aff. Daniel S. Garner' 8. 
Just as this Court found that the Garners had made a colorable claim as to breach of 
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warranty against the Poveys, the Garners, as the owners of the claims assigned by the Neigums, 
and Viehwegs, have now shown the ability to make at least a colorable claim of breach of 
warranty against the Poveys. In the interest of justice, the court should pennit the amendment of 
the complaint so that the Garners, as owners of the claims assigned by the Neigums and 
Viehwegs, may add their assigned claims of breach of warranty. See Second Aff. Michael W. 
Brown ~ 13. 
m. The Court should permit the Garners to amend their complaint to assert fraud if 
the Garners discover facts supporting a fraud claim. 
As indicated previously, the Garners have been in the process of negotiating settlement 
with the Deans, Neigums, Viehwegs, and the title company Second Aff. Michael W. Brown ~ 4. 
Although the parties have executed a settlement agreement, ~ese defendants have not yet been 
dismissed from the case. Second Aff. Michael W. Brown,. 6. Due to the fact that the Deans, 
Neigums, and Viehwegs will be represented by counsel until their dismissal from this matter is 
complete, counsel for the Garners has been unable to interview these defendants for purposes of 
gathering factual infonnation that would further strengthen the fraud claim alluded to in the 
Garners' motion for leave to amend their second amended complaint. Second Aff. Michael W. 
Brown ~ 12. For these reasons, and in view of the requirement to plead fraud with particularity, 
the Garners proposed third amended complaint does not include an allegation of fraud against the 
Poveys. Nevertheless, the Garners reserve the right to amend their complaint to assert fraud, if, 
upon interviewing the Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs, facts supporting such a claim come to 
light If such facts are discovered, this Court should permit the Garners to amend their complaint 
to assert fraud. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should grant the Garners' motion to amend their 
complaint as it is attached to the Second Affidavit of Michael W. Brown. 
Date: October 2, 2009 
~b6~ 
Michael W. Brown 
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
Reply to Povcys' Memornndum in Opposition 10 Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint - Page 6 
510 
10-02-09;04:27PM; 
CERTRIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho, I 11ave my office in Rexburg, 
Idaho, and on October 2,2009, I served a true and correct copy of Reply to Poveys' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint upon 
the following by the method of delivery designated: 
Eric Olsen Ig U.S. Mail Ig Hand-delivered £acsimile 
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Ryan McFarland 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Fax: (208) 342-3829 
Blake S. Atkin 
837 South 500 West 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Fax: (801) 533-0380 
Franklin County Courthouse 
39W. Oneida 
Preston, ID 83263 
Fax: (208) 852-2926 
Judge Stephen S. Dunn 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624E. CenterIP.O. Box 4126 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Fax: (208) 236-7012 
III U.S. Mail Ii:llHand-delivered ~acSimile 
IQj U.S. Mail I!dJ Hand-delivered ~Simile 
III U.S. Mail ~and-de1ivered IQJ Facsimile 
ICll U.S. Mail lEJJ Hand-delivered ~acsimile 
~M~ 
Michael W. Brown 
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffuey, Attorneys 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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1effrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
Michael W. Brown, ISB No. 8017 
343 E. 4th N. Suite 223 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg,ID 83440 
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Fax: (208) 359-5888 
jeff@beardstclair.com 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO 
Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner, 
husband and wife; Nola Garner, a widow; 
and Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola 
Garner Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon 
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey 1. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as 
Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and 
KathleenA. Neigum Revocable Trust, 
dated September 172004; Jeffery J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband 
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey, 
husband and wife; First American Title 
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title 
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of 
Authority; and First American Title 
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-342 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL W. 
BROWN 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
55. 
County of Madison 
I, Michael W. Brown, having first been sworn, depose and state: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen, am competent to testify and do so from personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am an attorney at Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffuey P A, counsel of record for 
Plaintiffs, Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner, husband and wife, Nola Garner, a widow; and 
Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007. 
3. On April 30, 2009, co-counsel Jeffrey Brunson and I met with Eric L. Olsen, 
counsel for Deans, Viehwegs and Neigums to explore the possibility of reaching settlement of 
our clients' claims. 
4. Since that time, we have sought to settle the matter between Garners and 
Defendants Deans, Viehwegs, Neigums and First American Title Insurance Company with due 
diligence. 
5. On October 1,2009, I received notice from counsel for the Deans, Neigums, and 
Viehwegs and counsel for the First American Title Company entities in this action that those 
defendants had executed a settlement agreement with the Garners. 
6. A stipulation to dismiss the claims against the parties identified in ~5 above has 
been circulated to and signed by counsel for those defendants. I am awaiting the original signed 
pages of the stipulation. Upon receipt of those pages, I intend to file the same with this Court. 
7. On October 1,2009, I received via e-mail from counsel for the Deans, Neigums, 
and Viehwegs scanned images ofan Assignment. of Causes of Action. Copies of these executed 
instruments are attached as Exhibit A. 
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8. The Assignment of Causes of Action contains a scriviner's error. It identifies 
Instrument No. 208652. That Instrument No. should instead be 231826. My knowledge of this 
error is based on my preparation of that instrument and on my discussions with counsel for the 
Viehwegs. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a correct copy ofInstrument Number 207408, 
which is a Warranty Deed from Brad & Leiza Povey to defendants, Hal J Dean and Marlene T. 
Dean. As part of the settlement agreement between the parties, all right, title and interest in the 
causes of actions of Deans against Poveys associated with this property in this cause of action 
were assigned to the Garners. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a correct copy of Instrument Number 212784, 
which is a Corrected Warranty Deed from Brad & Leiza Povey to defendants, Jeffery J. Neigum 
and Kathellen A. Neigum. As part of the settlement agreement between the parties, all right, title 
and interest in the causes of actions ofNeibums against Poveys associated with this property in 
this cause of action were assigned to the Garners. 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a correct copy of Instrument Number 231836, 
which is a Warranty Deed from Brad & Leiza Povey to defendants, Douglas K. Viehweg and 
Sharon C. Viehweg. As part of the settlement agreement between the parties, all right, title and 
interest in the causes of actions ofViehwegs against Poveys associated with this property in this 
cause of action were assigned to the Garners. 
12. Because the Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs will be represented by counsel in this 
matter until the stipulation for dismissal is filed, I have been unable to interview them to obtain 
all factual information relevant to the claims they assigned to the Garners. 
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13. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is the proposed Third Amended Complaint which 
includes breach of warranty claims assigned to the Garners by the Neigums and Viehwegs. 
Dated: October 2,2009. 
~MBr.---
Michael W. Brown 
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for Plantiffs 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on October 2.2009. 
~~, 
Notary Public for State ofIdaho 
Residing at Rigby 
My Commission Expires: 7-27-2013 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho, I have my office in Rexburg, 
Idaho, and on October 2, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
MICHAEL W. BROWN upon the following by the method of delivery designated: 
Eric Olsen lbD U.S. Mail IbIJ Hand-delivered ~acsimile 
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Ryan McFarland 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Fax: (208) 342-3829 
Blake S. Atkin 
837 South 500 West 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, ur 84010 
Fax: (801) 533-0380 
Franklin County Courthouse 
39 W. Oneida 
Preston, ID 83263 
Fax: (208) 852-2926 
Judge Stephen S. Dunn 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center/P.O. Box 4126 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Fax: (208) 236-7012 
Michael W. Brown 
/Qj U.S. Mail /Qj Hand-delivered ~acsimile 
IOJ U.S. Mail IbIJ Hand-delivered ~acsimile 
IQJ U.S. Mail ~and-delivered Ig Facsimile 
IDJ U.S. Mail C Hand-delivered ~acsimile 
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney, Attorneys 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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Assignment of Causes of Action 
For valuable consideration, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, Hal J. Dean and 
Marlene T. Dean, husband and wife~ Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and 
wife; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigmn, husband and wife, Jeffrey 1. Neigurn and 
Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable 
Trust, dated September 17th 2004 (collectively "Assignor") hereby transfer and assign to Daniel 
S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Gamer, husband and wife; Nola Garner, a widow; a:l1d Nola Gamer as 
Trustee of the Nola Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007, (collectively HAssignee") all of 
Assignor's right, title, and interest in and to all causes of action (determined and undetermined) 
agaiIlSt Brad Povey and Lezia Pavey, husband and wife, (poveys) including, but not limited to, 
all causes of action arising from all transactions and events associated with. the Poveys' 
conveyance to Assignor (or eny member of that class) of real property idelltified in Instrument 
Nos. 207408,208652, and 2127&4 ofllie records of Franklin County, Idaho. 
This assignment is intended to convey to Assignee all of Assignor's right, title. and interest in the 
assigned causes of action. Additionally. Assignee acquires the full power to prosecute, 
compromise, settle, reassign, and give a release in full settlement of the causes of action. 
Assignor agrees to take all reasonably necessary actions to assist Assignee in its prosecution of 
the assigned causes of action. 
This Assignment shall be binding on and shall inure to the benefit of the respective heirs, 
devisees, legatees, executors, admiuistrators~ trustees, successors, and assigns of the parties to 
this Assignment 
This Assignment shall be governed by and cOlistrued ill accordance with the laws of the state of 
Idaho. 
Date: September Z ~ ,2009. 
t:U:s Id 
--Hal 1. Dean 
~-x.~ 
Mar ene T. Dean 
Douglas K. Viehweg 
Sharon C. Viehweg 
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Assignment of Causes of Action 
For valuable consideration, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, Hal J. Dean and 
Marlene T. Dean, husband and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and 
wife; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband and wife~ Jeffrey J. Neigum and 
Kathleen A. Neigum. as Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable 
Trust, dated September 171h 2004 (collectively "Assignor") hereby transfer and assign to Daniel 
S. Garner and Sherri-lo Gamer, husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow; and Nola Gamer as 
Trustee of the Nola Garner Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, (collectively ~'Assignee") all of 
Assignor's right, title, and interest in and to all causes of action (determined and undetermined) 
against Brad Povey and Leria Povey, husband and wife, (Poveys) including, but not limited to, 
aU causes of action arising from all transactions and events associated with the Poveys' 
conveyance to Assignor (or any member of that class) of real property identified in Instrument 
Nos. 207408, 208652, and 212784 of the records of Franklin County, Idaho. 
This assignment is intended to convey to Assignee all of Assignor's right, title, and interest in the 
assigned causes of action. Additionally, Assignee acquires the full power to prosecute, 
compromise, settle, reassign, and give a release in full settlement of the causes of action. 
Assignor agrees to take all reasonably necessary actions to assist Assignee in its prosecutiori of 
the assigned causes of action. 
This Assignment shall be binding on and shall inure to the benefit of the respective heirs. 
devisees, legatees, executors, administrators, trustees, successors, and assigns of the parties to 
this Assignment. 
This Assignment shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the state of 
Idaho. 
Datc: September ~, 2009. 
HaIJ. Dean 
Sharon C. Viehweg 
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Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum Living Trust 
.' ; I. "'. ""'I!l ,,-
c/:>::Jtut2c JJ /,.L, :c:~-, "L-0 J 
Kathleen A. Neigum, Trustl(e 
Acknowledgment 
Assignment of Causes of Action - Pa.ge 2 
10-02-09;04:29PM; 
STATE OF IDAHO 
SS. 
County of Fru.V\ tl r ~ 
On September, 2009, befure rM,();,rJ..r;. ~n-fud, all Idaho notary public, persooally 
appeared Hal J. Dean and Marlene¥. Dean, hus and and wife, knO'WIl or identified to me to be 
the persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that 
they executed the same. In witness, I have set my hand and affixed my official seal the day al1d 
year in this certificate first above written. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Cotmty of 
~ 
IO··22-Z.0/~ 
Acknowledgment 
S8. 
On September, 2009, before me, , an Idaho notary public, personally 
appeared Douglas K.. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and 'wife, known or identified 
to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged 
to me that they executed the same. In witness, I have set my hand and affixed my official seal 
the day and year in this certificate flrst above written. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at 
My Commission expires: 
Assignment of Causes of Action - Page 3 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
County of 
On September, 2009, before me, t an Idaho notary public, personally 
appeared Hal ]. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband and wife, known or identified to me to be 
the persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that 
they executed the same. In witness, I have set my hand and affixed my official seal the day and 
year in this certificate first above written. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: 
My Commission expires: 
Acknowledgment 
,();JP 
STATE OF nil fH I ~a.(\<;,~ ~ 
ss. 
County of Je)h.n ~~ pu-) J 
On September, 2009, before me, R.±nCilA I Adede./, an ~ri.'c~otary!:5 public, personaUy 
appeared Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and wife, known or identified 
to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged 
to me that they executed the same. In witness, J have set my hand and affixed my official seal 
the day and year in this certificate fll'st above written. 
~~ Notary Publi~a.nss~ 
Residing at: 0..; er1a.ntl PMk-
My Commission expires: '1-17 ./o? 
~ NOTARV PUBLIC· State (If Kansas PATRICIAJ. ACKERlEY My Appl expIres q -IJ ., I '3 
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Atknowledgment 
STATE OF IDAHO 
SS. 
County of F~Y"\ "'-Lv-:-
~'g~ 
On September~ 2009, before me, ~ +bOyjcYo an Idaho notary public, personally 
appeared Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen . Neigum, husband and wife, knovvn or identified to 
me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the within inst:rum.ent, and acknowledged to 
me that they executed the same. In witness, I have set my hand and a..ffixed my official seal the 
day and year in this certificate first above ,vritten. 
Notary Publi 0 
Residing at: Y"C::~::A'C5Yl :r:d.o..no 
My Commission expires: <of ( <.0, a<::Jl '-J 
MARY HINRICHS 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Trustee Acknowledgment 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
County of Fro.. \'\~ 
On this~day of September, 2009, before me,f\..!a.Y\H ±bn'('\ili, a Notary Public in 
and for said State, personally appeared Jeffery J. Neigum an Kathleen A. Neigum, known to me 
to be persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument as the Trustees of the Jeffrey 
J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum Living Trust, and acknowledged to me that they executed 
the same as such Trustees. 
MARY HINRICHS 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
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207408 
WARRANTY DEED' 
For value Received BIa:l L Pr:Nr!f and ~ PflJf!I husbend iIIld wife 
Hereinafter called 1he rnn1cf. hereby g~. bargains, sells erd ~ unlll 
Hal J. Dean ard MatIene T. Daan huSband and wile, 
wt105'e sdtfre5s is: 60S SaIttl MBIn St. Cfilla1. Id 63ZZ8 
Aecorded at the requ9at of 
'F\ts.t I\ .... ,,.\c.~ ... i~\t.. c.. 
1<.: 15 
-10m. ,6.UG 301999 ---p.m. 
Herelnattar called h! GranI.De. 1he foIla.Wlg dasa1bed ptamI!;es s/!ua1ed In F'1Mkli'I Count!. 10. ID-wI!: 
T O'MIShlp 14 Sooll\, Range 3S East or fie Boise MeIidIan. FIl.V\~ Colr1t!. IdaIlo 
Section 27: Beginning eta poi1t946.2S feel West IiII1C1 Soutt 0"C6 East419.10feetfn:m!he Nor1heasta:mer-of1he SE114 of5llk!Sedicn 
'D. and I\II'Ining IhtlnCa East 185 feet, Il'ICII'a 01-. 10 Iha West Gne of HigI'wvay righldway; 1henc:e Sou!h 11'11' Eastalcng thi!I west ~t of 
way line 01 HIgtT.vay 150.5 fee!. mcntcrless.to1h6 SouIh line of an ~ rightofw"y:1hence West 195 fee!. morecriess.lDa pclnt 164.5 
feet Soutt of ~ POINT OF BEGINNING; Iherce Na1h 164.5 feei b Ihe POINT O~ BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO all ~ts.lIghtofYr.tjS. mwnanIs, msVlc:IIons, reservatlcnJ.uppli:::3ble building and ~ ~ and use 
regulallc:ns and restndons of reccrU. and payment of aa:nJing pesent yes Ialces Inl assessments as agTe(!!CS to ~ paIIles atx7.oo. 
TO HAVE ANOTO HOL01he said premIses.lMtllhelr~ untolhe &aid G!antI!e and to rho GrMIee's hen and 
assIgnlI~. Nd Iha S<Ii:f Grantcrdoes I"'eIeby l'XlII9nant to ard 1MtIlh8 sakj Gm(lIee.1t1atht Grana" !he cwnernfee simple ofS<li;i 
penises; !hat said prM1Ises are free fn:m all ena.rnI:Irances 1!lCepla.rrent)en tDle5.lEMes. end assessments, and ~ U. s.. Palent 
reseMltIons. ~ easement!J d record, end easements llisible upon Iha~. ard!hat GtantorYdlwarr:antand dl!fend Iho same 
fn:melldafmg~. 
Dated: ~'ZJ. 1999 
~~ 6rcdL Pt:foJet 
SfATEOFIOAHO ) 
COUNTY OF FRANKUN ) 
i( 
w; 
On ~is 2'" day of AuguS, 1999, before mG. a NoIaIy Public In and for SQJd Slate. personalIy~ 6RAO L POVEY ERf 
LSZA POVEY, kni:1Ml1O me III be the pasons v.flO5a names !lie 5U~ k) Ihev.ill1il i'IsIn.JrnelIt. and ~
to me 1hat!hey executed 1he S<me. In 1M1ness~ I have eetmy hand fIJ'ld al'ftxod my oIIIc:iaI seallha day ard year 
intm~Iitst~wrten. ~ ~~~~:£/~j--~~~~----­
Notarytlblie  
Residing at: Swan Lake, Id 
Comm. expires: 5/25/2000 
#- 121 49 
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2-1.2784 V') ~CaOtl;Scd 0.' \h~ ~t1Utst of 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
.. ~-- . _n ......... _ ..... __ ~ 
-t:!.t'i'l. APR n.5 2001 ~,::,zo~.r.t 
CORRECTED WARRANTY DEEli), E i 1I:~n' ~:";f:,'!;." ::::(',' :. ~." 
_ .. '- J. .~._. _ ........ ~ 
... 1/ -ie"":" 
""""'.' 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED 
FRANKl/f! ';Q')t.-lTy' IDt !.:r:-: • 
BRAD L. POVEY and LEIZA POVEY, husband and wife, 
do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto 
JEFFERY J. NEIGUM and KATHLEEN A. NEJ:GtrM, husband and wife, 
whose current address is: 202 Pony Ct., Pope Valley, CA 94567, 
the Grantees, the following described premises in Franklin County, 
Idaho to wit: 
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A" 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances 
unto the Grantee, his heirs and assigns forever. And the said 
Grantors do hereby covenant to and with the said Grantees, that 
they are the owners in fee simple of said premises; that they are 
free from all encumbrances and that they will warrant and defend 
the Same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
DATED: 8t&v-lt Aj #:21; I 
J ' 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Franklin ) 
on th1s.iz£.:~~ay of ~ , 2001. before me, the undersigned a Notary 
Public in and for said State, personally appeared BRAD L. POVEY and LZIZA POVEY, 
known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument and 
acknowledged to me that chey executed the same. 
¢~~I~~\ ~~~ ~It} ~..... ~ NOTARY PUBLIC for State of Idaho W +0." E Residing at: Preston. Idah.~ __ !!I~I!I!~_' .. ". ,0 0; Comm. Exp.: 2/19/05 EXHIBIT ~\~v :z:~ "... e~~ } "-~..., o~ ......... .5 
~ STA.~ \\\" ~ ""',,, . .,.. ,,'\' ---"-~---
10-02-09;04:29PM; 
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:: .' 
t:./ ' 
WARRANTY DEED 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED 
BRAD L. POVEY and 'LEIZA POVEY; Grantors, 
do hereby ~rant, bargain. '~ell an~ convey 'unto 
Recorded at the request of 
~V~ R • \2'\oIl'.I. \~r-
~a.in. 'NOV 0 1-2~05 p.m. ~: 00 
. , 
v. eu.)~tr LAR~'~ECORDER 
By &::q.. 14: Ii! ~ Deputy 
FRANKLIN Co.UNTY. I AHO 
bOUGLAS K. VIE..mEG and SHARON C. VIEHWEG.; whose current address Is: . 
5601 West. 15Sll! street, Overland Park, KS!1sas 66223, .' J 
Grantees, theli" intersst In the following descrIbed premlses In· Franklin County; Idaho to wit.: 
! - . seE AlTACHED"EXHJBIT "An ,. 
. .~ .. '~ 
.: . ," ..: . 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances·unto.the Grantees, 
their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantors do hereby covenant to and with the 
said GrantEJes, that they are the owner:s in fee simple of said premises; that they are free 
from all encumbrances and that they will: 'wananfarid defend the same from. all lawful 
claims whatsoever. . - . . ',' '. . -' .' . . 
DATED: 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Franklin 
j 
).ss. ) . 
On this 4'" day of October. 2005, before me, the undersigned, a Nota~ Public In and for 
said State, pe~onally appeared BRAD L. POVSY ~nd LEIZA PqVEY known or-IdentIfied to me to 
be the persons whose' names are subscribed to .the withIn Instrument and' acknowledged to me 
that they executed the same. ., '. . . 
. , 
STEVEN A. "FULLER 
1 NOTARY PUBLIC 1 STATE OF fDAHO 
.- .... 'J7 , • 1 ..... ......,.....i'""Ir'I!~_""" 
EXHIBIT 
iD 
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231836 2,. .. "Z. 
EXHIBIT"Aft 
• '". 1.: . ~ 
,PARCEL' 1~~; A PARCEL OF LAND BEING A PORTION OF THAT LARGER 
PARCE;L OF LAND PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED AT INSTRUMENT NO. 196512 IN 
, ',,' . ' THE iQFFICE:9F THE FRANKLIN COUNTY CLERK AND RECORDER, LYING 
ENTJRELY WITHIN'THE SOUTHEAst ONE-QUARTER OF SECTION 27, 
> ,',: ';, TqWN~MJP ~4SP.l[fH, RANGE3QEAST,~NT-IiE~I1)jOFCLIFTON, FRANKLIN 
',,1.>' ,. : '9.Q~J'~n\)O'~H9t~D' BEING MORE PARTICULARLY AS. FOLLOWS: 
'-' 'fuMMENCING A~ tHE NE CORNER OF SAID SE 1l4; "OF,lSaGTJ,QN:27, AS. 
FILED FOR RECORD AT INSTRUMENT NO. 208970 IN 'THE~sAltrt!AA'NKL.INl 
COUNTY RECORDS; THENCE WEST A DJSTANC~ OF 780.74 FEJ:T; THENCE' 
S 00a06'OO" E A DISTANCE OF 419.10 FEET TO A PO'tNT ON THE WESTERLY 
R'GHT-OF~WAYL1NE OFTHEWESTSIDE HIGHWAY,A PUBLIC ROAD; THENCE 
S 89°40.38" W A DISTANCE OF 354.54 FEET TO THE POINT Of aEGINNING; 
THENCES'04°48'00· EA DISTANCE OF 178.36 FEET; THENCE N 88°02'30. W 
A DISTANCE OF 154.44 FEET; THENCE N 04C140'OO·WA DISTANCE OF 170.00 
FEET; tHENCE N 88°52'10" E ALONG AN EXISTING FENCE LtNEADISTANCE 
OF 15S:2g:FEET TO THE POIN! OF BEGINNI~G; CONTAINING Q.61 ACRE. 
PARCEL 2: A PARCEL OF lAND BEING A PORTION OF THAT LARGER 
PARCEL OF LAND PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED AT INSTRUMENT NO. 196512 IN 
THE OFFICE OF THe FRANKLIN COUNTY CLERK AND RECORDER, LYING 
ENTIRELY WITHIN THE SOUTHEAST ONE .. QUARTER OF SECTION 27. TOWNSHIP'14S019T~GeS8€AS-T?IN--THe:ClT-Y OF CLIFTON. FRANKLIN 
C'OU~TY, -'~AHO, AND BEING MOR!?' P,ARTICULARl Y AS FOLLOW~: 
COMMENCING AT THE NE CORNER OF SAID SE 114 OF SECTION 27. AS 
FILED FOR RECORD AT INSTRUMENT NO. 208970 IN THE SAID 'FRANKLIN 
COUNTY RECORDS; THENCE WESt A DISTANCE OF 780.74 FEET: THENCe 
S Oooos'oon E A DISTANCE OF 419.10 FEET TO A POINT ON THE WESTERLY 
RlGHT-OF·WAY LINE OFTHEWESTSIDE HIGHWAY, A PUBLIC RQAD; THENCE 
S 11 °20'30" EALONG SAID WESTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE A DISTANCE OF 
150.50 FEET TO THE POINT QF BE~INNINc.a: THENCE CONTINUING S 
1'1 °02'30"·E ALONG SAID~WESr.F;RL yo RIGHT .. OF-WAY LINE A DISTANCE OF 
167.00 FEET; THENCE S 84~11JOO" W A DISTANCE OF 293.84 FEET; T-HEN,CE 
N 57045'00" W A, DISTANCE OF 3-12.25 FEET;, THENCE S' 88°02'30n'. E A 
DISTANCE OF 154.44 FEET; THENeE,N 85°01'10" e A DISTANCE OF 370.61 
FEET TO THE POINt OF aeGINNrNG;j:;ONT AlNlNG 1.56 ACRES. A~t? BEING 
SUBJECT TO A 10 FOOT UTILIlY EASEMENT PARALLEL AND ADJACENT TO 
THE NORTH BOUNDARY'OF SAID DESCRIBED PARCEL. ' "," i.", 
''\ ", , , 
:,< SUBJECr'TO AN'~ASEMENT 1 Q'F;E~~fIN,WIDTH FO~'A BURLED ,IRRIGATION 
"'PIPEL'IN&tAND·,A RIGHT .OF, ACGE;SS THERETO 'FOR -MAINT~ANCE A~D ,,",', 
REPAIR, BEGINNING ALONG"THE EAst':BOUNDARY'OF,~-THE~!:ABO\&':, ' .. 
PREMISES AND RUNNING' IN A NORTHWESTERLY O'JREOT'ON" TO '-THJ5:", ' 
PROPERTY l YING-NORTH 0F THE ABove DESCRIBED PREMISES. 
, " 
" '- . . 
• . • • ' ..... ~ .:... " .,. .t,. ;'. '. ' ... • 
TOGETHER WfTH2;SHARES OFTf.fE CAPitAL STOCK OF TWIN lAKES CANAL. 
..... "'/IAO 0\ "-IV ,-" " . ' ;: : ," ,; ... ' 
-', t-,.'_ 
# 15/ 49 
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I 
. - I Date: 12-07-2005 Title: i --
Scale: 1 inch = 125 feet JFite: VlEH\V.EG D 231836 #3lSS.des 
-fl'zact 1: 0.613 AJns:. 266S'2 Sq Fe CIosum ~ l4S.2443wO.Ol Feet:' Pmaisian =,V1l2140: Paimctc.t'-6$6 Feet 
+Tract 2: 1.565 Acres: 68171 Sq Feet: Closuro'" n18.S347e 0.88 Feet: PIociaion -111480: Perimeter = l29SFeet 
Net Art:zE= 2..178.A.m:ee: 948S4 Sq Feet 
.. - ........ - --------, ... ' .. --. 
OOl-.'NB"SB;ll~1~~~'-t"'~\I'''''f''~;:·-;· . 008aN88.S210B lSl.29 
oo:borIN9lJW780·'l4 009'=@0+ 
003=iS.0i6B 419.10 . 0l00elNB"SE.27.14S,.3m 
0I)4c:;iS&9A03SW 3s4.S4 Ol1=1N9oW'nI>.74 
OO.te0S4..48B 178.36 01>1S.06B 419; 10· 
()()6=tt'~0230W JS4.44 0)3-I811.203OB 150;50 
007mN4AOW 170 014:&$1 L023OE)6'l 
OJ5a0S84:.llW 293.84-
Ol6-NS7.4.SW 31US 
01'7=!S88.02:30E 154M 
OlBciN&S.OllOB 370.61 
.... 
-. . 
-
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Gordon S. Thatcher, ISB No. 880 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
Michael W. Brown, ISB No. 8017 
THATCHER BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY Attorneys 
116 S. Center St. 
P.O.Box216 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Tel: (208) 359-5881 
Fax: (208) 359-5888 
gthatcher@beardstclair.com 
jeff@beardstclair.com 
mbrown@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO 
Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Gamer, 
husband and wife; Nola Garner, a widow; 
and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola 
Garner Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Case No. CV-08-342 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 
and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon 
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as 
Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and 
Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust, 
dated September 17th 2004; Jeffery 1. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband 
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey, 
husband and wife; First American Title 
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title 
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of 
Authority; and First American Title 
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Third Amended Co 
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FOUNDATIONAL FACTS 
COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS 
1. On May 22, 1987, Plaintiff DANIEL S. GARNER ("Daniel") as Buyer entered into a 
written Contract of Sale with Ralph R. McCulloch and Thelma W. McCulloch, husband and wife 
("McCullochs") as Sellers to purchase the following described real property, ("40 Acres"), in 
Franklin County, Idaho: 
NE~NWI,4 of Sec. 34, Twp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E., Boise Mer. 
Along with other real property not involved in this action. A copy of the Contract of Sale which 
was recorded on July 8, 1987, as Instrwnent # 175876, records of Franklin County, Idaho, is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
2. The Contract of Sale (Exhibit "A") included a right-of-way along an existing roadway 
that ran from the 40 Acres across McCullochs' adjacent property to the Westside Highway, also 
known as Highway D-l. That Contract of Sale also provided for conveyance of an additional 
parcel from McCu110chs to Daniel in Sec. 27 adjacent to the 40 Acres as described in ~ 9 hereof 
3. At the time of the Contract of Sale the 40 Acres would have been totally landlocked 
and without any legal access, but for the existing roadway included as a right-of-way in the sale. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B-1" is a Google™ satellite photograph taken in 2004. It 
illustrates features of the area at the time it was taken. The focal point of the illustration is 
between the label "Sec. 27" and the label "Sec. 34" and is the cornmon point of the South-
Quarter-Comer of Sec. 27 and the North-Quarter-Comer of Sec. 34, Tvvp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E., 
Boise Mer., in Franklin County~ IdalIO. The squares illustrate the approximate location of 40 acre 
tracts coinciding with the United States official survey of the parts of the area shown. The 
following additional Exhibits, based on Exhibit "B-1," are marked to show features at particular 
Third Amended Complaint - Page 2 
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times relevant to this case: 
A. Exhibit "B-2" illustrates these features as existing on May 22, 1987: 
[1] Westside Highway is marked in orange. 
[2] Twin Lakes Canal is marked in blue. 
[3] The "First Phase" of the "Original Access Road" is marked in 
red. 
[4] The "40 Acres" in Sec. 34 acquired by Daniel is marked in 
fuschia. 
[5] Additional property in Sec. 27 acquired by Daniel pursuant to the 
Contract of Sale is also marked in fuchsia. 
[6] The "Second Phase" of the "Original Access Road" is marked in 
light blue. 
[7] Property retained by McCullochs is marked in yellow. 
B. Exhibit "B-3" illustrates the property purported to be acquired by Poveys from 
McCullochs on May 23, 1990 as alleged in ~ 10 hereof, marked in yellow. 
C. Exhibit "B-4" illustrates the property conveyed by Poveys to Gary T. Gamer 
("Gary") and Nola S. Gamer ("Nola") on June 17, 1992, as alleged in ~ 11 hereof, 
marked in blue. 
D. Exhl"bit B-5 illustrates an additional 40 Acres acquired from the Cox Trust, by 
Gary and Nola on August 20, 1997, as alleged in ~ 12 hereof, which is marked in green. 
Also marked in yellow is the revised "Second Phase" of the "Original Access Road" 
adapted to include the part crossing the Cox property. 
Third Amended Complaint - Page 3 
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E. Exhibit "B-6" illustrates a 30 foot wide access from the Westside Highway 
acquired from Rices on November 3,1998, as alleged in,-13 hereo±: marked in fuschia, 
and a 30 foot wide strip exchanged to Rices for that access as alleged in ~ 13 hereo±: 
marked in green. 
F. Exhibit "B-7" illustrates properties conveyed by Defendant Poveys to Deans 
(August and December 1999), explained in ~ 16 marked with yellow; to Neigums (April 
5,2001) explained in ~ 17, marked in blue; and to Viehwegs (November 1, 2005), 
explained in ~ 20, marked with red. 
5. All of the property over which the origina] right-of-way existed was at the time of the 
Contract of Sale (May 22, 1987) owned by McCullochs. 
6. At the time of the Contract of Sale (May 22, 1987), attached hereto as Exhibit "A," 
McCu110chs had been farming the 40 Acres and their remaining property over which the right-of-
way ran, including pasture for cattle, some irrigated crops, operation of a dairy farm, and some 
dry-fann hay ground. Some of the McCulloch property over which the right-of-way ran 
included gravel pits (and potentia] gravel pits) as the subject of present and future extracting of 
gravel, and removal of gravel over the right-of-way. 
7. The existing roadway constituted the right-of-way after the purchase by Daniel on 
May 22, 1987 and was used by Daniel continually thereafter; and was also used by McCullochs 
for their remaining properties so long as they retained those properties. 
8. Pursuant to the Contract of Sale, McCullochs conveyed the 40 Acres, with 
appurtenances, to Daniel by Warranty Deed dated May 22,1987 and recorded on May 28, 1987 
as Instrument # 175555, records of Franklin County, Idaho. A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"C." The Warranty Deed conveyed the property ''with their appurtenances unto the Grantee, his 
Third Amended Complaint - Page 4 
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heirs and assigns, forever." This means the right-of-way for the existing roadway was included 
in the conveyance and subject to the covenant of McCullochs "that they will warrant and defend 
the same from all lawful claims whatsoever." 
9. By Warranty Deed dated May 22, 1987 and recorded on July 8, 1987 as Instrument # 
175877, records of Franklin County, Idaho, copy attached hereto as Exhibit "D," McCullochs 
conveyed an additional parcel to Daniel, legally described as follows: 
Part ofNW~SE~ of Sec. 27, 1\vp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E., Boise Mer., described as 
follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest comer and running thence Northeasterly to the 
bottom ofthe gulley on the North side oftlle old gravel pit; thence 
Southeasterly to the Southeast comer; thence West to the point of 
beginning. 
The wording of the Warranty Deed implied this was in Sec. 34, but from the express description 
it is clear it was in Sec. 27 as above described. This property was included as paragraph 18 in an 
addendum on the Contract of Sale, Exhibit "A" hereto. It has continually been used by Daniel as 
an integral addition to the 40 Acres, and from the date of the Contract of Sale (May 22. 1987) 
Daniel has accessed it by the right-of-way. The Warranty Deed included "the premises with their 
appurtenances." The existing roadway comprising the right-of-way was included in the covenant 
by McCulloch ''to warrant and defend the same from a111a~ claims whatsoever." 
10. By Warranty Deed, dated May 23, 1990 and recorded June 4, 1990 as Instrument 
#181769. records of Franklin County, Idaho, McCullochs purported to convey ~o Defendants 
Brad L. Pavey and Leiza Povey, and Henry Nels Povey and Melanie Povey ("Poveys") all of the 
property of McCulloch, served by the right-of-way, except the 40 Acres of Daniel (and 
wrongfully included the property conveyed to Daniel by Exhibit "D", ~ 9 hereof). A copy of the 
Third Amended Complaint - Page 5 
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Warranty Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit "E." The part of the property included in this suit 
that was conveyed to Poveys is described as follows: 
Twp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E., Boise Mer., Franklin County, Idaho: 
Sec. 27: WYlSEY-!; SEY-!SW'4;ALSO, Commencing at a point 1323.25 feet West 
and 419.10 feet South OD06' East of the Northeast corner ofSE~ of Sec. 
27, and running thence Soo06' East 900.9 feet; thence East 770.819 feet; 
thence North II D11' West 918.53 feet; thence West 594.98 
feet to the point of beginning. 
The Warranty Deed conveyed appurtenances. so the rights ofMcCu1lochs to use the right-of-way 
to access the property conveyed were transferred to Poveys in the conveyance. Poveys 
commenced and continued to use the right-of-way to access their acquired property West of the 
Twin Lakes Canal and were fully aware Daniel continued to use the right-of-way to access his 
property West of the Twin Lakes Canal. 
11. By Warranty Deed recorded on September 16. 1992 as Instrument #186592, records 
of Franklin County, Idaho, copy attached as Exhibit "F," Poveys conveyed to GaryT. Gamer 
("Gary") and Nola S. Gamer ("Nola"), husband and wife, a part of the property acquired from 
McCulloch by Exhibit 'IE," which part was all of the McCulloch property West of the Twin 
Lakes Canal, which is described as follows: 
Beginning at the SW comer of the SE~SW'4 ofSeo. 27, Twp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E., 
Boise Mer., and running thence East to the Southeast comer of the SW~SE~ of 
Sec. 27; thence North to the Northeast comer of the SW!4SE!4 of Sec. 27; thence 
East to the East side of the Twin Lakes Canal; thence Northwesterly along the 
East edge of the Twin Lakes Canal to a point on the East-West centerline of Sec. 
27; thence West to the centerpoint of Sec. 27; thence South to the Southeast 
Corner of the NE!4SWJ;.j of Sec. 27; thence West to the Northwest comer of the 
SE~SW~ of Sec. 27; thence South to the point ofbeginning. (This legal 
description is depicted on a GoogleTtd satellite image, attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B-4".) 
The Warranty Deed conveyed agpurtenances, so the rights ofPoveys to use the right-of-
Third Amended Complaint - Page 6 
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way to access the property conveyed were transferred to Gary and Nola in the conveyance. Such 
rights were thereafter used by Gary and Nola. Nola and Gary received a policy of title insurance 
from Defendant First American Title Insurance Company, a Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho 
Certificate of Authority, in connection with the purchase, which policy insured them against loss 
or damage sustained by him by reason of: "3. lack of a right of access to and from the land." The 
only access to the Povey property was from the Westside Highway by the Original Access Road 
extending up to the Povey property. See Exhibit "B-4," attached hereto. 
12. By Trustee's Deed, recorded on August 20, 1997, as Instrument #199886, records of 
Franklin County, Idaho, with the Trustees of the Alvord 1. Cox Family Trust ("Cox Trust") as 
Grantors, and Gary T. Gamer and Nola Smart Gamer [also known as Nola S. Gamer] ("Gary and 
Nola"), Grantees, the following 40 acre tract in Franklin County, Idaho: 
NE~SW~ of Sec. 27, Twp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E, Boise Mer. 
together with appurtenances was conveyed. Acopy of the Trustee's Deed is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "0., and this 40 acre tract is depicted on a Google™ sateUite image, attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B-S." By oral agreement between Daniel and Gary and Nola the acquired 40 Acres was 
integrated into the common operation with Gary and Nola's property described in ~ 11 and with 
Daniel's property described in ~ 8 and ~ 9, hereof; and the Second Phase of the "Original Access 
Road" was adapted to include a preferred partial route crossing the Cox property. (See Exhibit 
"B-5"). Nola and Gary received a policy of title insurance from Defendant First American Title 
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of Authority, in connection 
with the purchase, which policy insured them against loss or damage sustained by him by reason 
of: "3. lack of a right of access to and from the land." The onI y access to the Cox property was 
from the Westside Highway by the Original Access Road extending up to the Cox property. See 
Third Amended Complaint - Page 7 
# 231 49 
10-02-09;04:29PM; 
Exhibit "B-5," attached hereto. 
13. By Warranty Deed from Edward Rice and Helen S. Rice ("Rices") as Grantors to 
Gary T. Garner and Nola S. Garner as Grantees ("Gary and Nola"), recorded on November 3, 
1998 as Instrument #204036, records of Franklin County, Idaho, the following described 
property for use as an access road, including as the prime purpose to haul extracted gravel in the 
non-wintry months (it was not usable in wintry months); was conveyed to Gary and Nola: 
Beginning at the Northwest comer of the SEy.{SE~ of Sec. 27, Twp. 14 S., Rge. 
38 E., Boise Mer., and running thence East along the existing fence line 718 feet 
more or less to Hwy. D-I; thence South 30 feet; thence West 718 feet, more or 
less; thence North 30 feet to the point of beginning. 
A copy of the Warranty Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit "H." In exchange by Warranty Deed 
from Gary and Nola to Rices, recorded on November 3, 1998, as Instrument #204035, the 
following described property was conveyed by Gary and Nola to Rices: 
Beginning at the Northeast Comer of the SW~SE~ of Sec. 27, Twp. 14 S., Rge. 
38 E., Boise Mer., and thence South 30 feet to the true point of beginning; thence 
S 718 feet along the existing fence line; thence West 30 feet; thence North 718 
feet, thence East 30 feet to the point of beginning. 
A copy of the Warranty Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit "I." See Exhibit "B-6." 
By reason of the two Deeds the one 30 foot wide strip for a special limited access road 
was added to the Gary and Nola property and the other 30 foot wide strip was removed from the 
Gary and Nola property. 
14. Gary died on December 1, 2005. The property of Gary and Nola involved in this 
case was distributed from the Estate of Gary with an undivided 65% interest distributed to Nola, 
and Daniel received 35% from the estate distribution and by exchanges with his siblings. Nola 
has gift deeded 9.796% interest to Daniel so that he now has a 44.796 % interest and Nola has 
retained a 55.204% interest. Nola had conveyed by Grant Deed her then (July 25, 2007) 
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60.102% interest to herself as Sole Trustee, or her successors in Trust, under the NOLA 
GARNER LIVING TRUST. dated July 19,2007 ("Nola Trust'). A copy of the Registration of 
Trust is attached hereto as Exhibit "1." Nola has since withdrawn 4.898% interest from the Nola 
Trust and gifted it to Daniel, leaving the present percentage ownership as 44.796% with Daniel 
and 55.204% interest in the Nola Trust. The Nola Trust is revocable by Nola. Nola was one of 
the insured in a policy of title insurance issued in the Povey purchase and in a policy of title 
insurance issued in the Cox purchase, which policies have been breached by Defendant First 
American Title Insurance Company, a Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of 
Authority. So complete relief can be obtained Nola, individually is a party Plaintiff to this suit to 
pursue the claims on the policies. 
15. Each Personal Representative's Deed, each Grant Deed (Furthering Exchange), each 
Gift Deed, and the Grant Deed to the Nola Trust, conveyed the property described in ~ 11, ~12 
and '113 (less the 30 foot strip exchanged away), together with all appurtenances pertaining 
thereto, so the rights of Gary and Nola to use the "Original Access Road" as adapted by 
acquisition of the Cox property (~ 12 hereof) are owned by Daniel, with an undivided interest of 
44.796%, and by the Nola Trust with a 55.204% interest. Such use of the right-of-way would 
also be in common with Daniel (and with any applicable rights ofSherri-l0 Garner his wife), as 
to all interests of Daniel, as to property of Daniel described in ~8 and ~9 hereof. 
16. Povey Defendants conveyed to Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband and wife 
("Deans") by separate Warranty Deeds recorded respectively on August 30, 1999 as Instrument # 
207408 and on December 30, 1999, as Instrument # 208652, records of Franklin County, Idaho, 
two parcels comprising part of the properties Poveys acquired from McCullochs. Copies of the 
two Warranty Deeds are attached hereto as Exhibits ''K,'' and "L" respectively. Attached hereto 
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as Exhibit "M" is an approximate illustration of the descriptions of the two parcels. 
In both Deeds Deans were on notice of an "existing right-of-way" along the South 
boundary, and in the first Deed they expressly took subject to "easements of record and 
easements visible upon the premises." Segment "A" of the First Phase of the Original right-of-
way was at the time of the Deeds visible upon the premises and the adjoining properties. 
17. A Corrected Warranty Deed from Povey Defendants to Jeffrey J. Neigum and 
Kathleen A. Neigum, husband and wife, ("Neigums"), recorded on April 5, 2001, as Instrument # 
212784, records of Franklin County, Idaho, is attached hereto as Exhibit "N." The complex legal 
description included all of the McCullochs' property conveyed to Poveys, Exhibit "E", explained 
in ~ 10 hereof, except: 
A. The property previously conveyed to Gary and Nola in 1992, Exhibit "F" 
hereto, explained in, 11 hereof, and illustrated in Exhibit B-4 hereto. 
B. The property previously conveyed to Deans in 1999! Exhibits "K" and "L," 
explained in 1116 hereof. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "0" is a Google™ satellite image produced taken on June 16, 
2004. The property received by the Neigums is depicted on this image. 
18. The Corrected Warranty Deed from Povey Defendants to Neigums on April 5, 2001, 
Exhibit "N," described in 1117 hereof, contained a reservation of a roadway for the benefit of 
Daniel in this language: 
" ... together with an easement for a roadway 20 feet in width lying adjacent to 
and along the South and West side of the above-described Courses 1) and 2) to be used by the 
Grantees, Daniel Garner and the Grantors, their heirs, successors or assigns for general ingress 
and egress purposes. Said easement shall continue in a westerly direction to a bridge located on 
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the Twin Lakes Canal accessing the Daniel Gamer premises" (emphasis added). 
The first sentence of the quoted provision describes. what is a possible "replacement 
access road" to what we refer to as Segment "A" of the First Phase of the Original Access Road. 
The second and last sentence of the quoted provision describes a route identical (except it should 
be 30-feet not 20-feet in width) as Segment "B" of the First Phase of the "Original Access 
Road." It starts at the end of Segment "A" and continues to the bridge over the Twin Lakes 
Canal. 
19. Because Daniel (with his wife) and the Nola Trust, and Nola with rights under the 
Trust, own all of the property West of the bridge over the Twin Lakes Canal, which has been 
served by the Original Access Road as adapted with the Cox property (~ 12 hereofiUustrated in 
Exhibit B-S), the only concerns in this case should be [a] the width oftlie First Phase (30 feet or 
20 feet); [bJ and whether the original Segment "A" (see '121 hereof) or the alternate Segment 
"A," such as described in the first sentence of the quoted provision and as further explained in ~ 
22 hereof, should apply. 
20. Povey Defendants conveyed the remainder of their property acquired from 
McCullochs (~ 10 hereof) to Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, ("Viehwegs") by 
Warranty Deed recorded on November 1, 2005, as Instrument # 231836, records of Franklin 
County, Idaho, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "P." The complex deed description 
of the property conveyed by Poveys to Viehwegs is illustrated by a diagram generated by deed 
plotting software, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "Q," which shows Tract 1 and 
Tract 2 described in the Warranty Deed. 
21. Segment "A" of the First Phase of the Original Access Road generally follows the 
courses and distances ofthe Northerly boundary of Tract 2 of the Viehweg property as shown on 
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Exhibit "Q." It also generally follows the courses and distances of the Southerly boundaries of 
the Dean properties as illustrated on Exhibit "M," based on the Warranty Deeds attached as 
Exhibits uK" and "L," and explained in ~ 16 hereof. Some of Segment "A" of the First Phase of 
the Original Access Road may be Northerly of the Southerly boundaries of the Dean properties; 
some or all may be South of the Northerly boundaries of Tract 2 of the Viehweg property; and 
some may be North of the South boundary of Tract 1 of the Viehweg property. 
If the original Segment "A" of the First Phase is confirmed as part of the right-of-way, a 
survey should be authorized by the Court to detennine the correct legal description including the 
Norther]y and Southerly boundaries of Segment "A" in relation to the Dean properties and the 
Viehweg properties. 
22. An alternative Segment "A" of the First Phase of the right-of-way is that alleged in 
111110, 11, and 12 of ANSWER of Defendants Dean, Viehweg, and Neigum, dated November 11, 
2008, herein, with part characterized therein as the "Neigum Driveway", and it may be referred 
to herein as "Replacement Access Road". The Northerly boundary thereof is the same as the 
Southerly and Westerly boundary of Tract 2 of the Viehweg properties, Exhibits "P" and "Q" 
explained in " 20 hereof. This is the same Northerly Boundary of the alternate First Segment of 
the right-of-way for access to the property of Daniel described in the quotation in 1118 hereof. 
23. Defendant First American Title Insurance Company, a foreign corporation that is a 
Title Insurer as alleged in 1148 hereof ("First American Title Insurance") issued to Plaintiff 
Daniel S. Gamer ("Daniel") a Policy of Title Insurance, ("Policy") on May 28, 1987, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "R." As applicable to this case, the Policy insured Daniel 
against loss or damage sustained by him by reason of: 
"3. lack of a right of access to and from the land." 
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The land involved in this suit as to that Policy is: NE~NW~ of Sec . 34, Twp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E., 
Boise Mer., Franklin County, Idaho. It is herein called "40 Acres." 
24. From May 22, 1987 the Roadway constituting the right-of-way benefited 
McCu1lochs by providing access as to their remaining property west of the Twin Lakes Canal, as 
well as benefiting Daniel as to his 40 Acres described in ~ I hereof and as to his additional parcel 
described in ~ 9 hereof. Thereafter Daniel (and his wife), NoJa, and the NoJa Trust succeeded to 
all of the remaining property ofMcCullochs West of the Twin Lakes Canal and thus succeeded to 
the use of the right-of-way as to such properties. Such properties benefited by the right-of-way 
in Franklin County, Idaho are described as follows: 
In name of Daniel (100%), '18 and ~ 9 hereof: 
Tract 1: 
Tract 2: 
NE}{NW~ of Sec. 34, Twp. 14 S. Rge. 38 E., Boise Mer. 
Part of the NE~SW}{ of Sec. 27, Twp., 14 S., Rge. 38 E., Boise Mer., 
described as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest comer, and running thence 
Northeasterly to the bottom of the galley on the North Side of the 
old gravel pit; thence Southeasterly to the Southeast comer; thence 
West point of beginning. 
In name of Daniel (44.796%), and in name of Nola Trust (55.204%) [with Nola 
individually having the right to revoke the Nola Trust and be the prime beneficiary 
thereof]: 
Beginning at the SW comer of the SE}{SW~ of Sec. 27, Twp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E., 
Boise Mer., and running thence East to the Southeast comer of the SW~SE}{ of 
Sec. 27; thence North to the Northeast comer of the SW~SE!4 of Sec. 27; thence 
East to the East side of the Twin Lakes Canal; thence Northwesterly along the 
East edge of the Twin Lakes Cahal to a point on the East-West centerline of Sec. 
27; thence West to the centerpoint of Sec. 27; thence South to the Southeast 
Comer of the NE~SW}{ of Sec. 27; thence"West to the Northwest comer of the 
SE~SW!4 of Sec. 27; thence South to the point of beginning. 
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Saving and excepting therefrom property exchanged to Rices, ~ 13 hereof: 
Beginning at the Northeast Comer of the SW!4SE'l4 of Sec. 27, Twp. 14 
S., Rge. 38 E .• Boise Mer., and thence South 30 feet to the true point of 
beginning; thence S 718 feet along the existing fence line; thence West 30 
feet; thence North 718 feet, thence East 30 feet to the point of beginning. 
Also, less the rights of Daniel to Tract 2 of the property described above. 
If approved by the Court also including the 40 Acres acquired from the Cox 
Trust, Exhibit "0," ~ 12 hereof, illustrated in Exhibit "B-5/' described as follows: 
NE!4SW!4 of Sec. 27, 1\vp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E., Boise Mer. 
25. Defendants First American Title Insurance Company; First American Title 
Company, Inc. (by its predecessor, Preston Land Title Company, prior to a merger); Poveys, 
Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs have been and are in complicity in seeking to deprive Daniel 
and his wife, the Nola Trust, and Nola, of thejr rights of access to and from their properties 
described in ~ 24 hereof. 
The pivotal action was by Viehwegs constructing ofa fence across Segment "A" of the 
First Phase of the Original Access Road, on May 28, 2008, at about the place where the roadway 
reached the Westerly boundary of the Viehwegs' property. 
The actions of those Defendants threatens to permanently deprive Daniel, his wife. Nola 
and the Nola Trust, and their heirs, successors and assigns, of their long established, effective 
and critical rights of access across Segment "A" of the First Phase of the Original Access Road 
as described in ~ 21 hereof. 
26. Defendants Deans, Neigums and Viehwegs have been and are in complicity in 
depriving Daniel, and his wife, and the Nola Trust of any effective alternate rights of access 
across those Defendants properties, such as the so called "Replacement Access Road", described 
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in ~ 22 hereof, to and from Plaintiffs' properties described in ~ 24 hereof. 
The pivotal action has been the opposition in the "Answer" of Defendants Dean, Viehweg 
and Neigum, dated November 11, 2008, filed herein, which opposed Daniel, his wife, and the 
Nola Tnlst having any access whatsoever across their properties to and from Plaintiffs' properties 
described on ~ 24 hereof; and in a Stipulation entered by those Defendants with Plaintiffs on 
December 15, 2008 wherein those Defendants reserved the right to oppose in this litigation any 
rights of Plaintiffs for access across their properties. 
FIRST COUNT: POVEYS 
Took Title Subject to Right-of~Way 
Breach of Warranty and Interference 
Damages and Attorney Fees 
27. Plaintiffs replead by reference" 1 through 26 of the Foundational Facts Common to 
All Claims. 
28. Poveys received from McCullochs a Warranty Deed recorded on June 4, 1990 as 
Instrument # 181769 (See,r 10 hereof, Exhibit "E" and Exhibit "B-3"). This deed described 
property on both sides of the Twin Lakes Canal. 
29. The Warranty Deed did not expressly provide the property conveyed was subject to a 
road right-of-way in Daniel for access to his 40 Acres acquired from McCullochs on May 22, 
1987, nor that it was subject to rights of Daniel in additional property described in, 9 hereof. 
30. Poveys were not qualified as bona fide purchasers for value to extinguish the right-
of-way of Daniel, by taking the Warranty Deed frot? McCu110chs, because the chain of title to 
the property purported to be acquired by Poveys contained earlier recorded instruments 
establishing the right-of-way. These instruments include the Contract of Sale, see Exhibit "A". 
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recorded on July 8, 1987 as Instrument # 175876, which described Daniel's right-of-way on 
adjacent property of McCullochs (which is the very property acquired by Poveys); and the 
Warranty Deed, Exhibit "e", conveying the 40 Acres with app~enances to Daniel recorded on 
May 28, 1987 as Instrument # 175555. 
31. Poveys were also not qualified to be bona fide purchasers of the property included in 
the Warranty Deed to them on June 4, 1990 because part of the property in Sec. 27 included in 
the Deed had previously been conveyed by Warranty Deed, with appurtenances, to Daniel by 
Warranty Deed recorded on July 8, 1987 as Instrument # 175877. See ~ 9 hereof, Exhibit "10," 
and Exhibit "B_2," part [5]. 
32. Poveys were not qualified to be bona fide purchasers for value to extinguish the 
right-of-way of Daniel, for the further reason they were on notice of the existence of the 
established road and the continual use of it by Daniel for access to his otherwise landlocked 40 
Acres. 
33. It was wrongful for Defendant Poveys to purport to convey property to Deans by 
Warranty Deeds recorded on August 30, 1999 a& Instrument # 207408 and on December 30, 1999 
as Instrument # 208652 without excepting the right-of-way in Daniel. 
34. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Henry Nels Povey and Melanie Povey, 
husband and wife, ("Henry and Melanie") have deeded to Defendants Brad L. Povey and Leiza 
Povey, husband and wife, any interest that Henry and Melanie had in the property conveyed to 
the four Poveys by McCullochs, less the property conveyed by the four Poveys to Gary and Nola 
by Warranty Deed recorded on September 16, 1992, as Instrument # 186592; and that Henry and 
Melanie will acknowledge the four Poveys had acquired the property subject to the right-of-way 
of Daniel while the Poveys had the right to use the right-of-way to access their property we.st of 
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Twin Lakes Canal. Henry and Melanie should acknowledge Daniel, his wife, Gary and Nola, 
and the Nola Trust have used and have had the right to use of the right-of-way to access their 
property west of the Twin Lakes Canal as described in '1 24 hereof. 
Because of expected cooperation of Henry and Melanie for Daniel and his wife and Nola 
and the Nola Trust to preserve their access rights, Daniel and wife and Nola and the Nola Trust 
do not include Henry and Melanie as Defendants and do not claim damages against them. 
35. The Poveys' conveyance to Gary Gamer and Nola Gamer, descn'bed above in ~ 11; 
was made by Warranty Deed, which warranty deed contains the following language: 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises. with their appurtenances unto the 
said Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantors do hereby 
covenant to and with the said Grantees that they [are] the owners in fee simple of 
said premises; that they are free from all incumbrances and that they will warrant 
and defend the samefrom all lawful claims whatsoever (emphasis added). 
36. The wrongful actions of Brad L. Povey and Leiza Povey, husband and wife, include 
plowing over Segment "A" of the Original Access Road to facilitate sale of their property; 
wrongfully conveying property without confinning the right-of-way now held by Daniel, his 
wife, Nola and the Nola Trust; warranting against the right-of-way; and by actions herein seeking 
to have Daniel, his wife, Nola and the Nola Trust lose all fully effective access rights. By 
performing these wrongful actions, the Poveys breached the warranty contained in the Warranty 
Deed described in ,r 11 hereof. These actions have damaged Daniel and his wife, Nola and the 
Nola Trust in compelling them to pursue this action to preserve their access rights. This is to 
their estimated damage of $1 00,000.00. Furthermore, if this wrongful conduct proximately 
contn'butes to the loss of effective access rights, Daniel and his wife, Nola and the Nola Trust 
should be awarded an added judgment of damages against Brad L. Poveyand Leiza Povey as 
jointly and severally liable in the amount determined by the Court. The estimated amount of 
such additional damages is $500,000.00. 
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37. Plaintiffs have been required to retain THATCHER BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY 
Attorneys, to bring and pursue this action to preserve their right-of-way and to recover damages 
against Defendants Brad Povey and Leiza Povey for their wrongful conduct in seeking to 
extinguish the right-of-way, and have agreed to pay reasonable attorney fees for those services. 
The purchase of the real estate by Gary and Nola from Povey Defendants was a commercial 
transaction under Idaho Code Sec. 12-120 (3) so Plaintiffs, as successors to Gary and Nola, 
should be entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees from Defendants Brad Povey and 
Lezia Povey. 
SECOND COUNT: DEANS, NEIGUMS AND VIEHWEGS 
Took Title Subject to Right-of-Way 
Quiet Title to Right-of-Way 
38. Plaintiffs replead by reference ~ 1 through ~ 37 hereof. 
39. Deans and Viehwegs each took title from Povey Defendants long after the recording 
on July 8, 1987 as Instrument # 175876 of the Contract of Sale (Exhibit "A") which conveyed to 
Daniel the 40 Acres "TOGETHER WITH .... a right-of-way across Seller's adjacent property 
along an existing roadway." 
40. Deans, Neigurns and Viehwegs do not qualifY as bona fide purchasers for value 
because: 
A. Each of their chains of title extended back to McCullochs ownership and use 
of tl'le 40 Acres and ownership and use of all of the adjacent property in Sec. 27 extending 
to the Westside Highway. An existing roadway ran from the 40 Acres across the adjacent 
McCulloch property to the Westside Highway. 
B. The 40 Acres was then landlocked with no access except across the eXisting 
roadway. 
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C. The roadway extending across the respective properties of Dean, Neigums and 
Viehwegs was clearly visible upon the premises when they acquired their respective 
properties. 
D. When Deans, Neigums and Viehwegs acquired their respective properties, it 
was clearly visible upon the adjacent property that the existing roadway ran to a bridge 
across the Twin Lakes Canal and extended beyond the Canal to the property west of the 
Canal. 
E. Any reasonable purchaser, at the time Deans, Neigums and Viehwegs acquired 
their respective property, would have inquired whether someone claimed a right to a 
right-of-way to access property west of Twin Lakes Canal. Inquiry would have led them 
to Daniel. as well as his parents, Gary and Nola, who are long-time residents of the area, 
and they would have found the claims to the right-of-way. 
41. Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree, quieting title to the right-of-way, 30-feet in width, 
extending from Westside Highway to the bridge on the Twin Lakes Canal on a route to be 
surveyed under direction of the Court. 
42. There are alternate legal foundations establishing the rights of Daniel and his wife 
#- 351 49 
and the Nola Trust to a decree quieting title to a right-of-way across property of Deans, Viehwegs ' 
and Neigums: 
A. An express easement founded in the language of the Contract of Sale of May 
22, 1987, from McCullochs to Daniel. Daniel continues to be owner as to the original 
properties benefited by the access roadway. Daniel, his wife, Nola and the Nola Trust 
have since duly succeeded to the other properties West of the Twin Lakes Canal which 
benefited in common with Daniel for access to the Westside Highway from the bridge 
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over the Twin Lakes Canal. 
B. An implied easement arising from the division by McCullochs of their total 
properties in Sec. 27 and adjoining Sec. 34, accessed from the Westside Highway, with 
the access road in regular use to connect the property conveyed to Daniel and the 
property retained by McCullochs West and East of the Twin Lakes Canal with the 
Westside Highway. Except for the right-of-way the 40 Acres was land-locked without 
access; thus the right-of-way was necessary. 
C. A reaffinnation of an implied easement arising from the division by Poveys of 
McCullochs' property in Sec. 27, acquired by them, between all such property West of 
the Twin Lakes Canal conveyed to Gary and Nola, with all their retained property East of 
the Twin Lake Canal; with the property connected by the 10ng-standing'regular1y used 
roadway between the Westside Highway and the bridge over the Twin Lakes Canal. 
D. Alternatively a right-of-way acquired by Daniel and his wife, Nola and the 
Nola Trust, and their predecessors by prescription. This begins with Daniel on May 22, 
1987, acquiring, if not by express easement at least under color of title, a right-of-way to 
benefit properties acquired by him from McCullochs by providing access to the Westside 
Highway; and continues under color of title as a right-of-way to benefit aU properties of 
Poveys West of the 1\vin Lakes Canal, acquired by Gary and Nola by Warranty Deed 
dated June 17, 1992, benefiting their properties by providing access to the Westside 
Highway. The additional elements to establish prescriptive easements are as follows: 
[1] Daniel's use of the roadway to access the property acquired by him on 
May 22, 1987 has been open and notorious; under claim of right; was adverse to 
any possible claim of any regular owner denying the right; was done with the 
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actual or implied knowledge of all 'successive owners of the property over which 
the roadway ran; and was continuous and uninterrupted from May 22, 1987 until 
May 28, 2008, when the road was blocked. (A period of more than 21 years.) 
The prescriptive right was established for the required period of five (5) years or 
more, under Idaho Code § 5-203, (effective uptil July 1, 2006. when it was 
changed to twenty (20) years or more). On June 30, 2006 the uninterrupted use 
had been for more than nineteen (19) years and the prescriptive right established. 
[2] Use of the roadway as to the properties acquired by Gary and Nola 
and now owned by Daniel and his wife and the Nola Trust, and Nola, acquired by 
Warranty Deed dated June 18, 1992 from Poveys, has been open and notorious; 
under claim of right; was adverse to any possible claim of a reputed owner 
denying the right; was done with the actual or imputed knowledge of all 
successive owners of the property over which the roadway ran; and was continued 
and uninterrupted from June 18, 1992 until May 28, 2008, a period of over fifteen 
(15) years, The prescriptive right was established for the required period of five 
(5) years or more, under Idaho Code § 5-203, (until July 1. 2006 when it was 
changed to twenty years). On June 30, 2006 the uninterrupted use had been for 
more than fourteen (14) years and the prescriptive right established. 
43. By Warranty Deed recorded on October 4, 2004, as Instrument # 227649, records of 
Franklin County, Idaho, copy attached hereto as Exhibit "S", Defendants Jeffery J. Neigum and 
Kathleen A. Neigum conveyed their properties involved in this action to Defendants Jeffery J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees of the Jeffery I. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum 
Revocable Trust, dated September 17, 2004. All rights alleged or claimed herein against Jeffery 
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J. Neigurn and Kathleen A. Neigum, or referring to "Neigums," shall be construed to apply to 
them individually and as Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigurn Revocable 
Trust, dated September 17,2004. 
44. Plaintiffs have been required to retain THATCHER BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY 
Attorneys to bring and pursue this action to quiet title to their right-of-way or to obtain an 
adequate replacement access to their properties and have agreed to pay reasonable attorney fees 
for those services. Defendants Dean, Neigum and Viehweg have been unreasonable and without 
proper legal and factual foundation in blocking the right-of-way on May 28, 2008, and in seeking 
to extinguish any effective year-around right-of-way across their properties and to prevent 
Daniel, his wife, Nola and the Nola Trust from having effective access to their properties. By 
reason thereof and Idaho Code § 12-121 and Rule 54(e), I.R.Cv.P., the court should award 
Plaintiffs Judgment against Defendants Dean, Neigum, and Viehweg for their reasonable 
attorney fees in obtaining a decree quieting title to the right-of-way or to an adequate 
replacement right-of-way for access to their properties. 
THIRD COUNT: DEANS, NEIGUMS, AND VIEHWEGS 
Confirm Adequate Replacement Access 
As a Partial Alternative Remedy 
45. Plaintiffs replead by reference, 1 through' 44 hereof. 
46. Daniel and wife and the Nola Trust, and Nola, are agreeable upon acceptable tenus 
to accept a "Replacement Access Road" for a right-of-way running from the Westside Highway 
to the bridge over the Twin Lakes Canal, to provide access to their properties described in ~ 24 
hereof, on the following tenns and conditions: 
A. The right-of-way should be 30 feet in width and should follow the general 
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route described in ~ 22 hereof, with the actual route to be surveyed as approved by the 
Court. 
B. The use of the right-of-way up to the bridge over the Twin Lakes Canal shall 
be a private road but shall be used in common by Daniel and his wife and the Nola Trust 
and Nol~ and their successors and assigns; and by Neigums and their successors and 
assigns. Maintenance shall be allocated according to the respective uses of the owners 
and users of the right-of-way. 
C. Daniel and his wife and the Nola Trust~ and Nola, should be granted a money 
judgment against Defendants Dean, N eigum and Viehweg for their attorneys fees and 
costs in responding to the opposition of Defendants Dean, Neigurn and Viehweg, to 
Plaintiffs having any access to their properties, depending on the opposition, as alleged in 
'144 hereof. 
D. Upon final Court confirmation of the rights to a "Replacement Access Road" 
in Daniel his wife and the Nola Trust, and Nola, their heirs, successors and assigns, and 
their collection of any judgment for attorney fees and costs against Defendants Dean, 
Neigum and Viehweg, for which they are adjudged responsible, respectively, Daniel, his 
wife and the Nola Trust, and Nol~ shall relinquish and disclaim any rights to the First 
Segment of the Original Access Road. 
47. Daniel and his wife and the Nola Trust, and Nola, their heirs, successors and assigns, 
shall have complete control over the right-of-way from the bridge over the Twin Lakes Canal 
extending to the West; and they shall have the duty of maintenance; and the same shall not be a 
public road nor shall Franklin County have any duty of maintenance thereof . 
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FOURTH COUNT: FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 
Breach of Contract to Assure Access 
Money Judgment for Damages 
48. Plaintiffs replead by reference ~ 1 through '147. 
49. Defendant First American Title Insurance Company ("First American Title 
Insurance") at all times material to this action was a "foreign insurer" under Idaho Code § 41-
333, engaged as a title insurer in the State ofIdaho under Idaho Code § 41-2704~ pursuant to a 
"certificate of authority" required under Idaho Code § 41-2705 to be issued by the Director of the 
Department of Insurance, and amenable to service of process in this action upon the Director as 
provided in Idaho Code § 41-333. 
50. First American Title Insurance has breached its contracts contained in Policy of Title 
Insurance ("Policy"), issued on May 28, 1987 with Daniel, as insured, described in ~ 23 hereof: 
and contained in Exhibit "R" hereof, as to insuring Daniel against loss or damages sustained by 
him by reason of: 
"3. lack of a right of access to and from the land." 
The land at issue is "40 Acres" in Franklin County. Idaho. described as follows: 
NE~NW~ of Sec. 34, Twp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E., Boise Mer. 
51. First American Title Insurance had and has an "implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing" in honoring its contractual duties to Daniel. 
52. Preston Land Title Company, which co-signed the Policy of Title Insurance, acted as 
an authorized agent for First American Title, as to all matters at issue in this case, under Idaho 
Code § 41-2708, under rules and regulations of the Department ofInsurance and under other 
applicable law. On December 26,2003, Preston Land Title Company merged into what is now 
First American Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation. Defendant First American Title 
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Insurance is chargeable in this case with information that was known or should have been known 
by Preston Land Title Company, and its successor coxporation, and is bound as principal by all 
actions of Preston Land Title Company, and its successor coxporation, as agent for Defendant 
First American Title Insurance, as to all matters relevant to this action. 
53. On May 28, 1987 when the Policy issued, Daniel had "a right of access to and from 
the land" over an existing roadway extending from the 40 Acres over adjacent land of Ralph R. 
McCulloch and Thelma W. McCulloch, husband and wife, ("McCullochs") to the Westside 
Highway. McCullochs sold the 40 Acres to Daniel in the title insured transaction, "TOGETHER 
WITH ... a right-of-way across Seller's adjacent property along an existing roadway." See 
Contract of Sale, Exhibit "A," described in ~, 1, 2 and 3 hereof; and Warranty Deed conveying 
the 40 Acres "with their appurtenances" to Daniel, Exhibit "C," ·described in ,8 hereof; and with 
the right-of-way and land features illustrated in Exhibit "B-2" described in, 4.A hereof. The 40 
Acres was then totally "landlocked" without any legal access except for the right-of-way 
included in the sale. 
54. First American Title Insurance had a duty under the Policy to defend Daniel's right-
of-way. It constituted the only right of access to an otherwise landlocked 40 Aces. Rather, First 
American Title Insurance has been complicit with others in seeking to destroy the right-of-way. 
55. The pivotal wrongful action by First American Title Insurance is documented by a 
letter to Daniel from Phil E. De Angeli, State Counsel-Idaho, for First American Title Insurance, 
dated March 14,2008, copy attached as Exhibit "T." These facts exist and are revealed or 
implied in the letter: 
A. First American Title Insurance was on March 14,2008 representing Viehwegs 
in seeking to invalidate Daniel's right-of-way or have him abandon it for the benefit of its 
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then client, Viehwegs. 
B. First American Title Insurance represented Viehwegs as their client for 
compensation prior to November 1, 2005 when Viehwegs acquired their property from 
Povey Defendants. See ~ 20 hereof and Exhibit "P" and Exhibit "Q." 
C. First American Title Insurance investigated the state of the property before the 
property was conveyed and insured good title to the property in Viehwegs. 
D. The implication is First American Title Insurance did not except the right-of-
way of Daniel, his wife, and Gary and Nola, in its Policy issued to Viehwegs, and thus 
would be liable to Viehwegs if the right-of-way is found valid. 
E. First American Title Insurance knew prior to November 1, 2005, or would 
have known had it conducted the investigation it later conducted, that Daniel claimed an 
ingress and egress easement along the North boundary of the Viehweg property; and that 
Daniel's claimed easement was described in the Contract of Sale recorded on July 8, 
1987 (Exhibit "A," '1'[ 1,2, and 3 hereof and Exhibit ·'B-2"). 
F. In investigating the "state of the property" First American Title Insurance, or 
its agent, saw or should have seen the visible roadway extending from the Westside 
Highway along the edge of the Viehweg property and extended to the bridge over the 
Twin Lakes Canal and beyond. 
56. The March 14, 2008 letter from First American Title Insurance, Exhibit "T", also 
discloses legal premises underlying the issuance of the Policy to Viehwegs on November 1, 
200S, that though represented as controlling to defeat the Plaintiffs' right-of-way were at best 
questionable in this case and at worst, spurious. 
A. First American Title opines that because the Warranty Deed to Daniel did not 
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expressly describe the right-of-way, the Contract of Sale merged into the Deed and the 
right-of-way was thereby extinguished. This is contrary on two grounds to a decision of 
the Idaho Supreme Court in West v. Bowen, 127 Idaho 128,898, P.2d 59 (1995) on very 
similar controlling facts. The Contract of Sale here was a conveyance and because it was 
recorded prior to the recording of the Warranty Deed to Viehwegs, the title ofViehwegs 
is subject to the right-of-way. Moreover. the Warranty Deed to Daniel expressly included 
"appurtenances" and did not need to describe the right-of-way under Idaho Code § 55-
603 and controlling Idaho case law, to prevent it being extinguished by a claimed merger. 
B. First American Title Insurance opines that the language purporting to grant the 
right-of-way had only "an extremely vague reference to an access easement over the 
property, no particular area of the easement is identified." To the contrary the grant of the 
right-of-way was based upon the "existing roadway." Settled law approves the grant of an 
easement over an "existing road," such as done here. An example is Conley v. 
Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265,985 P.2d 1127 (1999). At trial the location of the road, with 
the width can be determined as the basis for a specific description of the right-of-way .. 
C. hnplied in the position of First American' Title Insurance is that it could and 
can properly represent Viehwegs, and apparently Poveys, Deans and Neigums in seeking 
to destroy the right-of-way of Daniel which it had insured. That very representation raises 
another strong reason why the Court should not permit destruction of Plaintiffs' right-of-
way. Because Defendant First American Title Insurance, directly or through its agent 
Preston Land Title Company or its successor First American Title Company, Inc., knew 
or should have known of the recorded right-of-way to Daniel or the existing roadway 
suggesting a right-of-way, before Poveys, Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs took title to 
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their properties, each should be bound by the actual or imputed knowledge of their 
representative, and thus each took title subject to the right~of-way. 
57. Daniel responded to the First American Title Insurance letter of March 14, 2008, with 
his letter of March 24, 2008, copy attached hereto as Exhibit ''U.'' First American Title 
Insurance should have taken this as an objection to its seeking to destroy Daniel's right-of-way, 
contrary to its policy duties, and should have processed it as a claim for breach of the Policy, 
Daniel also referred to other policies. 
58. The failure of First Atnerican Title Insurance to defend Daniel's right of access to and 
from the land and its conduct seeking to destroy.that right is in plain breach of the Policy 
contract and are in serious breach of the "implied covenant af good faith and fair dealing" in 
honoring the contract with Daniel. 
59. Daniel has been damaged by the breaches of First American Title Insurance far in 
excess of the Policy limits of$54,000. Daniel should be awarded a judgment for $54,000 against 
First American Title Insurance. It is believed that First American Title Insurance is also in breach 
of a policy of title insurance issued to Gary and Nola as to the Povey purchase on September 16, 
1992, ~ 11 hereof, and as to the Cox purchase on August 20, 1997, ~ 13 hereof. First Atnerican 
Title Insurance has by its conduct also breached tllose policies so Gary and Nola should be . 
awarded damages sustained by them up to the full amount of the policy limits of each policy. 
60. Daniel S. Garner has been required to retain THATCHER BEARD ST. CLAIR 
GAFFNEY Attorneys to protect and defend his right of access to his 40 Acres insured in the 
Policy to Daniel and to recover damages from First American Title Insurance for breach of its 
duties under the Policy, and is obligated to pay the reasonable attorney fees and costs for their 
services. By virtue of the Policy of Title Insurance First American Title Insurance is obligated to 
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pay Daniel for those fees and costs in addition to the $54,000.000 amount of insurance, and 
judgment should be awarded Daniel against First American Title for such sums. On like grounds 
judgment should be awarded Daniel, Nola, and Nola Trust, as successors to Gary and Nola, for 
their attomey fees and costs pursuing damages for breach of the policies of title insurance in the 
Povey and Cox transactions. 
FIFTH COUNT: DEANS, NEIGUMS AND VIEHWEGS 
Access During Pendency of Action 
Protection Against Transfers 
61. Plaintiffs replead by reference ~ 1 through ~ 60. 
62. On December 15,2008, Plaintiffs Daniel and Sheni-Jo Garner, husband and wife, 
and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007, by Jeffrey D. 
Brunson, one of their attorneys; and Defendants Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband and 
wife, Jeffery J. Neigurn and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband and wife, and Douglas V. Viehweg 
and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and wife, by Scott Smith, one of their attorneys, entered into a 
written STIPULATION FOR USE OF REPLACEMENT ACCESS ROAD DURING 
PENDENCY OF ACTION, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "V." This, with 
approval of the Court, should have provided the appropriate interim relief to the parties durlng 
the pendency of the action. 
63. However, after the Stipulation was entered, and Neigum defendants had knowledge it 
was entered, they threatened Daniel as he hauled hay on the Replacement Access Road to his 
many head of cattle being fed on Plaintiffs' property described in 1 24 hereof. The nature of the 
threats was such that Daniel feared for his own life and safety and feared for the life and safety 
of his cattle. He removed the cattle to other property not involved in this suit. Daniel has been 
damaged by such misconduct ofN ei gum s in an amount to be established at trial. 
64. As further protection against transfers to any purported bona fide purchasers for 
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value, Plaintiffs have filed and recorded a Notice of Pendency of Action, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "W". This applies as to the original Verified Complaint and shall also 
apply to this Amended Complaint once it is filed with approval of the Court. 
SIXTH COUNT: POVEYS 
Claims of Breach of Warranty Assigned to Garners by Neigums and Viehwegs. 
65. Plaintiffs replead by reference ~ 1 through 11 64. 
66. On October 1, 2009, the Garners acquired by assignment all causes of action owned 
by the Neigums and Viehwegs in connection with their acquisition ofrcal property from the 
Poveys. 
67. The Garners now own those claims and may assert them against the Poveys. 
68. The Poveys sold real property to the Neigums and the Viehwegs. The sales of these 
properties are represented by two warranty deeds, which are attached to this complaint as 
Exhibits N and P. 
69. In those warranty deeds, the Poveys warranted that they were "the owners in fee 
simple of said premises; that they are free from all encumbrances and that they will warrant and 
defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever." See Exhibits Nand P, attached hereto. 
70. The premises conveyed were not free from encumbrances. They were subject to 
easement interests of one or more of the Garners. 
71. The existence of these encumbrances led to loss and damages sustained by the 
Neigums and Viehwegs, including, but not limited to costs associated with defending a lawsuit 
brought by the Garners and the difference in the value of the real property with and without an 
easement encumbering it. The Garners gave consideration for these claims and may now assert 
these damages to full extent that the Neigums and Viehwegs could have asserted them. The full 
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extent of these damages will be proven at trial. 
72. The Garners are entitled to their reasonable attoI11ey fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 
12-120) § 12-121) or any other relevant statute, rule of civil procedure, or provision. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Daniel S. Garner and Shem-Jo Garner, husband and wife, Nola 
Garner and Nola Garner, as Trustee of the Nola Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007, pray 
for Judgment and relief against Defendants as follows: 
1. Against Defendants Brad C. Povey and Lezia Povey, husband and wife, for damages 
for wrongful conveyance, wrongful interference with easement, breach of warranty, and for 
otherwise acting to seek to extinguish and destroy the "original access road" which is the road 
right-of-way now owned by Plaintiffs to access their properties in Sec. 34 and in Sec. 27 West of 
the Twin Lakes Canal over a pre-existing private road in Sec. 27, East of the Twin Lakes Canal, 
extending to the Westside Highway. The damages would be up to $100,000.00 for what is 
required to preserve the right-of-way against the conveyances and other actions of Defendants. If 
their wrongful conveyance and other actions destroy Plaintiffs' right-of-way and any adequate 
replacement right-of-way, then damages are sought against them for up to $500,000.00 for loss 
of all adequate access to their property. Plaintiff should also recover against those Defendants 
their attorney fees and costs. 
2. Against Defendants Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband and wife; Jeffery J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband and wife, individually and as Trustees of the Jeffery 
J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigurn Living Trust, dated September 17,2004; and Douglas V. 
Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and wife, for a decree quieting title in Plaintiffs to the 
"original access road", which is a road right-of-way 30 feet in width running from the Westside 
Highway over property of Defendants to a bridge over the Twin Lakes Canal. This shall enable 
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travel from there to the property of Plaintiffs described in ~ 24 hereof. The 30-feet wide 
easement is needed to accommodate vehicles and machinery that frequently must travel the 
roadway and to enable snowbanks within the easement from snow removal from the traveled 
portion during the common snow seasons. The "Defining Line" should be the Northerly 
boundary with the traveled and visible roadway being about equidistant between the Defining 
Line and the Southern boundary of the 30-feet wide easement. Also against such Defendants for 
attorney fees and costs. 
3. In the alternative on the Third Count against Defendants, Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. 
Dean, husband and wife; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband and wife, 
individually and as Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum Living Trust, 
dated September 17,2004; and Douglas V. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and wife, 
for a decree quieting title in Plaintiffs for the benefit of their property described in ~ 24 to a 
Replacement Access Road for Segment "A" of the Original Access Road. It must be a true and 
full replacement for Segment "A" of the Original Access Road consistent with the prayer for 
relief as to the Original Access Road. The presently traveled portion of Segment "A" of the 
Replacement Access Road must be broadened to accommodate a fully usable and travelable 
portion comparable to Segment HA" of the Original Access Road prior to it being blocked. Also 
against such Defendants for attorney fees and costs. 
4. Against First American Title Insurance Company on the Fourth Count for 
$54,000.000 damages for breach of the Policy of Title Insurance policy issued to Daniel and for 
damages for breach of the policies of title insurance in the Povey and Cox purchases for up to the 
policy limits on each policy, and for attorney fees and costs. 
5. Interim relief should be confirmed for continuous road access by Plaintiffs to and from 
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the properties described in ~ 24, by the alternate road access, pursuant to "Stipulation for Use of 
Replacement Access Road During Pendency of action", dated December 15, 2008, during the 
pendency of this action and until further Order of the Court. Neigum Defendants should be 
sanctioned for threats against Daniel in violation of the Stipulation and should be assessed 
damages in an amount to be detennined by the Court. 
6. For damages, to be proven at trial, caused by the Poveys' breach of warranty with 
respect to properties conveyed by the Poveys to the Neigums and Viehwegs. 
7. For such other and further relief as is deemed proper by the Court. 
PLAINTIFFS HEREBY DEMAND A TRIAL BY JURY ON ALL 
ISSUES PROPERLY TRIABLE BY A JURY 
Dated the __ day of October, 2009. 
Jeffry D. Brunson 
Michael W. Brown 
of THATCHER BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903 
7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, Idaho 83228 
Telephone: (208) 747-3414 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.c. 
837 South 500 West, Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 533-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380 
Attorneys for the Povey Defendants 
FILED 
09 OCT - 5 AM 9: I 0 
..-~, A '.1"! 1',1 f,r.UTf'fCLERK ff'\H"t\--'"v\..- I 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Gamer, 
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and 
Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola Gamer 
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. 
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees 
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A 
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 
17,2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. 
Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and 
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First 
American Title Insurance Company, a 
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho 
Certificate of Authority; and First American 
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. CV-08-342 
Judge Dunn 
Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey ("Poveys"), by and through undersigned counsel, 
hereby submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. POVEYS HAVE NEVER DENIED THE GARNER'S RIGHT TO USE 
WHATEVER ROAD THEY DESIRED TO ACCESS THEIR PROPERTY. 
Without any citation to the record, the Garners make the outrageous assertion that 
"Poveys interfered with the Garners' right-of-way over the original access road by seeking to 
terminate it, apparently to facilitate the sale of one or more of their properties lying east of the 
Twin Lakes CanaL" See, Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment of Defendants Brad Povey and Leiza Povey ("Memo in Opp to MSJ"), p. 11. 
There is simply no evidence of any interference, let alone interference "apparently to 
facilitate the sale of one or more of their properties .... " Memo in Opp to MSJ, p. 11. The 
Garners posit both an interference by filing deeds with the County Recorder and physical 
interference with the right of way. The problem is there is no evidence of either. 
A. The Poveys have never filed any document denigrating the Garners' right 
of access. 
Plaintiffs first argue that the Poveys tried to terminate the Garners access through deeds 
that they filed. This is indeed ironic. The Poveys are the only parties who recorded any deeds 
that mention the Garner right of access. The McCullochs, who conveyed the land to the Poveys 
did not mention in the deed that the property was encumbered by any easement. Likewise, the 
Garners accepted a deed from the McCullochs that does not mention any easement. I Thus, when 
I Vaguely, the Plaintiffs make reference to an easement Daniel S. Gamer attempted to purchase when he purchased 
a forty-acre parcel of real estate from Mr. and Mrs. McCulloch. While there may have been negotiations for the 
purchase of an easement, the final deed transferring the property to Daniel S. Gamer does not contain any mention 
of an easement. See, Copy of May 22, 1987 Warranty Deed, attached hereto as Exhibit A. Therefore, this claim of 
easement by purchase is barred by the doctrine of merger. Estes v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82, 85,967 P.2d 284, 187 
(l998)("When a deed is delivered and accepted as performance of the contract to convey, the contract is merged in 
the deed. Though the terms of the deed may vary from those contained in the contract, the deed alone must be 
looked to to determine the rights of the parties .... Where the right claimed under the contract would vary, change, or 
alter the agreement in the deed itself, or inheres in the very subject-matter with which the deed deals, a prior 
contract covering the same subject-matter cannot be shown as against the provisions of the deed.)(Emphasis in 
original)(intemal citations omitted). See also, Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 152 P. 3d 
the Poveys arrived on the scene there was no recorded easement. The Poveys conveyed one 
parcel of property to the Deans in which they mention the "existing right of way." This is the 
first evidence of the Garner right of way in any recorded deed. This reference was on the record 
when all the other deeds were filed by the Poveys so that none of the other purchasers could 
claim ignorance about the easement. And while the Poveys, who are not lawyers, did not 
describe the easement by metes and bounds, at least after they were done the easement was 
mentioned in the real estate records which, before, had been devoid of mention of this right of 
way.2 How the Garners can claim that the filing of the deeds by the Poveys somehow interfered 
or tried to terminate the Garner right of way is mind boggling. 
In trying to make sense of what is a nonsensical argument, the Garners engage in rank 
speculation. By not mentioning in the deeds a right of way that had not been mentioned in the 
deeds in their own chain of title, the Poveys are accused of some sort of fraud: "they likely 
induced the Viehwegs to purchase the property and subsequently seek to deny Daniel's easement 
over the original access road ., .. ,,3 Again, this rank speculation is not supported by any 
reference to the record. There is thus no evidence to prevent summary judgment based on any 
filing by the Poveys. 
B. The Poveys never physically interfered with the Garner's right of access. 
575 (2007). 
2 In another interesting twist of logic, the Garners posit that when the Poveys recorded a deed that did not mention 
the Gamer right of way, even though it had been mentioned in earlier deeds, "The recording of this deed had the 
effect of denying the Garners' interest in both the original access road and the replacement access road." Memo in 
Opp to MSJ, p. IS. If that were the law, then of course, when the Garners recorded their own deeds that fail to 
mention their right of access, they, in effect, were admitting that they had no right of way. Why then did they bring 
this action? 
3 Not only is this speculation that has no place in a summary judgment motion, but the law would preclude even the 
Viehwegs from making such an assertion. Reliance must be reasonable. Because the access roadway is and always 
has been visible on the ground, the Veihwegs would be on inquiry notice about the roadway. Farrell v. Brown, III 
Idaho 1027, 1033, 729 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Idaho App. 1 986)("[W]hatever is notice enough to excite the attention of a 
man of ordinary prudence and prompt him to further inquiry, amounts to notice of all such facts as a reasonable 
investigation would disclose")(internal citation omitted). With that notice, the Viehwegs could not have argued that 
because the deed did not mention the access road, they reasonably concluded it did not exist. 
Next, the Garners allege that the Poveys interfered with and tried to tenninate the access 
road by physically plowing the road. But there is no evidence that the Poveys did the plowing 
and not a shred of evidence that, if they knew it was happening, they had done it to try to 
obliterate the road. In that regard Nola Garner had to admit: 
Q. Is there anything that you saw or witnessed or heard that would cause you to 
believe that if Brad Povey planted grain on this roadway, it was anything other than a typical 
fanner accidentally, or maybe not caring, and planting grain on the roadway? 
A. Ask me that question again. 
Q. I'm just asking, isn't it possible that this was just typical fanning going on and not 
an intentional effort on Brad Povey's part to try and obscure the roadway? 
A. There's a possibility. 
Q. And do you have any evidence that would suggest other than that? 
A. Not -- no. 
See, June 2, 2009 Deposition of Nola Garner, pp. 105 - 106, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
Similarly in this regard Daniel Gamer testified: 
Q. Okay. I kind of take it that you wouldn't have fanned it that way? 
A. No. 
Q. Other than that, is there anything that leads you to believe that that planting -- that 
disturbance and planting was done to obliterate the roadway? 
A. Just that it was done in close proximity to the selling to Viehweg. 
Q. Okay. Anything else? 
A. No. 
Q. You haven't heard anybody -- nobody has ever told you that that's why it was done? 
~4 . . 
A. No. 
Q. You never asked anybody why the planting was done there? 
A. No. 
See, June 3, 2009 Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, p. 89, attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
Plaintiffs claim that an inference can be drawn from the plowing alone that it was done 
with the intent to obliterate the Gamer's rights in the road. Plaintiffs overlook the law. On 
summary judgment a party is entitled to only the "reasonable" inferences to be drawn from the 
facts. 
"While this Court will draw reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving 
party, the non-moving party cannot re~t upon mere speculation. The nonmoving 
party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material 
fact exists to withstand summary judgment. A mere scintilla of evidence or only 
slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material 
fact." 
Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 133, 191 P.3d 205, 211 (2008)(intemal citations 
omitted). 
There simply is no evidence to support a reasonable inference that the Poveys, if they 
knew about the plowing, intended anything by it except to plant crops. The Garners did not 
consider either incident of "interference" to be serious enough to even mention it to the Poveys. 
See, June 3, 2009 Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, pp. 61-63, 84-91, attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
Plaintiffs try in their memorandum to make the point that one incident of plowing 
preceded the sale to the Viehwegs, and suggest that that additional fact makes a reasonable 
inference that the plowing was intended to obliterate the roadway. There are two problems with 
this argument. First plaintiffs are not sure that the plowing occurred in proximity with the sale to 
the Viehwegs. Daniel Garner testified: 
Q. "You say it was in close proximity to the sale ofthe property to the Viehwegs? 
A. I'm not sure, but I believe so. 
See, June 3, 2009 Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, p. 89, attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
Even if there were more than supposition about the timing, the problem with that theory 
is that this was not the first time the roadway was plowed-indeed, this time the ground was only 
disturbed, whereas the other time, unrelated in time to any sale of the property-it was actually 
plowed with a three bottom plow. See, June 3, 2009 Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, pp. 61-63, 
attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
There can be little doubt from the record that what occurred was typical farming over a 
dirt farm road, and not some attempt to deny the Garners the use of the road. If it were not so, 
surely the Garners would have at least questioned the practice. Likewise, because it had 
occurred at least once when there was no sale of ground pending, it is obviously something of a 
regular farming practice. No reasonable inference can be taken from the mere fact that the 
roadway was disturbed and planted in conjunction with the fields on either side that it was done 
for any purpose other than to plant crops. 
Thus, there is no evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the 
Poveys did the plowing in the first place, let alone evidence that if they had done it, they 
intended something nefarious by so doing. When no evidence exists to support a plaintiff s 
claims, the claims should not have been brought, and summary judgment is appropriate. 
II. THE GARNERS' TRESPASS CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS. 
The Garners are apparently also pursuing a claim of trespass against the Poveys for the 
plowing of the roadway, even though the trespass never seemed serious enough for the Garners 
to even complain about the practice. It is doubtful that an interference or trespass claim could be 
maintained at all under those circumstances, and if it could, the damages would necessarily be de 
minimis. Because the law cmmot be encumbered with trifles, summary judgment would be 
appropriate on this claim as well. Crosby v. Rowand Machinery Co., 111 Idaho 939, 944, 729 
P.2d 414, 419 (Idaho App. 1986)("Ordinarily, we would not concern ourselves with such a 
modest amount. In view of the limited time and resourc~s of our judicial system, we adhere to 
the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex (the law does not concern itself with trifles)"). But, in 
any event, the claims would be barred by the statute of limitations. Causes of action for trespass 
to real property interests are governed by the three year statute of limitations in Idaho Code, 
section 5-218. The original complaint in this matter was filed on September 17,2008. Since the 
last incidence of plowing occurred in the "spring of 2005," the claims are barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
III. UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE GARNERS CANNOT CLAIM 
ANY PARTICULAR ROADWAY BASED ON THE APPURTENANCE 
LANGUAGE OF THE DEED. 
Because there is no recorded easement, Plaintiffs lawyers have creatively tried to create 
for their clients a right of access by reference to "appurtenances" in the conveying deed to Nola 
and Gary Garner. We know that this is creative lawyering rather than any legitimate expectation 
of the parties because neither Nola Garner nor Daniel Garner could even pronounce the word and 
had no idea what an appurtenance was. See, June 3, 2009 Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, pp. 
244 - 246, attached hereto as Exhibit C; see also, June 2, 2009 Deposition of Nola Gamer, pp. 
223 - 226, attached hereto as Exhibit B. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' assertion, in their response to 
the Poveys' Motion for Summary Judgment, that the original access is clearly fixed, Memo in 
Opp to MSJ, p. 9, does not comport with the record. 
The Garners never wanted their access to follow "the existing roadway." The Garners 
sought from the beginning to change the course of the access roadway so that trucks and farm 
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equipment would not be driven past the house with small children. 
Q. Okay. And you said that you had tried to get the McCullochs to move the 
right-of way, do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you have an idea of where you wanted them to move the right-of-way 
to? 
A. It didn't matter where they moved it. We just couldn't imagine them wanting 
us to go past their house. 
Q. Okay. So it wouldn't have mattered where? 
A. No. 
See, June 2, 2009, Deposition of Nola Garner, p. 215, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
Gary Garner even went so far as relinquishing any right to cross the canal pursuant to the 
original access road in exchange for a crossing at the Rice right-of-way. See, Affidavits of Ron 
Kendall, Ivan Jensen, and Judy Phillips. In that regard, Nola testified: 
Q: Just tell me what you remember in substance of what was said? 
A: That Gary wanted to move it to get out of the childrens' way. 
Q: To move what? 
A: The right-of-way. Get the gravel trucks going down the south - using the Rice 
easement to eliminate them from going past Marlene's [Dean's]. 
See, June 2, 2009, Deposition of Nola Garner, p. 27, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
Under these circumstances, the most that the Garners could hope for out of the vague 
reference to "appurtenances" would be "reasonable access". Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho 
522, 817 P.2d 188 (1991). And, since "it didn't matter where they moved it," the Bethel rule 
that Brad Povey could move it to a suitable . location so long as it was reasonable appears to 
apply. As to the suitability of the route chosen by Brad, the Garners even allege in their Second 
Amended Complaint that the replacement access road which Brad Povey described by metes and 
bounds in the Neigum deed is a reasonable access. See, Second Amended Complaint, ~~ 18 and 
IV. THE POVEYS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES. 
In their verified complaint, the Garners allege that this case arises out of a commercial 
transaction, and therefore they are entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
120. Indeed, as the last section of the Garners' opposition to summary judgment makes clear, 
the Garners are still pursuing claims of breach of a warranty in the deed by which the Garners 
purchased the property from the Poveys. Furthermore, the Garners assert that all the arguments 
made apply to their claims under the warranty deed. See, Memo in Opp to MSJ, p. 18. Clearly 
then the Poveys are entitled to recover all the fees they have expended defending the Garners' 
claims under Idaho Code § 12-120. 
Further, as is apparent from a perusal of the evidence supplied in support of this motion, 
except for some creative lawyering, there is nothing to support these claims against the Poveys. 
There is no evidence and that is painfully clear in the record. These claims should never have 
been brought and should have been dismissed long ago. Idaho Code § 12-121. Plaintiffs appear 
to be arguing that because they survived a motion to dismiss, they cannot be held responsible 
under § 12-121. First of all, § 12-121 applies both to when a case was brought frivolously or 
4 Daniel Garner tries to distance himself from this conclusion by falsely asserting that the original access was thirty 
feet wide. Not only is there no foundation for such an assertion, see Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike 
the Affidavits of Henry Povey and Daniel S. Garner, but it is false and known by Daniel Gamer to be false. Daniel 
testified in his deposition that he installed a gate on the Gamer side of the canal. See, June 3, 2009, Deposition of 
Daniel S. Gamer, p. 25, attached hereto as Exhibit c. The posts for that gate measure 19 feet 7 inches. See, 
September 29,2009, Affidavit of Brad Povey in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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was pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Rule 54(e), Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (emphasis added). Secondly, it would not be the Court's fault that it did not nip this 
suit in the bud on a motion to dismiss when the Plaintiffs were arguing that they had facts which 
could have supported the claim. When it turns out that the Plaintiffs actually had no such facts, 
the Court is not precluded from then imposing the sanction of § 12-121 for the plaintiff having 
led the Court down the primrose path. It would be unfair for the Poveys, who did nothing to 
interfere with or terminate the Garner right of way, who tried earnestly to extricate themselves 
from the fray, yet who then were still required by the Plaintiffs to defend this suit, to be left 
holding the bag for an ill fated lawsuit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Motion for Summary Judgment, the supporting 
memorandum as well as this reply memorandum, the Povey Defendants Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be granted, and the Court should order the Garners to reimburse them for the 
reasonable attorney fees this case has cost. 
Dated this 1 st day of October, 2009. 
ATKIN LAW OFFICS, P.C 
Blake S. Atkin 
Attorney for the Pavey Defendants 
~~10 .. 
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1 A. Well, and I kind of remember the other I', something about your husband - let me start over. 
2 one, but I had -- ifl hadn't of had him tell me I 2 Tell me what Brad Povey told you about what he hl 
3 don't know if! would have remembered. I 3 discussed with your husband with regard to the 
4 Q. Okay. And do you recall anything else I 4 Rice right-of-way. 
5 that was said in either of those conversations by II! 756 A. It was at the city community building 6 your son Lynn? in Clifton and you were there. 
7 A. Yes, but it wasn't about that. I Q. Tell me what you recalL I was there, 
8 Q. Okay. 8 but we need it on the record. 
9 A It wasn't about any of the properties. I 9 A Just that he had talked to -- I'm not 
10 Q. SO it wasn't about anything involved ,'10 recalling it very well. 
11 in this litigation? 11. Q. Just tell me what you remember in 
12 A. No. ! 12 substance of what was said? 
13 Q. What did you say to him during either ! 13 A. That Gary wanted to move it to get out 
14 ofthose conversations? 14 of the childrens' way. 
15 A. I asked him why his dad told him that 15 Q. To move what? 
16 Q. Anything else? 16 A. The right-of-way. Get the gravel 
17 A. I can't think of anything pertaining 17 trucks going down the south -- using the Rice 
18 to that otherwise. 18 easement to eliminate them from going past 
19 Q. How did he respond to that? Did he 19 Marlene's. 
20 tell you why his dad had told him that? 20 Q. Fair enough. Do you recall anything 
21 A. I don't know exactly how it was said, 21 else of that conversation with Brad Povey? 
22 but it was in regards to the safety of Marlene's 22 A. Not the direct conversation. I 
23 children. 23 couldn't quote -- well, as you can see, I can't 
24 Q. And who is Marlene? 24 quote anything. 
5 
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1 Q. SO the substance of it was a concern 1 you've told -- have you told me all of the 
2 about the safety of the Dean children? 2 substance that you can remember of a conversation? 
3 A. Yes. ! 3 A. . Do I have to tell him everything I 
4 Q. Okay. And hearing that from your son 4 remember? 
5 Lynn, was that the first time you had heard that 5 :MR.. ATK1N: l'Ulet your counsel tell you, 
6 as a concern that your husband had had? 6 but you do. 
7 A. Yes. 7 TIffi WITNESS: I got mad at him because he 
8 :MR. MCFARLAND: You may have already 8 said things that I didn't think was correct. 
9 addressed this, but when we say Lynn are we 9 Q. (BY:MR. ATKlN) Tell me the things that 
10 talking about Daniel Garner? 10 he said that you do not think were correct. 
11 MR. ATKIN: No. Lynn Gamer is another 11 A. I do a goodjob of forgetting things 
12 son. 12 like that That's how I eIljoy my neighbors. 
13 MR. MCFARLAND: Okay. Thank you. 13 Q. If you can recall, tell me what you 
14 MR. ATKIN: I knew who she was talking 14 got upset about. 
15 about, but I'm glad we have it clear on the 15 A. I can't really recall now. 
16 record. 16 Q. Okay. Other than that semi public 
17 Q. (BY l\.1R. ATKIN) Have you toldme all 17 conversation with Brad Povey, have you ever had 
18 that you can remember about your conversations 18 any other conversations with him on that subject? 
19 with your son Lynn about why your husband wanted 19 A. I have had other conversations with 
20 to establish the Rice right-of-way? 20 Brad, but I don't believe that the Rice 
21 A. I think so. 21 right-of-way was ever in it. 
22 Q. Okay. Now tell me about your 22 Q. Okay. Have you ever had any 
23 conversations with Brad Pavey. You said that Brad 23 conversations with Brad Povey about any of the 
24 had also mentioned something similar to you, or 124 right-of-ways or the roadways? 
25 had mentioned to you your husband's concerns or I 25 A. I have. 
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1 . The gravel is real strong down towards the , 1 Q. All right. But the roadway itself, 
2 Westside Highway, but then you can see the gravel i 2 being able to see the roadway, is reestablished by 
3 tlUnning out as you get further up the road. Do I 3 driving across it again? 
4 you see that? i 4 A. You would see the trail, yeah. 
5 A. I think: it's because it's been farmed I 5 Q. Okay. 
6 that it's thinning out there. I 6 A. -But it doesn't look as much like a 
7 Q. Well, and I'm just asking -- didn't I] road. 
a you tell me earlier that the gravel was best down I 8· Q. Let me ask you, after you saw one of 
9 by the Westside Highway and then after the grain ! 9 Walt Povey's boys doing this, disturbing the 
10 bin -- 10 ground and then planting grain on the roadway, did 
11 A. And by the barn where the milk is 11 you ever drive across that portion of the roadway 
12 picked up. It would be the same all the way down. I' 1132 again? 
13 Q. But beyond that point, up past the A. Yes. 
14 grain bin - 14 Q. How often? 
15 A. But up in this part it would be less. 15 A. Me? 
16 Q. Right. More like a typical two-lane 16 Q. Yeah. 
17 farm road, correct? 17 A. I went through the grain patch once 
18 A. Yeah. 18 and felt vel)' guilty. I probably went twice. I 
19 Q. Okay. And you have seen, haven't you, 19 don't go up there vety often. 
20 where farmers drill ground and they don't shut the 20 Q. All right And why did you feel 
21 grain drill off as they go across the road and 21 guilty? 
22 actually plant crops in the road? 22 A. Well, it was a beautiful stand of 
23 A. I have seen that done. 
24 Q. Is there anything that you saw or 
25 wjtnessed or beard tbat would cause you to believe 
Page 106 
1 that if Brad Povey planted grain on this roadway, 
2 it was anything other than a typical fanner 
3 accidentally, or maybe not caring, and planting 
4 grain on the roadway? 
5 A Ask me that question again. 
6 Q. I'm just asking, isn't it possible 
7 that this was just typical farming going on and 
a not an intentional effort on Brad Povey's part to 
9 try to obscure the roadway? 
10 A. There's a possibility. 
11 Q. And do you have any evidence that 
12 would suggest other than that? 
13 A. Not -- no. 
14 Q. Now, it's true, too, isn't it, that 
15 after you -- after a farmer has drilled a country 
16 road that way, if you continue to use the road it 
17 isn't long before the roadway is completely 
18 reestablished? 
19 A. No, that is not true. 
20 Q. Haven't you seen where driving across 
21 the roadway after it's been planted causes the new 
22 plants to be killed and the roadway is 
23 reestablished? 
24 A. But you lose the gravel. You lose 
25 your road base. 
23 grain. 
24 Q. "When youdrove through that grain 
25 patch, tbe once or twice that you did, did anyone 
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1 . protest about you driving through the grain patch? 
2 A. No. 
3 MR MCFARLAND: This is grain on the road? 
4 Q. (BYMR. ATKIN) I assume so. You were 
5 driving on what had been the driveway through 
6 grain? 
7 A. I don't like to get stuck. And I just 
8 got a new knee so I haven't liked to walk for 
9 quite a while. 
10 Q. But you were driving through the part 
11 where the road had gone? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Okay. And nobody complained about you 
14 doing that? 
15 A. No, no one. 
16 Q. SO there was a portion of the road 
17 where this disturbance occurred and some grain had 
18 been planted. And then was there another portion 
19 of the road past that that continued on up to the 
20 canal and across the canal? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. SO the portion that you were driving 
23 was between where the tillage or the disturbance 
1
24 started and the disturbance ended, is that fair to 
25 say? 
(208) 345-9611 M & M CJ>~ORTING SERVICE, INC. (208) 345-8800 (fa.--c) 
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11 Q. \Vbat is it? 
2 A They said they would testify for us. 
3 Q. wno did? 
4 A Hank and Melanie. 
5 Q. Okay. They told you that they would 
6 testifY -- okay. I understand that might have 
7 added to your reasons for not naming them as 
8 parties. My question is, your breach of warranty 
9 claim against Brad and Leiza Povey -
10 A. That's to the right-of-way. 
11 Q. The beach of the warranty. When they 
12 sold the property to you by warranty deed you're 
13 claiming that they breached that warranty, right? 
14 A. (Witness nodded her head.) 
15 Q. I'mjust trying to understand that. 
16 What is your claim that they breached the 
17 warranty? You said before that Brad and Leiza 
18 sold the property to the Deans, the Viehwegs and 
19 the Neigums. It's a simple question. 
20 A. WeIl-
21 Q. Does your breach of the warranty claim 
22 arise out ofthe sale by Brad and Leiza to the 
23 Deans, the Neigums and the Viehwegs? 
24 A. I think it does. For me I no longer 
25 have a right=Df-way through there 
2 
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A. I believe that's correct. 
Q. Okay. You said that when you 
bought -- when Danny bought his parcel from the 
McCullochs, that you and your husband, and I'm not 
sure T understood, but was it Gary that gave him 
advice about paying some money for a right-of-way 
across the McCullochs' property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Aud he told him to pay for a 
right-of-way across the property so that you won't 
have future complaints about the use of the 
right-of-way? 
A. That's basically what I understood. 
Q. Okay. Aud you said that you had tried 
to get the McCuliochs to move the right-of-way, do 
you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Aud did you have an idea of where you 
wanted them to move the right-of-way to? 
A. It didn't matter ¥!here they moved it. 
We just couldn't imagine them wanting us to go 
past their house. " 
Q. Okay_ So it wouldn't have mattered 
where? 
A No 
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1 Q. Okay. Let me ask you this. You don't 1 Q. It could have followed basically the 
2 think. that Hank and Melanie did anything that 2 route of what's now the Neigum driveway and that 
3 breached their warranty to you? That you had 3 would be okay? . 
4 whatever rights you had to the property they sold 4 A That would be okay. 
5 you; is that correct? 5 Q. Okay. So basically what you're 
6 A I believe because they didn't -- they 6 talking about isn't necessarily the route ofthe 
7 no longer owned it 7 northern roadway, but some roadway through the 
8 Q. Okay. So as of the time -- you're not i McCulloch property? 
9 claiming that any of the Poveys, Brad and Leiza or I 9 A Just some place, yes. 
10 Hank and Melanie, did anything to breach their i 10 MR. ATKIN: Okay. That's all I've got 
11 warranty to you until after they sold the property ! 11 THE WITNESS: That wasn't bad at alL 
12 . th? I, 12 MR. B OWN ha.l"; . to you; IS at correct. R : I ve a Lew questIOns. 
13 A I don't think that they have done 113 EXAMINATION 
14 anything deliberately to hurt, they just neglected 114 BY MR. BROWN: 
15 to take care. Does that answer the question? 115 Q. Nola, I want to go back and clarifY a 
16 Q. I think so. I'm just tying to 116 couple of parts on the record with respect to some 
17 understand how they neglected. They neglected to 117 of the questions the attorneys have asked you 
18 take care of your interests in the deeds that they 118 today_ 
19 gave to the Deans and the Viehwegs and the /19 Going back to some questions asked by 
20 Neigums, is that what you're saying? 120 Mr. Atkin, he asked yo~ questions about :vhy the 
21 A. That's right. I 21 Deans were upset. I belIeve that you testIfied 
22 Q. Aud since Hank and Melanie weren't 122 that they were upset about the existence of a 
23 parties to those deeds that went to the Deans, the /23 right-of-way going in front oftheir home and they 
24 Neigums and the Viehwegs, you don't have any 124 didn't know about it until after they'd purchased 
25 breach of warranty claim against them? r 25 the property; is that right? 
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1 was going up to the Pavey property, I used the 1 Q. Okay. Nola, Mr. Atkin asked you about 
2 north one. 2 the deed whereby Daniel acquired his interest from 
3 Q. Okay. Nola, you understand that there ,3 the McCullochs. He asked you whether the deed 
4 has been a stipulation entered that permits the ! 4 contained any reference to the right-of-way. Do 
5 plaintiffs in tbis lawsuit to access the property !:".!I ~5 you remember that? 
6 via the middle roadway during the pendency of the A. Yes. 
7 lawsuit? Q. Are you familiar with that deed? 
8 A. I do understand that. ! 8 Would it be helpful to look at it if I were to ask 
9 Q. And there was some discussion about ! 9 you a question about it? 
10 how Danny felt that he didn't truly have the 110 A. Yes, it would be very helpful. 
11 ability to access in that fashion, but I don't 111:MR BROWN: Would you mind, Blake, ifI 
12 want to talk about that. "What I do want to ask, j 12 used your exhibits there? 
13 was there -- I'll start the question over. 113:MR ATKIN: Sure. 
14 !vIr. Atkin asked you some questions /14 TIIE WITNESS: I imagine I read that when it 
15 about whether the northern or middle roadways i 15 was new. 
16 would be useless if they did not allow you to ! 16 Q. (BY MR. BROWN) Nola, you see there the 
17 cross the canal. Do you remember the questions ! 17 deed and it's obviously a legal description to the 
18 that he asked about that? 118 property that Daniel acquired. I'd like you to 
19 A. Yes. 119 read this last sentence down here beginning with 
20 Q. Has there ever been a time since you ! 20 the capitalized words to have and hold. Just read 
21 acquired an interest in any of these properties I 21 the first line there as well as you can. I know 
22 west of the Twin Lakes Canal when you have not 122 the print isn't terribly clear. 
23 been able to cross the canal via the northern I 23 A. To have and to hold the said premises 
24 roadway? II 24 with, and I don't know what that is. 
25 A When the canal company employees 25 MR BROWN' Would cOllnsel object to my 
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1 started to take the bridge out there was probably 1 coaching her to the correct word that I'm trying 
2 a little time then. Whether it was hours or until 2 to have her read? 
3 the next day, I don't know. 3 MR. ATKIN: What word is it that she can't 
4 Q. Okay. 4 read? 
5 A. But there would be some time there. 5 MR. BROWN: Their appurtenances. 
6 Q. But it was - 6 MR. SMITH: Do you understand what that 
7 A I don't know how many boards they had 7 means? 
8 taken off. . 8 THE WITNESS: No, I don't. 
9 Q. But it was an extremely brief period I 9 MR. SMITH: You're going to have her read 
10 oftime? 110 it even though she doesn't understand it? 
11 A Yes. 111 MR. BROWN: I'll have her read it and if 
12 Q. At some point you were asked by Mr. I 12 the questioning doesn't result in anything 
13 Atkin whether you used the middle roadway at any )13 helpful I'll move on. 
14 point. You said that you had out of respect for 114 MR. ATKIN: I don't know what good it is to 
15 the desire of the Deans to have safety for their ! 15 read a document she doesn't understand, but go 
16 children, you had used the middle roadway on 116 ahead. 
17 occasion; is that accurate? ,17 THE WITNESS: Appurtenances to the said 
18 A. That's right :1: 1189 grantee. 
19 Q. Did you at any point, either verbally Q. (BY MR. BROWN) You can stop right 
20 or by signing a legal instrument, agree to 120 there. I can see that this line of questioning 
21 relinquish an interest in the northern roadway? 121 probably won't be helpful to us. I'll move on. 
22 A No. J 22 A. That is very difficult to decipher. 
23 Q. SO you did it personally as a favor I 23 Q. I understand. 
24 for the Deans? i '24 MR SIv:l.ITH: For the attorneys too. 
25 A. And the Neigums. 125 Q. (BY MR. BROWN) Okay. I want to review 
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1 . this one issue with respect to the knowledge that 
2 the Poveys had about the property they sold to 
3 you. There's been -- you earlier testified that 
4 the Poveys knew that there was a right-of-way 
5 passing through the properties that they 
6 ultimately conveyed to the Deans, Neigums and 
7 Viehwegs that allowed access to the property west 
8 ofthe Twin Lakes Canal? 
9 A. That's right. 
10 Q. Okay. And how is it that Brad and 
11 Leiza Povey knew there was a right-of-way through 
12 that property? 
13 A. Maybe I shouldn't say they knew. It 
14 had been used for quite a number of years. They 
15 bought the property off of their uncle that sold 
16 it to us. I think it's her uncle. The McCullochs 
17 anyway. 
18 Q. Let me ask you this, Nola. There was 
19 a period of time when you owned property fonnerly 
20 owned by the Poveys west of the Twin Lakes Canal 
21 contemporaneous, or at the same time, when the 
22 Poveys still owned property that they subsequently 
·23 sold to the Deans, Neigums and Viehwegs, right? 
24 A. Yes. 
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1 access your property west of the Twin Lakes Canal 
2 through the northern roadway? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And did the Poveys know that you used 
5 that northern roadway? 
6 
7 
8 
A. They should have. 
Q. How should they have known? 
A. Well, driving past their house. 
9 Q. It was clearly openly visible to them? 
10 A. (Witness nodded her head.) 
11 Q. Okay. I want to bring you back to a 
12 moment when Mr. Smith, the attorney for the Deans, 
13 Neigums and Viehwegs, asked you a question about 
14 which parties were responsible for disturbing the 
15 ground on the northern roadway. He asked you 
16 whether the Deans, Neigums or Viehwegs had 
17 anything to do with tilling over the road or 
18 planting grain. You answered that they did not 
19 have anything to do with that; is that right? . 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Did that answer apply to the party or . 
22 parties responsible for erecting the fence at the 
23 convergence, as we've described it today, of the 
24 northern roadway and the middle roadway? 
25 A. No. 
.MR. SMITH: Objection. Vague. I don't 
understand the question. 
I 5 
I 
Q. (BY MR. BROWN) Okay. Mr. Smith aske( 
you did the Deans, the Neigums or the Viehwegs 
till over the road or disturb the road. You said? 
! 6 A. No. I didn't answer that correctly, 
I ~ because they did not till the road, but Viehwegs did put up a fence. 
i 9 
110 
111 
112 
Q. That's what I wanted to make sure I 
understood. When you said no, your description of 
their not being involved in the disturbance 
applied only to tilling of the ground and planting 
13 grain? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. It did not apply to the erection of 
16 the fence. And for- clarity of the record, who was 
17 responsible for the fence there at the convergence 
18 ofthose two roads? 
19 A. It's on the Viehweg property. I 
20 didn't see the Viehwegs putting it up, but I 
21 assume they did it. 
22 Q. That's fine. One last question here. 
23 Mr. McFarland, the attorney for the title company, 
24 asked you some questions about legal access and 
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1 that Danny has in property. It was established 
2 that Danny has at least some fractional interest 
3 in property that the Rice road accesses. 
4 Could you talk to me a little bit 
5 about the nature of the access that the Rice road 
6 provides? Let me clarifY that. The question 
7 wasn't terribly good. What type of access does 
8 the Rice road provide to you to your properties 
9 west of the Twin Lakes Canal? 
10 A. Very poor. 
11 Q. And what do you mean by very poor? 
12 A. It's steep going up and it's steep 
13 falling off on both sides. 
14 Q. I seem to recall testimony about the 
15 seasonal nature of the use ofthe Rice roadway_ 
16 Is there - are there some limitations with 
17 respect to the Rice roadway dictated by weather, 
18 the seasons? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Describe those limitations. 
21· A. If there was any snow or ice you 
22 couldn't get up. 
123 Q. SO would it be fair to say that in 
/
24 wintery conditions, when there's an accumulation 
25 of snow, that the Rice road wouldn't provide 
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1 picking up milk every other day, I assume. I 1 
2 Q. Okay. So do\Vl1 closer to Westside I 2 3 Highway is -- I 3 
4 A. Up to the hay bam is was used. And 
I 
4 
5 cattle above that that he fed. Like I said, it 5 
6 was a dairy operation with corrals. 6 
7 Q. SO up to the hay bam it wasn't a I 
7 
B two-track road? B 
9 A. Correct. I 9 
10 Q. How about beyond that? 110 
11 A. Beyond that it was a two-track road, 11 
12 like what you would see in the picture, or the 12 
13 exhibit. 13 
14 Q. Okay. And I understand that currently 14 
15 there is a gate at the end of the road -where-- 15 
16 just before it crosses Twin Lakes Canal? 16 
17 A. Correct. 17 
18 Q. You installed that gate? i8 
19 A. Yes, I did. 19 
20 Q. When did you install that gate? 20 
21 A. Oh, how close do I need to be? 21 
22 Q. The best of your recollection is all 22 
23 we can ask. 23 
24 A. Roughly two years after Neigmns 24 
Page 26 
Page 27 
see that that gate there is not adequate and I've 
talked with my mother about it. It's been hit n'1O 
or three times. 
Q. Okay. 
A. It's not on the binges anymore. 
Q. It was not me. I've not driven that 
road. 
A. I'll remember that 
Q. Again, I'm not going to mark this as 
an exhibit, but I have a copy if you need to look 
at it of the second amended complaint in this 
matter. At the tend of the second amended 
complaint there is what's called a verification. 
Do you understand what that is? 
A. I believe that to be me signing to say 
that what's in the complaint is accurate to the 
best of my knowledge. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Is that what it is? 
Q. That's fair enough. And that is your 
signature on page 32 of the second amended 
complaint? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Did you read the second amended 
. ? 
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1 Q. And what was your reason in installi:p.g 1 A. Correct. 
2 the gate? 2 Q. And the information contained in the 
3 A. The gate that was across there had 3 . second amended complaint was true and accurate to 
4 been destroyed. 4 the best of your knowledge? 
5 Q. SO there had been a gate -- was there 5 A. Correct. 
6 a gate when you bought the property? 6 Q. Now let me talk to you about this 
7 A. Yes. 7 middle road, that is also referred to as the 
8 Q. And it had been destroyed? 8 Neigurn driveway. At the time you purchased the 
9 A. Yes. 9 property what was the condition of that road? Was 
10 Q. Do you know how it was destroyed? 10 it also a gravel road? 
11 A. It was barbed wire gate and had just 11 A. There was no road there. 
12 been - 12 Q. Okay. 
13 Q. Deteriorating over the years? 13 A. It was a field. 
14 A. Yeah. 14 Q. I've seen - at least there was a 
15 Q. When you installed the new gate - how 15 roadway in that same area that went up into the 
16 wide is the new gate you installed? 16 field and ultimately converged with the northern 
17 A. Hmm~ the new gates were two 12-foot 17 roadway, although it may not have taken the same 
18 gates that my mother purchased. They overlap a 18 course that the Neigum driveway now takes. Do you 
19 little. My rough guess would be 20 to 21 feet. 19 recall that? 
20 Q. The gate that you replaced, how wide 20 A. Can you show me on a picture? 
21 was it? 21 Q. I'm not sure I have a picture that 
22 A. Oh, it would have been 25, 26 feet 22 shows that. Let me ask you, based on your 
23 Q. It was wider than the gate you 23 recollection, do you recall there being a roadway 
24 replaced it with? 24 to the south of what --
25 A. Correct If you go up there you'll 25 A. At the time that I purchased it? 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COlttl~RTINn SFRVTrF rnr (7()l!\ ':!L1'UI~()() (f"y\ 
Page 611 
! 
1 A.. Right. 1 
2 Q. Okay. Now, there is an allegation in 2 
3 the complaint in this matter that the Poveys at 3 
4 some point plowed the roadway. You're familiar 4 
5 with that allegation? 5 
6 A. Yes. 6 
7 Q. What do you mow about that? Did you 7 
8 see the Poveys plowing the roadway? 8 
9 A. Which time? ! 9 
10 Q. Well, was there more than one time ! 10 
11 that the roadway was plowed? In 
12 A. Plowed, tilled. 112 
13 Q. Well, maybe you can help me out. The 113 
14 allegation in the complaint is that the roadway i 14 
15 was plowed. Was the roadway ever plowed? 115 
16 A Y . 1116 . es, SIr. 
17 Q. Do you know what a plow is? i 17 
18 A v . 118 
• 1 es, SIr. I 
19 Q. Okay. What kind of plow was used to ' 19 
20 plow the road? /20 
21 A. A three bottom. I 21 
22 Q. And did you see the roadway being 122 
23 plowed? i 23 
24 A. No. 124 
25 Q How do you know it was plowed by a ! 25 
Page 62! 
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A. My father. 
Q. What did you say to your father? 
A. He carne and pulled me out. He told 
me -- I wanted to go -- I was quite upset. He 
calmed me down and told me not to worry about it. 
Once the field was planted it would be accessible 
again. That was the end of it. . 
Q. Okay. So did you talk to anyone else 
about it? 
A No. 
Q. So your father considered it not a big 
deal, wasn't that big of a deal, you shouldn't get 
upset about it? 
A. I don't mow what he considered, sir. 
Q. Okay. Fair enough. He told you don't 
wony about it, the field will be planted and once 
it's planted you'll be able to access the property 
. ? agam. 
A. That's what he told me. 
Q. Okay. I guess the field was 
eventually planted? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And after that you were able to access 
your property again? 
A Yes 
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1 three bottom plow? 
2 A. I mow what a plowed field looks like, 
3 sir. 
4 
·,i,.11 21 Q'?i~ you talk to anyone else about that 
plowing mCldent? 
I! ~ ~d the roadway was reestablished 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Q. So you saw the roadway after it had 
been plowed? 
A. I got stuck in it, sir. 
Q. You got stuck in it with what? 
A. A green GMC pickup. 
Q. Okay. When did the plowing occur? 
A. Early nineties, late eighties. 
11 Q. Okay. While the Poveys still owned 
12 the property? 
13 A. Correct 
14 Q. And again, you didn't see the plowing 
15 occurring, but you got stuck in it as you tried to 
16 drive through it? 
17 A. Correct. It was done and I went up to 
18 access my property and got stuck. 
19 Q. Okay. Do you know who did the 
20 plowing? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Did you ever talk to anyone about the 
23 plowing on the road? 
24 
25 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who did you talk to? 
I
'!.,.! 576 after ~e ~:~~~ occurred? 
Q. Now, this plowing didn't occur along 
8 the full length of the roadway? 
1 9 A. No. 
1
10 
ill 
I 12 
113 I 114 
! 15 
f 16 
117 
! 
Q. About how much of the roadway was 
plowed? 
A. Hmm, from the hay barn up. 
Q. All the way up to the canal? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And as I understand it, at that time 
the ground on both sides of the roadway was being 
farmed? 
i 18 A. Correct. 
119 Q. And when the field was planted do you 
120 mow what it was planted with? 121 A. I don't. I went back to college, or 
! 22 wherever I went. 
123 Q. SO this was while you were still in 
124 college? 
! 25 A. Early nineties, late eighties, yes, 
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Q. And then did you go back to using the 
2 roadway after that? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Was there anything planted on the 
5 roadway or was it just disturbed? 
6 A. At one time there was oats planted 
7 across the driveway, yes. 
8 Q. And did you have to drive across the 
9 oats to reestablish the roadway? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Did anybody complain to you about 
12 driving across the oats? 
13 A. No. 
14 !vIR. BROV1N: Perhaps we can break for a 
15 moment? 
16 MR. ATKIN: Sure. This is a good time .. 
17 (Recess.) 
18 Q. (BY MR ATKlN) Daniel, did you ever 
19 have a conversation with Leiza Povey about the 
20 safety of her children and her concerns about her 
21 childrens' safety in connection with the use of 
22 the northern right-of-way? 
23 A. Not that I remember. 
24 Q. Do you recall running over their 
. ? 
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1 of the Viehweg property, describing the Neigum 
2 driveway or that middle access road. Are you 
3 familiar with that? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q. And that one specifically references 
6 your use of that right-of-way to access your 
7 property on the west side of Twin Lakes Canal? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q. Now, before those two deeds were 
10 recorded, the Dean deed and the Neigum deed that 
11 described those rights of way, there weren't any 
12 deeds recorded that described your access rights 
13 across what had been the McCulloch property, is 
14 there? 
15 A. I believe that's correct. 
16 . 
17 
lIB 
19 
20 
21 
22 
/23 
24 
Q. Do you know of anything filed by Brad 
Povey or Leiza Povey that tries to deny your right 
of access across the property that had been owned 
by the McCullochs? 
A No, not to my mowledge. 
Q. Are you aware of anything that Brad 
Povey or Leiza Povey has ever done that tries to 
deny or negate the idea that you have a 
right-of-way across the McCulloch property? 
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1 A. No, I don't remember that. 1 right-of-way that we've talked about. 
2 Q. Ibat doesn't jog your memory of any 2 Q. Okay. Anything other than that? 
3 discussion with her about those concerns? 3 A. No. 
4 A. No. 4 Q. And I mow I asked you about the 
5 Q. Now, as I understand it, there came a 5 plowing. Let me make sure I ask about the later 
6 point in time, and we've got a document we can 6 disturbance. Other than that disturbance, is 
7 look at if we need to, but in connection with his 7 there anything that leads you to believe that that 
8 sale of a parcel of property Brad Pavey and Leiza 8 was anything more than planting of the two fields? 
9 Povey put into one of the deeds a legal 9 In other words, is there anything that makes you 
10 description of a right-of-way across the property 10 think that he was trying to -- whoever disturbed 
11 leading to the bridge we've talked about across 11 that was trying to obliterate the right-of-way and 
12 the Twin Lakes Canal. That was a right-of-way for 12 it wasn't just fanning? 
13 your use to access your property on the west side 13 A. Just that it's awful hard to plant 
14 of the Twin Lakes Canal. Are you familiar with 14 around granaries and the structures there with the 
15 that deed? 15 little bit of oats that you get. It seems that 
16 A. There's two deeds that reference it 16 you would have left it. 
17 Which one is it? There's one on the Dean deed and 17 Q. Okay. I'm not sure I understand that 
18 it shows it on the old one. I' 18 If you'll look at exhibit M again, maybe you can 
19 Q. That's true. In the Dean deed it 19 describe it for me. This disturbance occurred 
20 references a right-of-way at the south 20 feet of 120 between tract 1 ofthe Viehweg property and tract 
21 the Dean deed, I believe? 121 2 ofthe Viehweg property, across that area? 
22 A. Right. i 22 A. Correct. 
23 Q. And then there's a deed -- in the deed 23 Q. And where is the granary? 
24 to the Neigums there's an actual description of a 24 A. There's a couple of granaries here. 
25 right-of-way coming along about the south bound~ 25 Q. Okay. 
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1 A .. And it seems awful funny to mess Vvith 1 Q. Show us where that is. In fact, if 
2 t.hat comer a.Tld to plant it. 
3 MR MCFARLAND: Counsel, for the record, 
2 you'll take my pen and draw a line to show \vhere 
3 you think it is. 
4 Mr. Gamer was pointing to the south part of that 
5 stretch of that right-of-way between tract 1 and 
4 A. I'm allowed to do that? 
5 Q. Yes. 
6 tract 2? 6 A. From this post up to here and across 
7 MR ATK1N: Actually, be was pointing on 
8 exhibit M to the westerly portion of the 
7 the road like that. You can see the change in 
8 color. 
9 right-of-way. 9 Q. How wide of an area was disturbed? 
10 MR SIv11TH: Let's go offtbe record. 10 A. I don't know. Whatever it is from --
(Discussion off the record.) 11 I don't know. I haven't measured it. 11 
12 Q. (BY MR. ATKIN) Let me show you what was 
13 marked exhibit 1 -- or let me show you exhibit 2. 
12 Q. Okay. And was it also disturbed in 
13 the area past the grain bin? 
14 That may be what we want. Are you familiar with 14 A. Belovv? 
15 that photograph? 15 Q. To the west of the grain bin. 
16 A. Yes, sir. 16 A. To the west? 
17 Q. And who took the photograph? 17 Q. Yes. 
18 A. My wife. 18 A. Oh, yes. 
19 Q. Okay. And was that photograph taken 19 Q; IfI understand it correctly, this is 
20 on or about May 28th, 2008? 20 a picture looking west? 
21 A. Yes, sir. 21 A. No. Oh, yes, this is looking west. 
22 Q. Because exhibit 3 shows that date, May 
23 28th, 2008? 
22 Q. Okay. And where you've marked is on 
23 the east side of the grain bin, correct? 
24 A. Yes, sir. 24 A. No. That's where it goes north to 
25 Q All right What is that photograph -- 25 smrtb across the road, across the right-of-way 
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1 you're familiar with the area where that 1 Q. I understand that, but where you put 
2 photograph was taken? 2 the markings - the disturbance went north and 
3 A. Yes, sir. 3 south across the roadvvay, correct? 
4 Q. And does that photograph accurately 4 A. Correct. 
5 depict the area that is photographed? 5 Q. But we're on the east side of the 
6 A. Yes, sir. 6 grain bin? 
7 Q. And what does it show? 7 A. Yes. It was both on the east and west 
8 A. It shows the northerly right-of-way 8 sides ofthe grain bin. 
9 that bisects the Viehweg property. I believe he's 9 Q. SO both sides of the grain bin? 
10 standing on the Dean property about halfway up. 10 A. Yes. 
11 Is that what you want? 11 Q. Okay. And the field to the north of 
12 Q. When you say it bisects the Viehweg 12 the roadway, was it also planted in oats? 
13 property, are we looking at the westerly portion 13 A. Above the pole. 
14 of segment A as shown in exhibit M? 14 Q. Beyond this pole it was planted in 
15 A. Correct 15 oats? 
16 Q. Okay. And where on exhibit M would 16 A. Yeah. Up in here. 
17 the person taking the photograph be standing? 17 Q. Okay. The north --
18 A. In here somewhere. 18 A. I know - this tract vvas planted, yes. 
19 Q. Okay. Somewhere near the convergence 19 Q. Tract 1 ofthe Viehweg property on 
20 ofPovey tract 2 and Povey tract I? 20 exhibit M was planted? 
21 A. Probably. 21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. All right. On deposition exhibit 22 Q. Was tract 2 of the Viehweg property 
23 number 2 can you see the portion of ground that 23 also planted in oats? 
24 your telling me was disturbed and planted? 24 A. Correct. 
25 A. Yes. 25 Q. And so the disturbance would have gone 
(,)OR) ~4"_Qhl1 1..,f 1', 1..,f rV.TroT DT::D~~IOlEDUTf"'1:' ThTf"' (')no\ '> AC oon£) {C_ .. \ 
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across the road in the area between tract 1 and ,I 1 A. Correct. 
2 tract 2 of the Viehweg property? 2 Q. And your memory of when this property 
3 A. Correct. ,11
11 
3 was disturbed and the oats were planted, you know 
4 Q. Missing the grain bin, basically? 4 it was in the spring of the year sometime? 
5 A. Correct. 5 A. Yes. That's when you usually plant. 
6 Q. Okay. I kind of take it that you 6 Q. Well, you got stuck sometime in the 
7 wouldn't have farmed it that way? I 7 spring of the year with your backhoe? 
8 A. No. I 8 A. That would have been the year after it 
9 Q. Other than that, is there anything I 9 was planted. 
10 that leads you to believe that that planting -- , 10 ' Q. Oh, the year after? 
11 that disturbance and planting was done to 111 A. Yes. 
12 obliterate the roadway? 12 Q. Not the same year it was planted? 
13 A. Just that that was done in close 13 A. No. 
14 proximity to the selling to Viehweg. 14 Q. Do you know what year you got stuck? 
15 Q. Okay. Anything else? 15 A. No. 
16 A. No. 16 Q. Any way that you could refresh your 
17 Q. You haven't heard anybody - nobody 17 recollection and try to find out what year? 
18 has ever told you that that's why it was done? 18 A. Maybe, but I'll have to think about 
19 A No. 19 it. 
20 Q. You never asked anybody why the 20 Q. No documents that you can refer to? 
21 planting was done there? 21 
22 A No: 22 
23 Q. You say it was in close proximity to 23 
Are there documents that you could refer to that 
would refresh your recollection as to w'hen you got 
stuck with your backhoe? 
24 the sale of the property to the Viehwegs? 24 A. Maybe. 
25 A I'm not ~mre, but I believe so ,25 Q What would they be? 
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1 Q.' Okay. Do you know when the property 1 A. Calving records. 
2 was sold to the Viehwegs? 2 Q. Okay. How would the calving records 
3 A. 2005. 3 help you remember? 
4 Q. How do you know that? 4 A. IfI bappened to write it in there. 
5 A Thafs when the deed was recorded. 5 Q. Describe your calving records for me. 
6 Q. When did you first learn that the 6 A. I usually have the cow number, calf 
7 property had been sold to the Viehwegs? 7 number, problems that the cow had having the calf, 
8 A. 2008. 8 whether the calf was delivered live or dead. 
9 Q. Okay. So at the time that the 9 Q. And you're -
10 property was being sold, you were not aware ofit? 10 A. Feed ratios. 
11 A. Correct. 11 Q. And you keep accurate records that way 
12 Q. The Viehwegs don't live there? 12 of your calfs? 
13 A. No. 13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And somebody farms the property for 14 Q. And why would those records show when 
15 the Viehwegs? 15 you got stuck? 
16 A. I assume. 16 A. Only ifl was upset enough that I 
17 Q. You don't know who that is? 17 wrote it down when I got home, which I don't 
18 A I don't. 18 believe I was. I don't know. 
19 Q. Somebody must because it gets at least 19 Q. You still have those calving records? 
20 pastured? 20 A. Yes. 
21 A. Correct. 21 Q. Going back how far? 
22 Q. Maybe some hay cut off of it So you 22 A. Since we went organic. 
23 wouldn't have any reference point for knowing when 23 Q. Which would have been? 
24 the property was sold to the Viehwegs, other than 24 A. '87, 188. 
25 the deed? I 25 Q. Okay. So going basically back to --
r')()O\ "A'" (\""11 •• n .. ~~y"'~ • .l~~ ___ -------- - -- . ... . - -_ ... -
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1 south at some point? 
2 A. It can be done by horse. 
3 Q. Not by vehicle, but by horse? 
4 A. Correct. 
5 Q. And you've done that? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Your property that is south and east 
8 of the section 34 property, does it abut the 
9 Westside Highway or is there a road you take off 
10 of the Westside Highway to get on to that 
11 property? 
12 A. It abuts. 
13 Q. SO you can literally step off the 
14 Westside Highway onto your property? 
15 A. Correct. 
16 Q. And do you know how much frontage is 
17 along the Westside Highway? 
18 A. I don't know. 
19 Q. Can you guess? Is it a mile? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. A football field? 
22 A. A rough guess, a quarter of a mile. 
23 Q. Roughly a quarter mile of frontage. 
24 At any point on that quarter mile offrontage you 
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1 ride a horse up to your section 34 property? 
2 A. Ride a horse, yes. 
3 Q. That kind of gets to the next 
4 question. I believe it was Mr. Smith that asked 
5 you, going back to the original contract, we 
6 talked about that there was an irrigation pipe 
7 that you couldn't break - you couldn't 
8 disassemble or move if the pump was running; is 
9 that right? 
10 A. Correct. 
11 Q. You also testified that there had been 
12 times you went up there and found the pump running 
13 so you couldn't move the pipe? 
14 A. Correct 
15 Q. What did you do at those times? Did 
16 you access the property some other way or just not 
17 access your property? 
18 A. Just not access it. 
19 Q. Okay. And you would just come back at 
20 some future time to see if the pump was off? 
21 A. Yeah. Wait three or four days and it 
22 was usually off. 
23 Q. A similar question about this 
24 obstruction, and I may get this a bit wrong, but I 
25 think you said that the Deans would obstruct the 
Page 24: 
I right-of-way by parking their cars and putting a 
2 garbage truck LI1 the way of the northerly 
3 right-of-way? 
4 A. A garbage can. 
5 Q. Okay. But it was the Deans doing 
6 that? 
7 A. Their vehicles. 
8 Q. Okay. When you found that 
9 right-of-way, that northerly right-of-way, 
10 obstructed in that manner, you testified that you 
11 tried to talk to the Deans about it. You knocked 
12 on their door once and weren't able to get 
13 contact. Did you just tum around and not tty to 
14 access the property or did you access the property 
15 a different way? 
16 A. I accessed the property a different 
17 way. 
18 
19 
Q. What way was that? 
A. I went up Neigums' driveway. 
20 Q. Okay. I need a minute to look through 
21 my notes. I think rm about done. 
22 (Recess.) 
23 Q. (BY :MR. MCFARLAND) I'm going to return 
24 to this issue about your percentage ownership in 
the R ice road I'm going to ask you to direct 
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1 your attention again to the second amended 
2 complaint, paragraph 15. I'll warn you this time 
3 that I do intend to interrupt you at least once. 
4 If you would read for the record paragraph 15. 
5 A. Each personal representative's deed, 
6 each grant deed, furthering exchange, each gift 
7 deed, and the grant deed to the Nola Trust 
8 conveyed the property described in paragraphs II, 
9 12, and 13. 
10 Q. I'll stop you there. It's talking 
11 about the property described in paragraphs 11, 12 
12 and 13. If you'll flip back to paragraph 13, and 
13 you don't need to read it out loud, but the first 
14 paragraph I asked you to read, I believe that is 
15 referencing the Rice road; is that right? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Okay. Paragraph 13 is talking about 
18 the Rice road. Back to 15 now. We left offat 
19 conveyed the property described in paragraphs 11, 
20 12, and 13. If you will take it from there. 
21 A. Less the 30-foot strip exchanged away. 
22 Q. I'll interrupt you again. That's the 
23 gravel area that was given to the Rices? 
24 A. Correct. 
25 Q. Okay. 
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A.. Together with all, and whatever that 
2 word is. 
3 Q. Appurtenances. 
4 A. Pertaining thereto, so the rights of 
5 Gary and Nola to use the original access road as 
6 adapted by acquisition of the Cox property, 
7 paragraph 12 hereof, are owned by Daniel, with an 
8 undivided interest of 44. 796 percent. 
9 Q. Okay. Stop there. As I read that 
10 paragraph, that is stating that you have a 44.796 
11 percent - excuse me. A 44.796 percent interest 
12 in the property in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13, which 
13 inCludes the Rice road. 
A. That's how I read it too. 14 
15 Q. SO to make it clear, having now read 
16 paragraphs 15 and 13 of the second amended 
17 complain~ do you understand - is it your 
18 understanding that you have a 44.796 percent 
19 interest in the Rice road? 
20 A. I hate to get caught up in the 
21 percentage, but didn't you say less than five? 
22 MR. BROWN: I'll confer with him for a 
! 1 Q. You testified that the disttrrbance 
2 that was done, and the oats planted across the 
3 northern road at one point, that that was done in 
4 the spring of one year and then you got stuck the 
5 next year. Do you recall that? 
6 A Yes. 
1 7 Q. SO the disturbance and the planting 
l
i.1 89 happened. And in the same year that the 
disturbance and planting happened, later on in 
110 that year you had driven across the roadway? 
\11 A Driven or gotten stuck? 
112 Q. Well, you got stuck the next year? 
113 A The next spring, right. 
114 Q. Okay. But in the same year that it 
115 was planted --
i 16 A Did I drive through -
117 Q. Later in that year you drove through 
! 18 the oats? 
1,'19 A Y 
. es. 
I' 20 Q. And reestablished the roadway? 21 A Correct. 
122 Q. And that would have been sometime in 
23 moment. 123 June or July? 
24 MR. MCFARLAND: Let's see ifhe can answer i 24 A. Correct. The oats were six to 10 
;25 b . b I, 25' h h' Le qllesti on, Len you can confer ___ mc eS1gb 
I 
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1 THE WI1NESS: Having read that, I see the 1 Q. Okay. So by mid summer sometime the 
2 44.796 percent I don't understand what that - 2 roadway would have been reestablished and visible 
3 I hope that's correct. 3 upon the ground? 
4 MR. BROWN: Before he answers another 4 A. Correct. 
5 questio~ can I just briefly consult with him? 5 Q. Okay. So when the Viehwegs bought 
6 MR. MCFARLAND: Sure. We'll go off the 6 their property in October that roadway was 
7 record. 7 reestablished? 
8 (Recess.) 8 A. If they'd looked at it, correct. 
9 THE WITNESS: I don't understand that I 9 Q. Now, I probably need to do this by a 
10 estate thing. 110 document request fonnally, but let me ask you, I 
11 Q. (BY MR MCFARLAND) Perhaps I'm making 111 would like access to the property on the west side 
12 my questions more complicated than they need to 112 of Twin Lakes Canal. Maybe the use of your disk 
13 be. My questio~ to simplify it, having read that 113 to see how well I could drive it up the Neigum 
14 paragraph do you understand thatyoll now own 114 driveway. 
15 more - a greater than five percent interest in 115 .rv:tR. MCFARLAND: Are you going to be a 
16 the Rice road? 116 witness, counsel? 
17 A Yes. 117 MR. ATKIN: I have the right under rule 34 
18 Q. Okay. And that you may own over 44 - 118 to examine -
19 over a 44 percent interest in the Rice Road? 119 MR. SMITH: I'm not objecting to it. 
20 A. Yes. ! 20 Q. (BY MR.. ATKIN) Let me ask you, and you 
21 MR MCFARLAND: I have nothing further. 121 and your counselor can teIl me about it later, but 
22 MR ATKIN: I have some follow up. Is it /22 would you give me pennission to your use your disk 
23 my turn? Okay. !.23 and examine it and be able to drive it across the 
24 FURTHER EXAMINATION i 24 Neigum driveway? And I probably would want to 
25 BY MR. ATKIN: 125 take it down through the Rice access, but I'm 
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husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow; 
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Insurance Company, a Foreign Title 
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Case No. CV-08-342 
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO STRIKE 
THE AFFIDAVITS OF HENRY POVEY 
AND DANIEL S. GARNER 
The plaintiffs (collectively the Garners), through counsel of record, Thatcher Beard St 
Clair Gaffney P A respectfully submit this response to the Povey Defendants' Motion to Strike 
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the Affidavits of Henry Povey and Daniel S. Garner. 
I. Daniel's statements about acquiring an easement from the McCullochs are 
admissible. 
Daniel is competent to testify about a transaction he entered to purchase property and an 
easement from the McCullochs, both of which are central issues in this matter. The doctrine of 
merger does not operate to exclude relevant testimony about how Daniel acquired his interest in 
the easement in which he asserts an interest in this lawsuit. 
n. There is foundation for Daniel Gamer's assertion the Poveys knew of the Garner 
easement. 
In both his affidavit and his deposition, Daniel testifies about how Brad Povey asked 
Daniel on multiple occasions to relocate his easement from the original access road to the 
replacement access road. Aff. Daniel S. Gamer~ 8; see also Depo. Daniel S. Gamer at 114:4-
122:7, attached as Exhibit D to the Affidavit of Michael W. Brown. Clearly, evidence of Mr. 
Povey's repeated requests for Daniel to relinquish his interest in the original access road is 
adequate foundation for Daniel's statement in '14 of his affidavit. 
m. Daniel Garner's assertion as to the width of the original access road is admissible in 
the context of a motion for summary judgment. 
In his affidavit, Daniel lays foundation for his sworn statement about the width of the 
original access road by declaring that he is familiar with its dimensions from having frequently 
uscd it for many years. See Aft: Daniel S. Garner 1f 6. This statement is adequate foundation for 
statements regarding the road's width.. The Poveys contend that this statement is contradicted by 
Daniel's deposition testimony. Defs.' Briefat 6. To support this claim, the Poveys then 
reproduce deposition testimony in which Daniel described the road variously as a two-track road 
or not a two-track road. In any event, nowhere in the quoted testimony is a reference to the 
access road's having a width of a number of feet less than thirty. The fact that the Poveys argue 
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the road was narrower indicates there is an issue of genuine fact preclusive of swnmary 
judgment. 
IV. Testimony of physical interference with the Garners' easement is admissible. 
The Poveys seek to characterize the Garners' claim for interference with their easement 
as a trespass claim, despite the fact the word "trespass" does not appear in the second amended 
complaint. See Defs.' Brief at 8. The Poveys then assert that the statute of limitations for the 
cause of action of trespass bars Daniel Gamer from testifying about physical interference with 
his easement. Id. 
As an initial observation, it appears the Poveys now seek to raise a statute of limitations 
argument with respect to one of the Garners' claims even though they did not raise it in their 
initial memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment. The court should not 
consider this untimely attempt to present a statute oflimitations defense after the Garners have 
already responded to the Poveys' motion for summary judgment. Moreover, regardless of any 
statute of limitations defense to a claim brought by the Garners, the Poveys have not argued the 
evidence contained in Daniel's affidavit is inadmissible because it is irrelevant or otherwise 
excludable under the rules of evidence. 
"'Relevant Evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action'more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." IDAHO R. EVID. 401. Certainly, evidence of interference with 
the Garners easement is relevant to the Garners' claims that the Poveys interfered with the 
easement. Such evidence is supportive of all claims brought by the Garners against the Poveys, 
including those claims not alleged to be barred by the statute oflimitations. "All relevant 
evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by other rules applicable in 
Re!lponse to Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Henry Pavey and Daniel S, Garner -Page 3 
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the courts of this state." IDAHO R EVID. 402. Because the Poveys have not articulated a 
legitimate basis for the excluding relevant testimony, the affidavit of Daniel Garner must not be 
stricken. 
V. Daniel's statement about not agreeing to acquire or use the Rice road is admissible. 
Daniel Garner is competent to testify from personal knowledge about his refusal to 
acquire or use the Rice road at the time it was required. The Poveys' attempt to undennine 
Daniel's statement by referring to the fact that Daniel now has a legal right to use the Rice road 
does not render Daniel's sworn statement in ~ 11 ofbis affidavit inadmissible. 
VI. The court should consider Daniel's testimony about the Rice Road under Rule 56(0). 
The Poveys ask this Court to strike paragraph 11 of the affidavit of Daniel S. Garner 
because Daniel's affidavit is devoid of foundation. Defs.' Brief at 10. For purposes of summary 
judgment under rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court should consider 
Daniel's sworn statement regarding the unsuitability of the Rice Road in winter months. First, 
Daniel's affidavit lays foundation for tins statement by explaining Daniel's familiarity with the 
properties involved due to his visiting them frequently for two decades. The Rice Road is one of 
the roads accessing the properties with which Daniel is familiar. Thus, Daniel has laid sufficient 
foundation to demonstrate familiarity with the Rice Road. 
Second, even if Daniel's affidavit lacks foundation for his statement about the Rice Road, 
the Court should consider this statement anyway in ruling on the Poveys' motion for summary 
judgment. "As long as the non-moving party relies on statements that are based on personal 
knowledge and which would be admissible as evidence at trial and does more than rest on mere 
allegations or denials in his pleading, it will be considered sufficient to comply with Rule 56( e)." 
McCoy v. Lyons, l20'Idaho 765, 771,820 P.2d 360, 366 (1991). A substantially similar version 
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of Daniel's statement about the Rice road in wintry months is contained in paragraph 13 of the 
verified second amended complaint the verified complaint. See Second Amd. Compi. ~ 13. 
Moreover, Daniel testified under oath at his deposition as follows: 
Q. While I'm thinking about this, with regard to the Rice road, you mentioned that 
you had slipped on it the one time. Have you ever been able to use the Rice road 
in the winter time? 
A. No. I mean. all winter, throughout the whole winter? 
Q. Has there even been one time while there was [snow] on the road you were able to 
use it? 
A. When the first snow falls you can still make it. But after the first track up, you 
compress the [snow] and it becomes ice and you can't make it. So you have one 
day. 
See Depo. Daniel S. Gamer at 153:14-154:1. attached hereto as Exhibit A. ill McCoy the court 
held that the non-moving party in a summary judgment "met and satisfied the requirements of 
the rule [56(e)] when they relied on their depositions, in addition to, the swom contents of the 
verified amended complaint and the numerous exhibits attached thereto." McCoy, 120 Idaho at 
771,820 P.2d at 366. Here, in addition to this statement made in Daniel's affidavit, the Garners 
are relying on their depositions and the swom contents of the verified second amended 
complaint. Thus, the court should consider Daniel's statement about the Rice road's not being 
usable in wintry months. 
VII. Henry Povey's affidavit contains admissible statements. 
Henry Povey's affidavit lays sufficient foundation to establish that Brad Povey . 
participated in farming operation on property through which the original access road passes. To 
that extent, his affidavit should not be stricken. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should deny the Poveys' motion to strike the affidavits 
of Hank Povey and Daniel S. Gamer. 
Date: October 3, 2009 
~Id~ 
Michael W. Brown 
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
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1 . with your permission? 
2 A. Maybe two. 
3 Q. Do you give those folks instruction on 
4 which road to use? 
5 A. They use - I usually - those guys 
6 they just call me and I say yes, you can go. 
7 Please don't cut the fences and shut the gate. 
8 Q. Okay. So you don't know how they get 
9 in there? 
10 A. I don't. 
11 Q. Maybe they snowmobile in from over the 
12 mountain? 
13 A. Exactly. I don't know. 
14 Q. While I'm thinking about this, with 
15 regard to the Rice road, you mentioned that you 
16 had slipped on it the one time. Have you ever 
17 been able to use the Rice road in the winter time? 
18 A. No. I mean, all winter, throughout 
19 the whole winter? 
20 Q. Has there even been one time while 
21 there was show on that road you were able to use 
22 it? 
23 A. When the first snow falls you can 
still make it But after the first track up, you 24 
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1 make it. So you have one day. 
2 Q. I see. All right. We've heard about 
3 some activities. Can you think of any other 
4 activities? 
5 A. We horseback ride up there. We gather 
6. cows out of there. 
7 Q. Okay. I'm going to group all of these 
8 activities together. We've talked about hunting 
9 and snowmobiling, so I don't want to cover that 
10 ground again. In terms of the parties and the 
11 scout camps and the horseback riding, can you give 
12 me a sense on which access road you've used for 
13 those, whether it was the Rice or the Neigum 
14 driveway or the north road? 
IS A. Those have always been the north road 
16 because the others weren't there when I was a 
17 leader. 
18 Q. I see. That all occurred before the 
19 Rice road went in? 
20 A. I believe so. I might have been 
21 Webelos leader after that. 
22 Q. All right. Have you had any parties 
23 up there for skeet shooting, scout activities, 
24 since the Rice road went in? 
25 A. No. 
# 8/ 8 
Page 155 
1 Q. I also understand that you nm cattle 
2 on the Gamer property; is that right? 
3 A. Right. 
4 . Q. Okay. Can you show me on exhibit 6, 
5 jU$t use your finger for now, show me generally 
6 where you nut the cattle? Where are the cattle 
7 generally - where are they most ofthe time? 
8 A. Okay. You want me to trace the area 
9 with my finger? Tm not understanding, because 
10 it's bigger than this. . 
11 Q. Okay. Just describe it to me instead 
12 of using the map. 
13 A. The whole place is fenced and they run 
14 anywhere on there they want 
15 Q. By the whole place. what do you mean? 
16 A. All of the property that the Garners 
17 own west of the canal has a perimeter fence arolDld 
18 it and they run on the whole thing. 
19 Q. Okay. So ifwe look at deposition 
20 exhibit number 6 and look at the outline done in 
21 the Sharpie marker, is that the whole of it or is 
22 there more? 
23 A. There's more. 
24 Q. Connected to this? 
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1 Q. And which direction, using the map? 
2 A. South. 
3 Q. South. All right. Because at the 
4 bottom of this deposition exhibit 6 map I see what 
5 looks to be an arrow. Is it down in that 
6 direction? 
7 A. Correct 
8 Q. How many acres are there down there? 
9 A. Approximately 190 or 180. 
10 Q. Another three or four forties out that 
11 way? 
12 A. Correct 
13 Q. Okay. But you didn't buy those other 
14 acres from the McCullochs, right? 
15 A No. 
16 Q. How many cattle do you run out here? 
17 A At one time I was up to 150 head, a 
18 hundred. 
19 Q. A hundred head or 150? 
20 A. A hundred head there. 
21 Q. And by Garner property, to be clear~ 
22 it's what flowed from the McCullochs and the 
23 Coxes? 
24 A Yes. EXHIBIT 
25 Q. All right And are those ~ 
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DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO 
Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Gamer, 
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow; 
and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola 
Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon 
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as 
Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and 
Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust, 
dated September 17th 2004; Jeffery J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband 
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey, 
husband and wife; First American Title 
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title 
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of 
Authority; and First American Title 
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-342 
STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL 
WITH PREDJUDICE 
The undersigned parties, by and through counsel of record, hereby stipulate and 
agree to dismiss with prejudice all claims against Defendants, Hal J. Dean and Marlene 
Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice Page 1 
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T. Dean, husband and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and 
wife; Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. Neigum 
and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees of the Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum 
Revocable Trust, dated September 17, 2004; and First American Title Insurance 
Company, a Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of Authority; and First 
American Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, in the above entitled matter as the 
parties have entered a settlement agreement resolving all controversies between and 
among each other. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the parties fUlther agree that 
each shall be responsible for their own attorney fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
DATE: October 7-, 2009. 
Michael W. Brown 
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Daniels S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner, Nola Garner, a widow, 
and Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Garner Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007. 
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DATE: October _1_,2009. 
Scott J. Smith 
of Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
Attorney for Defendants, Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband and wife; Douglas 
K. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen 
A. Neigum, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees of 
the Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 17, 
2004. 
Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice Page 3 
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DATE: October 13,2009. 
Attorney for Defendants First American Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation and 
First American Title Insurance Company, a Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho Certificate 
of Authority .. 
Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice Page 4 
CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho, I have my office in Rexburg, Idaho, 
and on October 7 ,2009, I served a true and correct copy of the STIPULATION FOR 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE upon the following by the method of delivery 
designated: 
Franklin County Courthouse 
39 W. Oneida 
Preston, ID 83263 
Fax: (208) 852-2926 
Blake S. Atkin 
837 South 500 West 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Fax: (80l) 533-0380 
Eric Olsen 
Racine Olson Nye Budge & 
Bailey 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello,ID 83204-1391 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Ryan T. McFarland 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Fax: (208) 342-3829 
~s. Mail 0 Hand-delivered 0 Facsimile 
o U.S. Mail 0 Hand-delivered ~csimile 
o U.S. Mail 0 Hand-delivered ~csimile 
o U.S. Mail 0 Hand-delivered ~simile 
Judge Stephen S. Dunn 0 U.S. Mail 0 Hand-delivered ~imile 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center 
P. O. Box 4126 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
~/1:7)~ 
Michael W. Brown 
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO 
Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Gamer, 
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow; 
and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola 
Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon 
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as 
Trustees ofthe Jeffery J. Neigum and 
Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust, 
dated September 17th 2004; Jeffery 1. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband 
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey, 
husband and wife; First American Title 
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title 
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of 
Authority; and First American Title 
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-342 
ORDER FOR DISMISSAL 
WITH PREDJUDICE 
This matter having come before the Court by a Stipulation for Dismissal with 
Prejudice executed by the parties thereto, and good cause appearing therefor, 
Order for Dismissal With Prejudice Page 1 
ItiDU 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above entitled action is dismissed with 
prejudice as to Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband and wife; Douglas K. 
Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A. 
Neigum, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees of 
the Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 17, 
2004; First American Title Insurance Company, a Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho 
Certificate of Authority; and First American Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation. 
It is further ordered that each party shall bear their own attorney fees and costs incurred 
in this matter. 
Dated: October R, 2009. 
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn 
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Register No.CV-2008-342 
DANIEL S. GARNER, et aI., 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
HALJ. DEAN, eta!. 
Defendants. 
, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
POVEY DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment ("MSJ") 1 of 
Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey ("Poveys") pursuant to LR.C.P. 56. Also before the Court are 
the following motions: 1) Poveys' Motion to Strike the Garner Aff. and the H. Povey Aff.; 2) 
Plaintiffs,2 Motion for Enlargement of Time; 3) Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Second 
Amended Complaint; and 4) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Ron Kendall, Ivan 
Jensen, Ted Rice, Lorraine Rice, Judy Phillips and Brad Povey.3 Oral argument was held on the 
various motions on October 6,2009. The Court has taken all pending Motions under 
I Poveys' MSJ is supported by a Memorandum in Support ("Poveys Memo"), which included Exhibits A - I (the 
exhibits include the Affidavits ofIvan Jensen, Judy Phillips, Ron Kendall, Ted Rice, and Lorraine Rice and are 
referred to as "Jensen Aff." etc., rather than by the Exhibit letter); a Reply Memorandum in Support ("Poveys 
Reply"), which included Exhibits A-C. Plaintiffs submitted a Memorandum in Opposition ("Garner Memo"), 
which included the Affidavits of Henry Povey ("H. Povey Aff.") and Daniel S. Garner ("Garner Aff."). Also 
pertinent are Exhibits A- V, ("Complaint Ex. A ... V"), attached to the Verified Amended Complaint, but which are 
also referenced in the Second Amended Complaint, the Complaint currently at issue in this matter. 
2 Where appropriate, Plaintiffs Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner, husband and wife, are collectively referred to 
as "D. Gamer" and Plaintiff Nola Gamer, individually and as Trustee of the Nola Garner Living Trust, is referred to 
as "N. Gamer." When appropriate, Gary Garner and Nola Garner, husband and wife, are also collectively referred 
to as "N. Garner." Otherwise, Plaintiffs are collectively referred to as "Garners" or "Plaintiffs." 
3 All Motions other than the MSJ were both supported and opposed by briefs filed by the parties, and, in some 
instances, affidavits of parties and attorneys. More specific references will be made below as necessary. 
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advisement, and having carefully considered all written submissions, the oral arguments of 
counsel, and the applicable law, issues this Mem~randum Decision.4 
BACKGROUND AND FACTS 
To a large extent, the facts submitted by both parties are not in material dispute, except as 
otherwise noted below. On May 22, 1987 D. Garner acquired real property, by Warranty Deed, 
from Ralph R. and Thelma N. McCulloch ("McCullochs,,).5 On the same day, May 22, 1987, a 
Contract of Sale was entered into where McCullochs conveyed to D. Garner "a right-of-way 
across Seller's adjacent property along an existing roadway.,,6 Where the "existing roadway" 
was actually located on May 22, 1987 is disputed by the parties and discussed below. It is 
agreed, however, that without the use of some road across the remaining McCulloch property, 
beginning at the Westside Highway, D. Garner would not have had access to the property 
acquired from McCullochs in 1987.7 
On May 23, 1990 Poveys acquired, by Warranty Deed, all of the rest of the property 
owned by McCullochs.8 The deed to Poveys from McCullochs does not specifically mention, in 
any way, the easement allegedly granted to D. Garner by McCullochs in 1987. However, Poveys 
4 Counsel for Garners advised the Court that a settlement agreement had been reached between Garners and all 
Defendants other than Poveys, with a pending dismissaL The Court has received and signed an Order dismissing all 
Defendants except Poveys. However, the dismissal apparently included an assignment of all claims that Defendants 
Hal J. and Marlene T. Dean ("Dean"), Douglas K. and Sharon C. Viehweg ("Viehweg"), and Jeffrey J and Kathleen 
A. Neigum (together with any related trusts) ("Neigum") may have against Poveys. Those assignments are the basis 
for the Garner's Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint, and are discussed below. 
5 See Complaint Exs. B-2, C and D. The Warranty Deed was recorded with the Franklin County Recorder twice, on 
May 28, 1987 and on July 8, 1987. 
6 See Complaint Ex. A. There was some limiting language not pertinent here. The Contract of Sale was recorded, at 
the request ofD. Garner, with the Franklin County Recorder on July 8, 1987. 
7 Although the entire "existing roadway" claimed as an easement by Garners is quite lengthy, see Complaint Exs. B-
2 through B-5 (on B-5 the entire roadway marked in both blue and yellow), only a small piece of the road, marked in 
red on Complaint Ex. B-2 as the First Phase of the Original Access Road and starting at the Westside Highway, is at 
issue here, and is referenced in various ways in the pleadings. It is referred to herein as the ''Northern Road". 
Access to D. Garner's property also required the need to cross the Twin Lakes Canal, marked in dark blue on 
Complaint Ex. B-2. 
8 See Complaint Ex. E. The McCulloch property on the west side of the Twin Lakes Canal is identified and marked 
in yellow on Complaint Ex. B-2. The McCulloch property on the east side of the Twin Lakes Canal is identified and 
marked in red, blue and yellow on Complaint Ex. B-7 and is the property at issue in this case. 
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concede that D. Gamer was entitled to an easement across their property when they acquired it 
from McCullochs. What they dispute is the location and scope of that easement. 
On June 17, 1992 Poveys conveyed, by Warranty Deed, property they owned on the west 
side of Twin Lakes Canal to Gary T. and Nola S. Gamer. 9 The deed from Poveys to N. Gamer 
did not mention any easement, for either N. Gamer or D. Gamer, across Poveys property on the 
east side ofthe Twin Lakes Canal. Nevertheless, Poveys also agree that N. Gamer did have an 
easement across their remaining property because access to the N. Gamer property was not 
possible otherwise. Again, the location and scope of the N. Gamer easement is also disputed. 
On August 27, 1999 Poveys conveyed a portion of their remaining property to Dean, by 
Warranty Deed. IO That deed did convey the property subject to certain easements of record and 
visible on the premises. II 
On March 22,2001 Poveys conveyed another portion of their property to Neigurn, by 
Corrected Warranty DeedY The Neigurn deed granted an easement in favor of Neigurns, 
Poveys and Daniel Gamer. I3 That easement is referred to herein as the Neigurn Driveway and is 
also known as the Replacement Access Road. It lies on the north boundary ofthe Neigurn 
9 See Complaint Ex. F (Warranty Deed) and Ex. B-3 (aerial photo). 
10 See Complaint Exs. K and L. This deed was also recorded twice, on August 30, 1999 and on December 30, 1999. 
The Dean property is marked in red on Complaint Ex. B-7. 
II The deed states, in pertinent part: "SUBJECT TO all easements, right of ways, ... TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the 
said premises, with their appurtenances unto the said Grantee [Dean] and to the Grantee's heirs and assigns forever. 
And the said Grantor [Poveys] does hereby covenant to and with the said Grantee, that the Grantor is the owner in 
fee simple of said premises, that said premises are free from all encumbrances except current years taxes, .... and 
except .... easements of record, and easements visible upon the premises, and that Grantor will warrant and defend 
the same from all claims whatsoever." [Emphasis added]. The Northern Road easement claimed by Garners is on 
the southern east-west boundary of the Dean property. Compare Complaint Exs. B-2 and B-7. 
12 See Complaint Ex. N. The Neigum property is identified and marked in blue on Complaint Ex. B-7 (see also 
Complaint Ex. 0). 
13 The specific language reads: "[TJogether with an easement for a roadway 20 feet in width lying adjacent to and 
along the South and West side of the above-described courses 1) and 2) to be used by the Grantees [Neigum], Daniel 
Gamer and the Grantors [Poveys], their heirs, successors and assigns for.general ingress and egress purposes. Said 
easement shall continue in a westerly direction to a bridge located on the Twin Lakes Canal accessing the Daniel 
Garner premises." It is agreed that the bridge mentioned is the same bridge D. Garner had been using to access his 
property when he was using the Northern Road. 
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property.14 Importantly, the Neigum property does not touch or impact in any way on the 
Northern Road easement claimed by Garners. 
On October 30, 1998, Helen and Edward Rice exchanged certain property they owned for 
property owned by Gary and Nola Garner. 15 The effect ofthis exchange was to allow N. Garner 
to acquire a road south of the Neigum Driveway by which N. Gamer could access their property 
on the west side of the Twin Lakes Canal across a second bridge built in 1999.16 
On October 4,2005 Poveys conveyed the last of their property to Viehweg, by Warranty 
Deed, but the deed does not describe or refer to any easement at all. 17 On May 28,2008 
Viehweg constructed a fence across part of the Northern Road, allegedly depriving Garners of 
their right to use that road. 18 Prior to that, on March 14, 2008, First American Title Co. notified 
D. Garner that First American and Viehweg claimed that D. Garner did not have an easement for 
ingress and egress on the Northern Road. 19 
It should also be noted that Gary Garner died on December 1, 2005 and that D. Garner 
has acquired an interest in the estate ofN. Garner.20 Thus, any position taken by N. Gamer 
herein is shared by D. Gamer. 
On September 17, 2008 this lawsuit ensued. As to Poveys, the Second Amended 
Complaint, filed March 13,2009, alleges that Poveys wrongfully conveyed property to Dean, 
Neigum, and Viehweg without protecting Garners easement in the Northern Road, which 
14 This Neigum Driveway is clearly visible on Complaint Exs. B-2 through B-6. See also Complaint Ex. M and Ex. 
2 attached to Complaint Ex. W. 
15 Second Amended Complaint, ,-r 13; Complaint Exs. Hand 1. 
16 See Complaint Ex. B-6. The property acquired by N. Gainer is marked in red. See also Kendall and Jensen Affs. 
17 See Complaint Ex. P. The language of focus here says: "TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with 
their appurtenances unto the Grantees [Viehweg], their heirs and assigns·forever. And the said Grantors [Poveys] to 
hereby covenant to and with the said Grantees, that they are the owners in fee simple of said premises; that they are 
free from all encumbrances and that they will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever." The 
Viehweg property is marked in red on Complaint Ex. B-7 (see also Complaint Ex. M.) The Northern Road is 
located on the northern east-west boundary of the Viehweg property. 
18 Second Amended Complaint, ,-r 25. 
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required Garners to file this action to protect it. 21 It is also alleged that Poveys impaired the 
easement by plowing over part of it to facilitate the sale to Dean, Neigum and Viehweg. 22 
Poveys' position is that they did nothing to impair or limit the Garners' easement, either by 
physical action or by conveyance. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" LR.C.P. 56(c); Northwest 
Bee-Corp v. Home Living Service, 136 Idaho 835, 838,41 P.3d 263, 267 (2002); see also, Cox v. 
Clanton, 137 Idaho 492, 494, 50 P .3d 987, 989 (2002). When considering a motion for summary 
judgment, a court should liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the nonmoving party. Id. (citing S. Griffin Contr., Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 135 Idaho 181, 
185, 16 P.3d 278, 282 (2000». Normally, summary judgment must be denied where reasonable 
persons could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence 
presented. Id. 
The moving party has the burden of showing the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. 
Northwest Bee-Corp, 136 Idaho at 838, 41 P.3d at 267. To meet this burden, the moving party 
must challenge, in its motion, and establish through evidence, that no issue of material fact exists 
for an element of the nonmoving party's case. Id. If the moving party challenges an element of 
the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden 
then shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine 
19 Complaint Ex. T. 
20 Second Amended Complaint", 14-15. 
21 Id. m)28-33; see also Prayer for Relief. 
22 !d. '35. 
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issue of material fact. Id. The nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided 
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. 
(quoting IRCP 56 (e». Summary judgment is properly granted, in favor of the moving party, 
when the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Smith v. Meridian Joint School 
Dist. No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996). 
Even if the facts are not disputed, that does not mean that summary judgment is proper. 
In Riggs v. Colis, 107 Idaho 1028, 1030, 695 P.2d 413,415 (Ct.App. 1985), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals stated: 
[T]he Idaho Supreme Court has held that even though there are no genuine issues of 
material facts between the parties a motion for summary judgment must be denied, when 
the case is to be tried to a jury, if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be 
drawn therefrom and if reasonable men might reach different conclusions. Riverside 
Development Company v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657 (1982). 
See also Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 326, 411 P.2d 768, 770 (l966)("A motion for summary 
judgment must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn 
therefrom and if reasonable men might reach different conclusions.") Likewise, if the record 
raises questions concerning the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence, a motion 
for summary judgment must be denied. Altman v. Arndt, 109 Idaho 218, 706 P.2d 107 (Ct.App. 
1985)(citing Merrill v. Duffy Reed Construction Co., 82 Idaho 410,353 P.2d 657 (1960». 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Motions to Strike 
Both parties have filed Motions to Strike affidavits filed by the other. These motions are 
governed by LR. c.P. 56 ( e), which provides: "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made 
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on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." 
I. Poveys' Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Henry Povey and Daniel S. Garner. 
Henry Povey Affidavit. H. Povey's Aff. avers that he farmed with his brother, Brad 
Povey, approximately 15 years ago (about 1994) and that they were farming property "adjacent 
to the only access road to the Garner property lying west of the Twin Lakes canal." Attached to 
his affidavit are photographs allegedly showing the access road "as it previously existed" and 
also showing damage to the access road "in some manner." The affidavit is deficient in a 
number of ways. First, an inadequate foundation is laid to identify the access road Henry Povey 
refers to. It is vague and conclusory. The attached photographs are in black and white and 
nothing meaningful can be observed in them. Since the record clearly shows that Brad Povey 
owned a number ofparce1s in 1994, Henry Povey's affidavit does not identify, in any particular 
way, the actual property he claims to have been farming with Brad Povey at the time. 
Statements in affidavits require significantly more specificity than is found here. This affidavit 
must be stricken. 
Daniel Garner Affidavit. Poveys' objections to Garner's Aff. are summarized as follows: 
1) there is conflict with his prior deposition testimony, 2) there is conflict with Poveys legal 
positions of merger and statute of limitations, 3) his statements lack foundation. The Court has 
reviewed Daniel's deposition testimony provided and finds that it is not in conflict with his 
affidavit. Poveys' legal positions are not an adequate basis to object to factual assertions in an 
affidavit. The Court's determination on legal issues will resolve whether factual assertions 
related to those legal issues are pertinent or not. However, the affidavit suffers from a lack of 
foundation of both personal knowledge or assumptions of what others know in paragraphs 4, 5, 
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and 7 (with the exception that some damage occurred in the early nineties). The Court strikes 
those paragraphs except for the observation that some damage occurred to the original access 
road in the early nineties. The aerial photographs attached to Daniel Garner's affidavit are 
admissible under LR.E. 803(8) and (24), and are considered by the Court. The Court further 
notes that those portions of the Gamer Aff. that relate to the scope of the easement in question 
are rendered MOOT by the settlement agreement entered into with Dean, Viehweg and Neigum 
and need not be considered or ruled on herein. 
Thus, Poveys Motion to Strike the H. Povey Aff. is GRANTED. The Motion to Strike 
the Garner Aff is GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and not ruled on in part, as more fully 
stated above. 
II. Garner's Motion to Strike the Kendall, Jensen, Rice, Phillips and Povey Affidavits. 
Ron Kendall Affidavit. Garners object to those portions of the Kendall Aff. where he 
states that, as water master of the Twin Lakes Canal Co., he participated in a discussion with 
several people, including Gary Gamer, where Gary Garner allegedly stated that he wanted to 
access his property by a new crossing over the Twin Lakes canal because the right of way he was 
using passed Poveys' home where little children were present. Gary Garner also allegedly stated 
that if Twin Lakes Canal Co. would install a new crossing he would agree that the old crossing 
could be removed. Garners claim these statements are hearsay and lack foundation. While the 
time of the conversation could be identified more clearly, the foundation is adequate. The 
statements of Gary Gamer, except for his alleged assertion that he had a right of way past the 
Poveys' home (which is stricken as hearsay), are admissible because some parts of it are not 
hearsay at all (his state of mind about the safety of children, for example) and/or because they 
constitute declarations against his interest, LR.E. 804(b )(3). 
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Ivan Jensen Affidavit. Mr. Jensen, an employee of Twin Lakes Canal Co., asserts 
essentially the same things as Ron Kendall. It is more specific as to the time ofthe meeting. 
Any objection to foundation for reference to the "Rice right of way" is not valid as all parties 
have routinely referenced a second crossing of the Twin Lakes Canal as being associated with 
the "Rice right of way," the "Rice easement" or the "Rice Road." Statements by Gary Garner 
are either not hearsay or are a declaration against interest. Any statements by Daniel Garner, in 
paragraph 7, are admissions of a party opponent and not hearsay, I.R.E. 801(d)(2). Whether any 
of the statements are relevant is discussed below. 
Ted and Lorraine Rice Affidavits. The pertinent portions of these two affidavits assert 
that the property owned by Garners on the west side of the Twin Lakes Canal was "originally" 
accessed along the Neigum driveway, not the Northern Road, which, it is asserted, ended at some 
outbuildings. While this is an important factual issue in this case, the affidavits lack adequate 
foundation. Ted Rice claims he has been aware of these circumstances for 82 years, which 
would have been substantially before D. Garner acquired his property from McCullochs in .1987. 
By using the word "originally" it is unclear whether Rice is referring to a time prior to D. 
Garner's acquisition or not. Of relevance in the MSJ is what road "existed" at the time D. 
Garner acquired his property, but the Rice affidavits do not speak to that issue. Thus, the Rice 
affidavits lack foundation and cannot be considered. 
Judy Phillips Affidavit. Judy Phillips, as the secretary of Twin Lakes Canal Co., attaches 
a copy of minutes of the board of directors on March 25, 1999. There is a reference to the 
meeting discussed by Kendall and Jensen concerning taking out a bridge used by "Garner." 
While the document is not hearsay per I.R.E. 803(6), it is somewhat vague and deals with a 
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question (bridge crossings of the Twin Lake Canal), that is not relevant to any issue before the 
Court at this time. Thus, the Phillips Aff. will not be considered. 
Brad Povey Affidavit.23 At the hearing on the MSJ, Garners objected to this affidavit as 
untimely. Affidavits in support of motions are to be served so as to be received no later than 14 
days prior to the hearing. I.R.C.P.7(b)(3)(A). P6veys' Motion to Strike was filed on September 
29,2009, less than 14 days prior to the hearing. Thus, the affidavit is untimely. However, 
Garners did not object to the Motion to Strike, just the Povey Aff attached to it. More 
importantly, however, the affidavit addresses the issue of the scope of the D. Garner's easement 
in the Northern Road.24 This issue has been rendered MOOT by the settlement between Garners 
and Deans, Viehwegs and Neigums which establishes a permanent easement of a scope 
acceptable to Garners. Therefore, Brad Povey's affidavit need not be considered herein. 
The Garners' Motion to Strike the Affidavits ofthe persons referred to above is 
GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and not ruled on in part for the reasons stated above. 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Garners rely on three legal theories to support their claims against Poveys. First, Garners 
assert that Poveys interfered with their easement by ''plowing over Segment 'A' of the Original 
Access Road.,,25 Secondly, N. Garner asserts that Poveys breached a warranty to protect an 
easement they allegedly acquired in the transfer of property from Poveys to N. Garner in 1992.26 
Thirdly, Garners assert that Poveys breached a duty owed to them when Poveys transferred 
23 The Povey Aff was attached to the Povey Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Henry 
Povey and Daniel S. Gamer, as Ex. D. 
24 The Gamer Aff asserts that the Northern Road easement was 30 feet wide when he acquired it, that this width 
was necessary to accommodate his needs, and that the Neigum driveway width of20 feet was "too narrow to 
support my established practices .... " Gamer Aff mJ 6,9. The Povey Aff. raises a question of fact about those 
assertions, attaching photographs showing grain elevators on the Northern Road and a gate at the entrance of the 
original bridge across the Twin Lakes Canal which have openings of no more than 22 and 19.8 feet respectively. 
25 Second Amended Complaint, ~~ 28-33, 35-36. 
26 I d. 
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property to Dean, Viehweg and Neigum without describing or protecting the Garners 
easements.27 Before reaching the merits ofthese contentions, threshold questions must be 
addressed. 
I. What easement did D. Garner acquire and where is it located? 
A. D. Garner's Contract of Sale is merged into his deed. 
D. Garner asserts that he acquired an easement in an "existing roadway" in 1987 from 
McCullochs in the Contract of Sale, and also claims that this easement was physically located in 
the Northern Road. He further claims that when Poveys acquired the property across which the 
Northern Road ran, in 1990, they took it subject to his easement. Although Poveys acknowledge 
D. Garner's easement across their property, they claim that Garner did not acquire an "easement 
by purchase" because any easement described in the Contract of Sale from McCulloch to D. 
Garner is "merged" into the Warranty Deed, which does not mention an easement at a11.28 
In Estes v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82,967 P.2d 284 (1998), Barry, pursuant to a contract of 
sale, sold property to Estes. The terms of the contract were a purchase price of$59,500, with 
$13,900 down and an assumption by Estes of an existing mortgage in the amount of $45,600. 
However, because Barry had purchased the home pursuant to a specific government loan 
program that contained a recapture provision, the deed specified that the underlying indebtedness 
was $47,500, subject to recapture under the FHA § 235 program. Later, Estes was required to 
pay a recapture amount and sued Barry for that payment, asserting a breach of the contract of 
sale. Barry claimed that the contract of sale was merged into the deed and the deed controlled. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, quoting Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 414 P.2d 879 
(1966), set forth the merger doctrine, as follows: 
27 !d. 
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It is a well established rule oflaw that prior stipulations are merged in the final and 
formal contract executed by the parties, and this rule applies to a deed or a mortgage 
based upon a contract to convey. When a deed is delivered and accepted as performance 
of the contract to convey, the contract is merged in the deed. Though the terms of the 
deed may vary from those contained in the contract, the deed alone must be looked to to 
determine the rights of the parties .... 
There is an exception to the rule stated, which is that the contract of conveyance is not 
merged upon execution of a deed where under the contract the rights are conferred 
collaterally and independent ofthe deed; there being no presumption that the party in 
accepting the deed intends to give up the covenants of which the deed is not a 
performance or satisfaction. Where the right claimed under the contract would vary, 
change, or alter the agreement in the deed itself, or inheres in the very subject-matter 
with which the deed deals, a prior contract covering the same subject-matter cannot be 
shown as against the provisions of the deed. Id. at 382-83, 414 P.2d at 884 (emphasis in 
the original) (quoting Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 41 N.M. 82,64 P.2d 377,380 
(1936)). 
132 Idaho at 85, 967 P.2d at 287. The Court held that because the terms of the contract were in 
conflict with the deed, the contract was merged and the deed controlled. 
In Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704,152 P.3d 575 (2007), an 
easement case, a landowner named Funk owned a large piece of property, which was sold to 
various purchasers over time. In one instance, Funk entered into a real estate contract "subject to 
and including an ingress egress easement over this and adjoining property ... " However, the 
deed did not mention an easement. Much later, a successor in interest to one of the parcels 
claimed an easement across another parcel based on the language ofthe contract of sale. The 
ultimate holding of the Idaho Supreme Court was: 
In determining that the sale agreement created an express easement the court focused 
upon the following language in paragraph 5: "Subject to and including an ingress egress 
easement over this and adjoining property in said sections 21 and 22 owned by the 
grantor ... " The question is whether the parties made clear their intention to establish a 
servitude over the Section 21 parcel subsequently acquired by the Lawrences for the 
benefit of other unspecified property owned by the Funks in Sections 21 and 22. There is 
nothing in the sale agreement that indicates an immediate grant of easement rights .... 
28 The "merger" principle was first raised in Poveys' Reply, p. 2, citing Estes v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82, 85, 967 P.2d 
284,287 (1998) and Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawr~nce, 143 Idaho 704,152 P.3d 575 (2007). 
DECISION & ORDER-12 
Register No.CV-04-0113-0C 
The sale agreement therefore does not, by itself, create any easement either by grant, 
reservation or exception. The district court erred in concluding that it did. In order for an 
easement to be created, there needed to be language in the 1992 warranty deed reserving 
or excepting an easement. No such language is contained therein. The deed does make 
reference to the sale agreement but does not purport to incorporate it and, even if it did, 
the language in the sale agreement is insufficient to create an easement. 
143 Idaho at 708,152 P.3d at 579. This case holds that if a contract of sale is expressly 
referenced and incorporated into a deed, then any terms of that contract have continued force and 
effect. However, the converse is also true. If a deed does not incorporate terms of a contract of 
sale that have direct bearing on the subject matter of the sale, the contract is merged into the deed 
and the deed controls. In fact, in his concurring opinion, Justice Eismann stated: 
In 1975 Harold and Marlene Funk sold certain real property to Human Synergistics, Inc., 
under a real estate contract. The contract provided that the sale was: 
5. Subject to and including an ingress egress easement over this and adjoining 
property in said sections 21 and 22 owned by the grantor and including an ingress 
egress easement over portions of Section 21 heretofore granted to the grantors. 
The contract recited that the Funks had executed a deed conveying the property to Human 
Synergistics .... That deed did not reserve or grant any easement. The district court held 
that the above-quoted sentence in the real estate contract created an easement. The district 
court did not explain how it could have done so. 
Under the doctrine of merger, any recitals in the real estate contract were merged into the 
deed .... There is no question that the deed in this case was delivered and accepted in 
performance of the real estate contract. It recites that it was. 
The recital does not incorporate the contract by reference, but merely excludes from the 
warranties of title, quiet enjoyment, and against encumbrances any defect arising out of 
the purchaser's conduct during the time from the contract of sale to the issuance of the 
warranty deed. Thus, under the doctrine of merger, any purported reservation or grant of 
an easement in the real estate contract would be irrelevant. The district court erred in 
attempting to create an easement based upon the real estate contract. 
143 Idaho at 709-10, 152 P.3d at 580-81. 
In this case, the undisputed facts demonstrate that D. Garner acquired property from 
McCullochs by deed, but the deed did not specify an easement and did not, by its express terms, 
incorporate the contract of sale which did reference an easement in an "existing roadway." An 
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easement, which is a restriction or limitation on the use of the servient estate, "inheres in the very 
subject-matter with which the deed deals,,,29 and is not collateral thereto. Thus, the Court 
concludes that the Contract of Sale between D. Gamer and McCulloch is merged into the deed 
and no express easement by purchase was created in 1987. 
B. Poveys are not entitled to determine the location ofD. Gamer's easement. 
If the Contract of Sale is merged into the deed, Poveys claim that D. Gamer's easement 
was, at the time of transfer from McCulloch to D. Gamer, an "unbounded easement," and that 
it's location can be established by the servient estate holder, Poveys, at their discretion, citing 
Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho 522, 817 P.2d 188 (Ct.App. 1991). The Court disagrees. 
In Bethel, the plaintiff acquired property from Van Stone in 1974. The deed expressly 
conveyed two "easements of record" and reserved to the VanStone's an easement across the 
deeded property to serve other properties they owned. The easement in question stated, in 
pertinent part: "the parties ... desire to provide mutual easements for ingress and egress ... do 
hereby grant unto the other. .. a perpetual sixty (60) foot easement over and across the existing 
road as it traverses their respective interests in the said Government Lots 1, 2 and 3 ... " The 
district court determined, and the Idaho Supreme Court agreed, that this easement was 
ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence must be considered to determine the intent of the parties.3o 
The only factual dispute was where one end of the easement was located. Bethels believed that 
the southern part of the easement ran through a certain meadow although it was agreed that there 
was no road in the meadow at the time the easement was granted. Another access road was 
available along an additional 16 foot easement as well, although Bethels claimed that easement 
was inadequate. There was testimony showing that Bethels had driven through the meadow in 
29 Estes, supra. In this case, the sale of the property is the subject matter of the deed and an easement would be a 
restriction on the use of the deeded property. 
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exercise of their claimed easement, although it was agreed that the meadow was closed offby the 
Van Stones at times for feeding cattle. At some point there was a dispute over the continued and 
expanded use of easement through the meadow and litigation ensued. The district court found 
that Bethels had an express 60 foot easement through the meadow and the Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed. The case was remanded for a judicial determination of the metes and bounds 
description ofthe easement. In doing so, however, the Court stated: 
[T]he present owner of Chester's property [the servient estate holder of the meadow] 
shall have the right in the first instance to locate the road within the meadow, and, 'if 
reasonably suitable for the purpose, a selection of the place cannot be questioned' ... This 
procedure is in recognition of the right of the owner of the servient property to make such 
use of his property as he desires, so long as his use is consistent with the easement 
granted. The owner may choose the location of minimize the impact of the road and to 
prevent unreasonable interference with the rights of the owner so long as the chosen 
easement is a convenient and suitable way.31 
120 Idaho at 528,817 P.2d at 194. It is this statement upon which Poveys rely to support their 
contention that they are entitled to put D. Garner's easement in a reasonably suited place oftheir 
choosing. However, this statement ofthe Court must also be noted: 
Jd. 
Consistent with these rights, the district court should encourage the parties to agree to the 
exact location of the entire sixty-foot easement, but to the extent they are unable or 
unwilling to do this, the court shall determine a reasonable location that is convenient and 
suitable. 
While there are some factual similarities between Bethel and this case that may offer 
guidance, the differences are paramount. First, the case involved an express easement 
established by an ambiguous deed. Second, while the exact placement of the easement within 
the meadow had to be determined, the presence of the easement in the meadow was established 
by the deed. It was only the precise location of the easement within that meadow that was 
30 120 Idaho at 525,817 P.2d at 191. 
31 Quoting from Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 246-47, 270 P.2d 825,826 (1954). 
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subject to the servient owner's discretion, and even that was to be detennined by agreement of 
the parties ifpossible. In the instant case, this Court has detennined that D. Garner does not 
have an easement by agreement, and there is no evaluation of extrinsic evidence needed to 
detennine an ambiguous written easement. Based on this conclusion, Poveys' contention that 
they are entitled to choose the location of an easement is inconsistent with and not a reasonable 
extension of Bethel. 
Poveys also make much of the fact that Daniel Garner was in college when he purchased 
the 40 acres from McCulloch in 1987, that D. Garner's parents, Gary and Nola Gamer, did much 
of the negotiating for him, and that Gary and Nola Garner did not want the easement to run along 
the Northern Road because ofthe presence of children. 32 Poveys also assert that Gary Gamer 
specifically acquired the Rice Road, including a new crossing of the Twin Lakes Canal, to allow 
another access to all of Garners' property.33 However, any discussions in 1987 about where D. 
Garner's easement would be, regardless of who was involved in those discussions, are also 
merged into the deed, which does not reserve any easement. Thus, these discussions are 
irrelevant and cannot contradict the deed. The location of Garners' easement arises by operation 
oflaw, as noted below. Poveys cannot consistentiy argue that there is no express easement 
pursuant to merger, and then also argue that there was an agreement to have it in a location other 
than the Northern Road. 
By the same token, any desire by Gary Gamer, in 1999, to persuade the Twin Lakes 
Canal Co. to build another crossing on the Twin Lakes Canal so he could use the Rice Road for 
access to his property is not binding on D. Gamer, there being no assertion that Gary Gamer had 
authority to speak for D. Garner at that time. That desire also does not establish that N. Garner 
32 Poveys Memo, p. 8; Poveys Reply, pp. 7-8, including deposition references. 
33 ld.; Kendall Aff.; Jensen Aff. 
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did not have an easement in the Northern Road. Rather, it confirms that he believed he did. The 
fact that Gary Garner may have desired to abandon the Northern Road easement does not 
establish that he accomplished it. The evidence is insufficient to conclude that N. Garner did 
anything other than express an interest and make an unsuccessful attempt to move their access to 
their property from the Northern Road to the Rice Road. 
C. D. Garner acquired an easement by operation oflaw in the Northern Road. 
Even though Poveys acknowledge that D. Garner has an easement across their property, 
questions remain as to how that easement came into being, what type of easement it is, and 
where it is located. 
The evidence is undisputed that D. Garner used the Northern Road as the access to his 
property from 1987 to 2008 when this lawsuit commenced.34 N. Garner openly used the 
Northern Road from when they acquired their property in 1992 until 2008.35 Poveys do not 
dispute the use ofthe Northern Road, openly and obviously, for many years by Garners.36 
There are two types of implied easements~ an easement by prior use and an easement by 
necessity. The elements of an implied easement by prior use are: 
In order to establish an implied easement by prior use, the party seeking to establish the 
easement must demonstrate three essential elements: (1) unity oftitle or ownership and 
subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long 
enough before separation of the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be 
permanent; and (3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment 
of the dominant estate. 
34 Poveys Memo. Ex. C, p. 65, 1. 15-17; Garner Aff. ~ 3. Poveys submitted the Rice Affs. to establish that the 
Neigum Driveway was also accessible to D. Garner at some point, but those affidavits lack foundation and have 
been stricken. In addition, Ex. B to the Garner Aff. clearly shows that the Northern Road was the only access 
available to D. Garner in 1987. 
35 Poveys Memo Ex. B, pp. 225-26; Second Amended Complaint, ~ 42.D[2]. 
36 Poveys Memo, pp. 3-4. 
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Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 642, 991 P.2d 362, 367 (1999).37 As applied to this case, the 
first element is established because McCullochs owned the entire property, and then transferred 
the dominant estate to D. Garner, retaining the servient estate across which the easement passed. 
As to the second element, there is no direct evidence showing McCullochs used the Northern 
Road and for what period oftime. The Court infers, however, that McCullochs, who owned the 
entire property in question prior to 1987, used the Northern Road to access their property across 
the Twin Lakes Canal because no other access was possible and Garner's Aff. Ex. A shows the 
Northern Road as the only available access in 1987. As to the third element, an easement on the 
Northern Road was reasonably necessary in 1987 to allow D. Garner access and enjoyment of his 
property on the west side of the Twin Lakes Canal. An implied easement by prior use is shown. 
An implied easement by necessity is similar to an easement by prior use, but there are 
some differences in the elements: 
One who claims an easement by necessity across another's land must prove "(1) unity of 
title and subsequent separation of the dominant and servient estates; (2) necessity of the 
easement at the time of severance; and (3) great present necessity for the easement." Bear 
Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 725, 874 P.2d 528, 536 (1994). 
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 482-83,129 P.3d 1223, 1231-32 (2006). As applied in this 
case, the first and second elements are established by the same facts that establish an easement 
by prior use. Whether there is a "great present" necessity for the easement is more questionable. 
Certainly, by the time D. Garner filed this lawsuit he had received an easement in the Neigum 
Driveway from Poveys.38 That was an established alternate to the Northern Road. D. Garner 
asserts that the Neigum Driveway is inadequate because it is only 20 feet wide.39 However, the 
37 See also Akers v. D.L. White Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196,204 (2005); Beach Lateral 
Water Users Ass 'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 130 P.3d 1138 (2006). 
38 See discussion at p. 3-4, infra, and fn. 12-14. 
39 Gamer Aff. ~ 9. 
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Povey Aff shows that the width necessary may only be 20 feet. 4o The Court concludes that 
questions of fact exist about whether an easement by necessity is established. Thus, the Court 
cannot conclude that D. Garner acquired an easement by necessity in the Northern Road. 
The third type of easement that may apply here is an easement by prescription. 
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription "must prove by 
clear and convincing evidence use of the subject property, which is characterized as: (1) 
open and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of 
right; (4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement (5) 
for the statutory period." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 229, 76 P.3d at 973. The statutory period 
in question is five years. I.C. § 5-203; Weaver, 134 Idaho at 698,8 P.3d at 1241.. .. 
Once the claimant presents proof of open, notorious, .continuous, uninterrupted use of the 
claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the use began, he 
raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. Wood v. 
Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 702-03, 963 P.2d 383,385-86 (1998); Marshall v. Blair, 130 
Idaho 675, 680, 946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). The burden then shifts to the owner ofthe 
servient tenement to show that the claimant's use was permissive, or by virtue of a 
license, contract, or agreement. Wood, 131 Idaho at 703,963 P.2d at 386; Marshall, 130 
Idaho at 680,946 P.2d at 980. The nature of the use is adverse if"it runs contrary to the 
servient owner's claims to the property." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 231, 76 P.3d at 975. The 
state of mind of the users of the alleged easement is not controlling; the focus is on the 
nature of their use. Id. at 231-32, 76 P .3d at 975-76. 
Akers, 142 Idaho at 303, 127 P.3d at 206. In this case the undisputed evidence shows that D. 
Gamer's use of the Northern Road was open and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted, with 
the actual or imputed knowledge ofPoveys and for in excess of five years. Since Poveys 
acquired the servient estate from McCulloch without any reservation of an easement for D. 
Garner, D. Gamer's use of the Northern Road after 1990 was clearly adverse to Poveys. 
Thus, the Court concludes, as a matter oflaw, and based on undisputed facts, that an 
easement was acquired by D. Garner in the Northern Road, and was an easement by prior use 
and/or an easement by prescription. 
40 The Court has previously ruled that the Povey Affidavit need not be considered because the issues raised by it are 
moot. However, the Court refers to it here only to establish that questions of fact exist about whether there is 
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II. What easement did N. Garner acquire and where is it located? 
N. Gamer cannot point to any deed or agreement that mentions or describes an express 
easement across Poveys' property. The deed from Poveys does not specifically reserve any 
easement, but N. Gamer asserts that the language of the deed - "with their appurtenances" -
establishes an express easement.41 They cite no authority to this effect. On the other hand: 
An express easement, being an interest in real property, may only be created by a written 
instrument. Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770; 773, 554 P.2d 948, 951 (1976) (citing I.e. § 9-
503; McReynolds v. Harrigfeld, 26 Idaho 26, 140 P. 1096 (1914». ''No particular forms 
or words of art are necessary [to create an express easement]; it is necessary only that the 
parties make clear their intention to establish a servitude." Benninger v. Derifield, 142 
Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006) (quoting Seccombe v. Weeks, 115 Idaho 433, 
436, 767 P.2d 276, 279 (Ct.App.1989». An express easement may be created by a written 
agreement between the owner of the dominant estate and the owner of the servient estate. 
It may also be created by a deed from the owner of the servient estate to the owner of the 
dominant estate. 
Capstar, 143 Idaho at 707, 152 P.3d at 579. Thus, an express easement can only be created by a 
written document which clearly expresses an intention "to establish a servitude." 
N. Gamer's attempt to create an easement through the use of the language "with their 
appurtenances" reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of an "appurtenant easement." 
There is a difference between easements appurtenant and easements in gross. West v. 
Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 556, 511 P.2d 1326, 1332 (1973). An easement appurtenant is 
attached to a dominant tenement. Id. A person does not hold an easement in gross by 
virtue of ownership in a particular parcel of land; rather, an easement in gross is a 
personal right to use the land of another. Id. .... Contrarily, an easement appurtenant 
"serves the owner of the dominant estate in a way that cannot be separated from his rights 
in the land." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d at 974. When such an easement is 
created, "it becomes fixed as an appurtenance to the real property, which is subject to the 
prescriptive use and may be claimed by a successor in interest." Id. "In cases of doubt, 
Idaho courts presume the easement is appurtenant." Id. 
Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 65, 190 P.3d 876, 884 (2008). Therefore, easement 
"appurtenant" or "in gross" is simply a description of the type of easement that exists after it is 
currently a "great present necessity." 
41 Gamer Memorandum, p. 6; Second Amended Complaint, ~~ 11, 35; Complaint Ex. F. 
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created. The use of such language in a deed does not create an easement, although it may covey 
or reserve an easement that has already been created. Thus;in this case, the easement D. Garner 
acquired, by prior use and/or prescription, was an easement "appurtenant" to the Poveys' 
servient property, but it was not expressly created by such language in any deed. 
With this understanding, N. Garner did not acquire an express easement of any kind. 
There is no express reservation of a servitude by Poveys, when they conveyed property to N. 
Gamer in 1992. The use of the phrase "with their appurtenances" did not create an easement in 
favor ofN. Garner. 
Without an express easement, the Court must determine what type of easement N. Gamer 
acquired across Poveys' property. The analysis of this question is the same as determining the 
type and location of D. Garners' easement. N. Gamer, after acquiring landlocked property from 
Poveys in 1992, could not have accessed that property without some type of easement across 
Poveys' property. Poveys do not dispute N. Garner's assertion that they used the Northern Road 
under the same conditions as did D. Gamer for at least five years after 1992, and on some form 
of regular basis thereafter until 2008. While Gary Garner desired to use a different easement to 
protect the children of the Poveys,42 this desire confirms, rather than refutes, the fact that Gary 
and Nola Garner believed they had an easement in the Northern Road. 
With the same analysis stated above, this Court concludes, as a matter of law, that N. 
Garner had an easement, by prescription and/or prior use, in the Northern Road.43 
The Court has gone to some lengths to review the record to determine whether, as a 
matter of law, D. Garner and N. Garner acquired an easement in the Northern Road, and has 
41 
- Poveys Memo Ex. B, p. 27. 
43 The elements of an easement by prior use is confirmed by the fact that both the dominant and servient estates were 
held by Poveys, the Poveys used the Northern Road easement in a way that establishes its permanence, and the use 
by N. Gamer was reasonably necessary for the proper e~oyment ofN. Gamer's property. 
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concluded that they did. To what end? The duty Poveys may have had to Garners, if any, cannot 
be determined until the type of easement Garners had across Poveys' property is also known. 
Since the Court has concluded, as a matter of law, the nature and location of the Garners 
easements across Poveys' property, the Court can now address whether Poveys breached any 
duty to protect or preserve those easements. 
III. Did Povevs breach a duty to Garners relative to the Garners' easements? 
A. What is the duty of the servient property holder to protect the easement? 
Garners assert that Poveys have a duty to not interfere with their easement and failed to 
do so, both physically and by transfer. Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to 
decide.44 The holder of the servient estate clearly has a duty not to physically interfere with the 
easement in such a way as to prevent its reasonable use. 
A servient owner ordinarily has no duty to do any positive act with respect to the 
maintenance or repair of an easement, but he or she is required to refrain from unlawfully 
interfering with or obstructing the easement. ... 
The servient owner has all the rights and benefits of ownership consistent with the 
easement, however. Thus, the right to use the land remains in the servient owner, without 
any express reservation to that effect, so far as such right does not conflict with the 
purpose and character of the easement. The servient owner may cultivate or make 
improvements on the land subject to an easement of way, or use the way for any purpose, 
provided that he or she does not interfere with the right of passage resting in the owner of 
the easement. ... [Emphasis added]. 
Am. Jur. 2d, Easements, § 86. This principle of law was confirmed in Benninger v. Derifield, 
142 Idaho 486, 129 P.3d 1235 (2006), where the parties shared a driveway that was in existence 
when both parties acquired their homes and was the only access Benninger had to the home. 
Derifield obstructed the driveway such that Benningers had to walk to their home from an 
adjacent roadway. Ultimately, the courts found that Benninger had acquired a prescriptive 
easement in the driveway and that Derifield could not interfere with Benninger's reasonable use 
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of the driveway. See also Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Federal Sav., 135 Idaho 
518,523,20 P.3d 702, 706 (2001).45 
What is the duty of the servient property owner when he sells the property to another? 
The Court has found no Idaho decisions which specifically identify any duty, and none have 
been cited by the parties. However, the reasoning of the court in Crescent Harbor Water Co., 
Inc. v. Lyseng, 51 Wash.App. 337, 346, 753 P.2d 555,560 (Wash.App.1988), is helpful: 
It is well settled that title acquired by adverse possession is not affected by the recording 
statutes. In Mugaas v. Smith, 33 Wash.2d 429, 432-33, 206 P.2d 332, 9 A.LR.2d 846 
(1949), the Supreme Court emphasized that if the transfer of a servient tenement to a 
bona fide purchaser without notice is sufficient to extinguish title by adverse possession, 
then claimants under the adverse possession statute, however they may have perfected 
their rights, "must keep [their] flag flying for ever, and the statute ceases to be a statute of 
limitations." (Emphasis in original.) The court concluded it was therefore appropriate that 
the recording acts "relate exclusively to written titles." [Citation omitted]. ... 
The courts' reasoning in these cases applies equally well to prescriptive easements. An 
easement by prescription is not subject to recordation and would be of little value if it 
were extinguished by a transfer of the servient estate. Thus, 
[i]t is a recognized principle that a bona fide purchaser ofland without actual or 
constructive notice ofthe existence of an easement in such land takes title free 
from the burden of the easement. As stated, this rule is broad enough to include 
all easements, ... but an examination of the cases ... will disclose that while this 
principle is occasionally relied upon to support a holding that a purchaser ofland 
without notice ... takes free of [ an] easement [by implication], it has rarely, if 
ever, been intemreted to mean that an easement by prescription once actually in 
existence can be destroyed by a conveyance of the servient estate even to a 
purchaser in good faith. [Citation omitted]. We therefore hold that the bona fide 
purchaser doctrine does not apply to an easement by prescription. [Emphasis 
added]. 
Several other legal principles apply as well. First, does a subsequent purchaser take the 
servient estate subject to an unrecorded easement? In Davis v. Peacock, supra, the Idaho 
44 Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212,192 P.3d 1036 (2008; Hansen v. City o/Pocatello, 145 Idaho 700,184 P.3d 206 
(2008); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122,937 P.2d 434 (Ct.App.1997). 
45 "The owner of the servient estate is entitled to use the estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does 
not materially interfere with, the use of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate. See Boydstun Beach 
Ass'n. v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 377, 723 P.2d 914, 921 (1986). In other words, the servient estate owner is entitled 
to make uses of the property that do not unreasonably interfere with the dominant estate owner's erUoyment of the 
easement. See Carson v. Elliott, III Idaho 889, 890, 728 P.2d 778, 779 (Ct.App.l986). Thus, an easement owner is 
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Supreme Court stated: 
Peacock's final argument is that, even if the easement was created and passed to the 
Davises, he should not be subject to the easement because it is an unrecorded interest not 
contained in his chain of title. However, Peacock admitted that his deed expressly 
included a provision notifying him there was a road over his land providing access to the 
neighbor's property. It is undisputed, therefore, that he had actual knowledge of the 
existence of the road, if not the easement. Because of this notice, Peacock had the duty to 
at least inquire into the situation at the time he purchased the property. Since he failed to 
do so, he cannot now claim that he had no notice of the easement. 
Davis, 133 Idaho at 644,991 P.2d at 369. 
Second, if a claimed easement is not recorded, what IS the duty of the subsequent 
purchaser of the servient estate? 
"One who purchases land expressly subject to an easement, or with notice, actual or 
constructive, that it is burdened with an existing easement, takes the land subject to the 
easement." Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 721,152 P.2d 585, 587 (1944). 
Akers, 142 Idaho at 301, 127 P.3d at 204. 
In addition, a subsequent purchaser has a duty of inquiry. 
This Court has stated that when one is purchasing land, the rule of caveat emptor applies 
and that "whatever is notice enough to excite the attention of a man of ordinary prudence 
and prompt him to further inquiry, amounts to notice of all such facts as a reasonable 
investigation would disclose." Hill v. Federal Land Bank, 59 Idaho 136, 141, 80 P.2d 
789, 791 (1938). See also, Farrell v. Brown, 111 Idaho 1027, 1033, 729 P.2d 1090, 1096 
(Ct.App.1986). 
Hunter, 131 Idaho at 153,953 P.2d at 593.46 
Finally, the five years needed to acquire a prescriptive easement can span the ownership 
of the servient estate by more than one owner. . 
A claimant may rely on his own use, or he "may rely on the adverse use by the claimant's 
predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may combine such predecessor's 
use with the claimant's own use to establish the requisite five continuous years of adverse 
use." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d at 974. 
entitled to relief upon a showing that he is obstructed from exercising privileges granted in the easement. See 
Boydstun Beach, 111 Idaho at 377, 723 P.2d at 921." 
46 See also Ponderosa Homeside Lot Owners v. Garfield Bay Resort, Inc., 143 Idaho 407, 410,146 P.3d 673,676 
(2006). 
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Akers, 142 Idaho at 303, 127 P.3d at 206. 
From these legal principles, the Court concludes that the duty of the servient estate 
holder, upon sale of the servient estate, is only to expressly convey what is of record, either by 
express agreement or express determination.47 No duty arises to expressly protect implied or 
prescriptive easements, particularly when the easement use is open and obvious. Subsequent 
purchasers of the servient property take the property subject to easements of which the purchaser 
has notice, actual or constructive, either by inquiry or what is in view, and the duty of inquiry is 
on the purchaser. To hold otherwise would be to impose a duty on a servient estate holder to 
convey something which may not even exist.48 
B. Poveys did not physically interfere with Garners' easement. The material facts, 
either undisputed or viewed in a light most favorable to Garners, are that once in the late 80's or 
early 90's, and twice in the spring of 2005, a portion of the Northern Road was plowed over or 
disturbed in a way that D. Garner became stuck, either with his pickup or with a backhoe, while 
traversing the Northern Road.49 These events occurred while Poveys owned and lived on the 
property. Poveys assert that the Court may not infer that any plowing or disturbing of the 
easement was at their direction. However, Nola Garner testified that she saw Poveys' nephews 
"disturbing the road so it could be planted". in 2005.50 Viewing all facts and reasonable 
inferences in favor of Garners, the Court concludes that, at a minimum, any plowing or 
47 For example, should a servient estate holder challenge a claimed implied or prescriptive easement and that 
easement be established by judicial determination, the servient estate holder may have a higher duty to expressly 
disclose that determination, to subsequent purchasers of the servient estate. 
48 For example, if Viehweg and First American Title had obtained a judicial determination that Garners did not have 
an easement in the Northern Road, any lack of reference to that easement in the deeds of transfer by Poveys would 
simply be confrrmed by that determination. Assume there had been three more sucessors in interest between Poveys 
and Viehwegs. Could Garners still assert that Poveys breached some duty to protect an implied or prescriptive 
easement? Clearly not. The analysis and conclusion is the same when there is only one sale. 
49 Poveys Memo Ex. C, pp. 61-63, 70-73; Garner Aff. ~~ 7,10. 
50 Complaint Ex. B, p. 107; Nola Gamer Depo., p. 94. 
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disturbance of the Northern Road on the two occasions mentioned were for the benefit ofPoveys 
and was their responsibility. 
However, the Court also concludes that these undisputed facts, and the reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, do not establish a breach of any duty by Poveys, as a matter of law, 
for several reasons. 
First, "the servient owner may cultivate or make improvements on the land subject to an 
easement of way, or use the way for any purpose, provided that he or she does not interfere with 
the right of passage resting in the owner of the easement. ... ,,51 Poveys were entitled to use the 
servient estate for farming purposes, as reasonably necessary, as long as Garners' "right of 
passage" was retained. While the plowing may have, in a very temporary way, made passage 
harder, this cannot constitute a legal interference with the easement. D. Garner's testimony 
confirmed that his expected access was retained after the field was planted. 52 When an easement 
crosses a servient estate that is used for farming, it is reasonable to expect some minor 
inconvenience in using the easement during plowing in the spring. 53 At best, any plowing was 
just that, a minor inconvenience that does not constitute an unreasonable interference with the 
easement. 
Second, any claim for the event in the 80's or early 90's is clearly barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. The parties dispute which statute of limitations applies54 
However, the Court concludes that the four year statute of limitations applies to these claims.55 
5] AmJur.2d, Easements, § 86. 
52 Poveys Memo Ex. C, pp. 63-64. 
53 This is similar to the easement in Bethel v. Van Stone, supra, where gates closed off the easement in question 
when cows were using the meadow, a reasonable use by the servient estate holder. 
54 Poveys assert that the statute oflimitations for trespass on real property, I.e. § 5-218 applies, while Garners assert 
that I.e. § 5-224 applies. 
55 Actions for damage to real property, the essence of Garners claims on this point, are governed by I.C. § 5-224. 
Woodland v. Lyon, 78 Idaho 79, 298 P.2d 380 (1956); Boise Dev. Co. v. Boise City, 30 Idaho 675,167 P. 1032 
(1917). 
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Nevertheless, any claim for damage to property, i.e., the easement, occurring in the late 80's or 
early 90's, is clearly barred. Although the claim for any damage in the spring of 2005 is not 
barred by the statute of limitations, the fact that this is the only remaining claim for such damage 
enhances the Court's conclusions as to the limited nature of this claim. 
Third, there is nothing in this record to establish any damage experienced by D. Garner. 
He asserts that he has continually used the Northern Road in the same fashion contemplated in 
1987 and there is nothing to suggest that his use, in the way he expected, was substantially 
interfered with during that entire period. 56 Getting stuck with a backhoe twice in 2005 does not 
establish any monetary loss on his part. 57 
For these reasons, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that no viable claim is made 
for physical interference, by Poveys, with the Northern Road easement. 
C. Poveys did not breach any duty when they transferred portions of the servient 
estate to Dean, Neigum and Viehweg. This is the final issue on whether Poveys breached a duty 
owed to Garners. It is reiterated that Poveys did not take the servient estate from McCullochs 
subject to any easement specifically described, reserved or mentioned in their deed. At best, as 
this Court has already concluded, Poveys took their property subject to an easement in favor of 
D. Garner because D. Garner acquired an implied or prescriptive easement, or began to acquire 
such an easement, when he purchased from McCullochs in 1987. N. Garner did not even begin 
to acquire an easement in the Northern Road until they purchased their property in 1992, and this 
was also not an express easement, but implied and/or by prescription. Poveys duty was to 
56 Second Amended Complaint, ~2.D.[l]; Garner Mf ~ 3. 
57 Garners make much of this Court's Decision denying Poveys Motion to Dismiss, March 11, 2009, which states: 
"It would be possible for Poveys to block, hinder, or obscure the access road without permanently depriving Garners 
of its use, and the level of the alleged obstruction, and any resulting damage, would remain an issue for the jury to 
determine. Thus, the fact that Garners used the road continuously for over 20 years does not preclude the possibility 
that obstruction or interference existed during some portion of that time." However, the context of that order was 
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convey what they received expressly, either by deed or by judicial determination. Each of the 
transfers will be discussed in turn. 
Dean transfer. Poveys conveyed a certain parcel to Dean in 1999. Garners' easement in 
the Northern Road was adjacent and appurtenant to the Dean property. The deed from Poveys to 
Dean specifically states that the transfer was "SUBJECT TO all easements" and "free from all 
encumbrances except.. . easements of record, and easements visible on the premises ... " In short, 
Poveys conveyed to Dean a property description more definitive concerning easements than any 
they received. Garners claim that Poveys had a duty to be even more definitive, by describing in 
the deed the exact easement claimed by Garners. While it is reasonable to infer that Poveys were 
aware of Garners use and claim to an easement in the Northern Road, no such easement was 
expressly conveyed or legally determined. Thus, any duty Poveys had was fulfilled with the 
description provided in the deed to Dean. 
Neigum transfer. Poveys conveyed a certain parcel to Neigum in 2001. The Court 
reiterates that the property acquired by Neigum does not impact or touch, in any way, the 
Northern Road. Nevertheless, Poveys' deed to Neigum specifically reserved, in favor of D. 
Garner, a 20 foot easement in the Neigum Driveway.58 Although it is clear that Brad Povey 
attempted to persuade Daniel Garner to move his easement from the Northern Road to the 
Neigum Driveway, it is also clear that Daniel Garner did not agree to this proposa1.59 Garners 
assert that this is evidence of Poveys' attempt to affirmatively extinguish, obstruct and create 
doubt about the existence of Garners' easement in the Northern Road. 6o An alternative 
explanation is equally possible, i.e., that Poveys gratuitously conveyed an easement to D. Gamer 
without full development of both facts and the law related to physical interference with an easement. The only issue 
there was whether the Amended Complaint may state a claim for relief so as to survive a Motion to Dismiss. 
58 Complaint Ex. N. 
59 Garner Memo, pp. 11-14, which references D. Gamer's Depo.; Garner Aff. ~ 8. 
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in the Neigum Driveway in the hope that D. Garner would voluntarily agree to use that easement 
instead of the Northern Road. However, Poveys' motive is not relevant here. Poveys had no 
duty to protect a non-express easement in the Northern Road when they conveyed property to 
Neigum which does not even impact or touch on the Northern Road.61 
Viehweg transfer. Poveys conveyed a certain parcel, which did impact the Northern 
Road, to Viehweg in 2005. The Viehweg deed is silent as to any specific easement. However, it 
does covey the property "with their appurtenances.,,62 The Court has previously held that the 
easement in the Northern Road is an easement "appurtenant" to the Poveys' property. Thus, 
when Poveys conveyed property to Viehweg, "with their appurtenances," Viehwegs took the 
property subject to any appurtenant easement. The implied or prescriptive easement Garners 
have was conveyed to Viehweg by that deed. Poveys fulfilled any duty they had to Viehweg and 
to Garners. The fact that Viehweg, almost three years later, decided to challenge Garners' 
easement by putting up a fence does not create a liability in Poveys. The undisputed facts in this 
record show that the Northern Road was open and obvious and was being used by Garners until 
Viehweg put up the fence blocking the road in 2008. Thus, at a minimum, Viehweg was on 
notice, actual or constructive, of both the roadway on the ground and its use by Garners, at the 
time of the purchase from Poveys and for almost three years thereafter, which imposed a duty of 
inquiry on Viehweg, as the purchaser ofthe servient estate, regardless of whether Poveys advised 
Viehweg of Garners use of the Northern Road or not. 
60 Gamer Memo, pp. 6, 14. 
61 The issue as to whether D. Garner, as a "stranger" to the deed between Poveys and Neigums, is entitled to the 
easement reserved for him in the Neigum deed, is technically raised by the facts of this case, but is MOOT and need 
not be decided herein because the settlement agreement represented is that Garners have acquired a permanent 
easement in the Neigum Driveway and have abandoned any easement in the Northern Road. See Benninger v. 
Derifield, supra, 142 Idaho at 490, 129 P.3d 1239; Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 232, 76 P.3d 969,976 (2003); 
Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 209-10,360 P.2d 403,406 (1961) for a discussion of the rights, if any, a stranger to a 
deed can obtain in an easement described therein. 
62 Complaint Ex. P. 
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Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that D. Gamer and N. Garner acquired an 
easement, implied and/or prescriptive, in the Northern Road and Poveys could not unilaterally 
change the easement to another location. However, because the Garners' easement was not 
express, and had not been judicially determined, Poveys. only duty was to not unreasonably 
interfere physically with Garners' easement. Poveys had no duty to protect, by express 
language, Garners' easement in any conveyance of the servient estate. Nevertheless, Poveys did 
convey, with appropriate language, any easement that may have been created over time in 
Garners behalf, through the conveyances of portions of the servient estate to Dean and Viehweg. 
Poveys attempted to created an additional easement for D. Garner in the conveyance to Neigum. 
The Court further concludes that Poveys did not, as a matter of law, unreasonably physically 
interfere with Garners' easement for the reasons stated above. Poveys' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is GRANTED. 
Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint and Motion for Enlargement of 
Time 
The last motions for consideration are Garners' Motion for Leave to Amend Second 
Amended Complaint ("Motion to Amend") and Motion for Enlargement of Time ("Motion to 
Enlarge"). Although the Motion to Enlarge asks for more time to file affidavits and take further 
depositions to assist in Garners' opposition to the MSJ, the Court considers it here because of the 
Court's decision on the MSJ. Poveys object to the Motion to Amend and Motion to Enlarge on 
the basis that Neigum and Viehweg have never filed any cross-claims prior to this time, under 
LR.C.P. 13(g), and also assert that Garners have failed to comply with the requirements of 
LR.C.P. 56(f). Dealing with the objections first, the Court, in its discretion, concludes that a 
sufficient basis has been shown to permit consideration of both the Motion to Amend and the 
Motion to Enlarge. Ample justification has been given for any delays in asserting the claims 
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sought to be added by the Motion to Amend and in not submitted additional affidavits or 
conducting further discovery to assist in responding to the MSJ.63 The Court will consider the 
Motion to Amend and the Motion to Enlarge on their merits: 
The determination of a motion to amend a complaint is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 43, 122 P.3d 300,302 (2005). 
In considering a proposed amendment to a Complaint, the Court may consider "whether the 
amended pleading sets out a valid claim, whether the opposing party would be prejudiced by any 
undue delay, or whether the opposing party has an available defense to the newly added claim." 
Id. at 44, 122 P.3d at 303. As a general rule, requests to amend are to be "freely given" absent 
undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice, or the futility of the amendment. Carl Christensen 
Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1999); Suitts v. First 
Security Bank 0/ Idaho, 110 Idaho 15, 24-25, 713 P.2d 1374, 1383-84 (1985). On the other 
hand, the proposed amendment must adequately state a cause of action. If it does not, a denial of 
the request to amend is not an abuse of discretion. See Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. 
Idaho First Nat'! Bank, 119 Idaho 160, 804 P.2d 900 (1991); Wells v. United States Life Ins. Co., 
119 Idaho 160,804 P.2d 333 (Ct.App. 1991). 
The sole basis for the Motion to Amend is that a settlement has been reached between 
Garners on the one hand and Dean, Neigum and Viehweg on the other hand, by which Neigum 
and Viehweg, only, "assign to Garners causes of action against the Poveys.,,64 The only 
document before the Court that explains the nature of any claims Neigum and Viehweg may 
have against Poveys is the proposed Third Amended Complaint ("3rd Complaint"), attached to 
the Second Affidavit of Michael Brown, Ex. E. In essence, the 3rd Complaint alleges only: 1) 
63 See Michael Brown Aff. and Second Aft 
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that Poveys sold real property to Neigum and Viehweg, 2) that the deeds from Poveys to Neigum 
and Viehweg warrant that Poveys were "the owners in fee simple of said premises; that they are 
free from all encumbrances and that they will warrant and defend the same from all lawful 
claims whatsoever," 3) that the properties conveyed were not free of encumbrances because they 
were subject to the easement interests of the Garners, and 4) that the existence of these 
encumbrances caused loss to Neigum and Viehweg, primarily in the costs of defending this 
lawsuit. The question is whether these allegations adequately state a cause of action. 
The basis for the Motion to Enlarge is to permit Garners to file additional affidavits 
and/or conduct additional discovery that would assist Garners in pursuing these additional claims 
assigned to them by Neigum and Viehweg, and in more fully responding to the MSJ.65 
The Court's legal determinations herein are relevant to the consideration of the Motion to 
Amend. The Court has held that the deed by which Poveys conveyed property to Neigum 
specifically reserved an easement in the Neigum Driveway in favor of Daniel Garner. The 
undisputed evidence also shows that the Neigum property does not touch or relate in any way to 
the Northern Road. Interference with the Garners' easement in the Northern Road is the only 
basis for the claims by Garners against Neigum in the Second Amended Complaint. Since the 
Court has concluded there was no basis for that claim against Poveys, related to the conveyance 
to Neigum, it follows, as a matter of law, that there would be no basis for any claim by Neigum 
against Poveys related to that same deed. The Court concludes that the 3rd Complaint does not 
state an adequate claim of any kind related to the Neigum property. 
The Court has held that the deed by which Poveys conveyed property to Viehweg also 
conveyed, by operation of law through the use of the word "appurtenance," any easement 
64 Motion to Amend, p. 2; Michael Brown Aff ~ 9. 
65 The Court does not have before it the settlement agreement which defines the nature of the assignment. 
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Garners may have acquired, by implication or prescription, to use the Northern Road. While 
Viehweg, and First American Title, may have used the lack of any express description of an 
easement in the Viehweg deed as a basis to contest Garners' easement in the Northern Road, the 
Court has concluded that Poveys had no duty to more specifically describe the Garners' 
easement in the deed to Viehweg. Poveys acquired their property from McCullochs without any 
specific mention of Garners' easement and they conveyed a portion of the property to Viehweg 
without any specific mention of Garner's easement. The Northern Road was open and obvious 
and was used by Garners for almost three years prior to Viehweg's attempt to interfere with it. 
Thus, it was Viehweg's duty to inquire, with actual or constructive notice of the use, about the 
presence of the Garners' easement. Viehweg's failure to do so, or to contest Garners' easement 
even if they did know, cannot be imputed to Poveys. If Poveys have no duty to Garners under 
these circumstances, they also have no duty to Viehweg. Therefore, based on the allegations of 
the 3rd Complaint, i.e., that Poveys breached some duty to Viehweg by failing to provide notice 
of Garners' easement in the deed to Viehweg, the Court concludes that an adequate claim is not 
stated. 
The Court cannot envision any additional facts, obtained in discovery, or provided by 
affidavit, that would alter the legal duty Poveys had to Garners, Neigum and/or Viehweg when 
the transfer by deed from Poveys to Neigum and Viehweg occurred. The Court has concluded 
that Poveys had no duty to do other than they did, and that they are not liable to Garners for their 
actions. Likewise, Poveys are not liable to Neigum or Viehweg for the same actions. The fact 
that litigation ensued is unfortunate, but that litigation was precipitated by Viehweg's 
determination to contest Garners' easement, an action for which Poveys are not responsible. 
Therefore, the Motion to Amend and the Motion to Enlarge are DENIED. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, the Court GRANTS in part, DENIES in 
part, and declines to rule in part on Poveys' Motion to Strike. The Court GRANTS in part, 
DENIES in part, and declines to rule in part on Garners' Motion to Strike. The Court GRANTS 
Poveys' Motion for Summary Judgment in full. The Court DENIES Garners' Motion to Amend 
and Motion to Extend Time. Poveys shall submit a Judgment to the Court consistent with this 
decision. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED October 27,2009. 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of October, 2009, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the manner indicated. 
Michael W. Brown 
Thatcher, Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney 
PO Box 216 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Blake Atkin 
Atkin Law Office 
7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, ID 83228 
DATED this 27th day of October, 2009. 
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Facsimile: (801) 533-0380 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Garner, husband 
and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and Nola 
Garner as Trustee of the Nola Garner Living 
Trust, dated July 19, 2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband and 
wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. 
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey J. Neigum 
and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees of the 
Jeffery 1. Neigum and Kathleen A Neigum 
Revocable Trust, dated September 17, 2004; 
Jeffery 1. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, 
husband and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey, 
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MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES 
Case No. CV-08-342 
Judge Dunn 
EH.i' iJ ii 
Defendants, Brad and Leiza Povey, as the prevailing parties in this matter, submit the 
following Memorandum of Costs Including Attorney Fees pursuant to Rule 54( d), Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. To the best of these parties' knowledge and belief the items are correct and the 
costs claimed are in compliance with Rule 54. 
The Povey Defendants ask that costs in the amount of$47, 099.85 identified and summarized 
in the accompanying Affidavit of Blake S. in Support of Memorandum of Costs Including Attorney 
Fees dated November 9, 2009, which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated into this 
memorandum by reverence, be taxed as costs against the Plaintiffs and in favor of the Povey 
Defendants. 
I. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES PURSUANT 
TO IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 54(d) AND IDAHO CODE § 12-
120(3) AND IDAHO CODE § 12-121. 
In this case, Plaintiffs sued these Defendants claiming breach of warranty of title and 
interference with easement. In addition to the action being based on a commercial transaction, for 
which attorney fees are available under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), this action was brought and pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Therefore under Idaho Code § 12-121, as 
interpreted by Rule 54( e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, these Defendants are entitled to recover all 
their attorney fees incurred in defending this action. 
A. Plaintiffs' claims arose out of a commercial ~ransaction, therefore fees are 
recoverable under Idaho Code Annotated § 12-120(3). 
Idaho Code Annotated § 12-120(3) provides: 
2 
-r6'l . 
(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable 
instrument guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, 
merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by 
law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, 
to be taxed and collected as costs. (emphasis added) 
Plaintiffs took the position in this litigation that the commercial transaction by which the 
Poveys conveyed real estate to the Garners and their successors by warranty deed underlay all their 
claims. After pointing out to the Court that all the Plaintiffs, pursuant to mesne conveyances, were 
successors to the property interests that Gary and Nola Gamer obtained from Brad and Leiza Povey 
by warranty deed, Plaintiffs went on to allege in their Second Amended Complaint: 
The purchase of the real estate by Gary and Nola from Povey Defendants was a 
commercial transaction under Idaho Code Sec. 12-120(3) so Plaintiffs, as successors 
to Gary and Nola, should be entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees from 
Defendants Brad Pavey and Leiza Pavey. Second amended complaint at paragraph 
37. 
In their memorandum in opposition to these Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Plaintiffs again tied all their claims back to the commercial transaction between Gary and Nola Garner 
and went on to argue that all the arguments made by them apply to their claims under the warranty 
deed. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 18. Clearly then, the 
Poveys are entitled to recover all the fees they have expended defending the Garners' claims under 
Idaho Code § 12-120 as they all arise out of and relate to the failed commercial transaction claim. 
B. Plaintiffs' claims were brought and pursued frivolously and for a purpose for 
which the judicial process was not designed. Therefore Poveys are entitled to 
recover their attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Annotated § 12-121 and 
Rule S4(e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3 
Shortly after this case was filed, in November 2008, counsel for the Povey Defendants worked 
out a stand down agreement with Plaintiffs' counsel so that unnecessary attorney fees would not be 
incurred. Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin in Opposition to Motion for Enlargement of Time dated 
September 29, 2009, attached hereto as Exhibit "s." Sadly, that stand down agreement was short 
lived and the Plaintiffs demanded that the litigation proceed in January 2009. Defendants repeated 
settlement attempts met a blank wall from the Plaintiffs. Id. Until a recent interview with former 
Defendant Jeffrey Neigum, these Defendants were at a loss to explain the reason for Plaintiffs 
litigation tactics in this case. The reason is now clear. 
Plaintiffs' claims against the Povey Defendants were brought for purposes other than for 
resolution of the dispute alleged in the Complaint. This is a use for which our courts were not 
designed. In response to the motion of the Plaintiffs to amend the Second Amended Complaint and 
assert claims assigned from, among others, the Neigums, these Defendants contacted the Neigums to 
inquire into the assigned claims. Surprisingly, these Defendants learned in that interview that this 
action was brought by the Garners to avenge a perceived slight by Brad Povey against his niece, 
Plaintiff Sherri-Jo Gamer, and her husband, Plaintiff Daniel Gamer. Affidavit of Jeffrey 1. Neigum 
dated October 24, 2009, attached hereto as Exhibit "c." Such use of the judicial process is 
universally condemned and results in liability even in the absence of a statute. But in Idaho, the 
legislature has specifically authorized recovery by litigants who are the victims of abuse of process. 
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides in pertinent part: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party 
4 
or parties ... 
Rule 54( e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure clarifies: 
attorney fees under may be ayvarded by the court only 
when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation .... 
The motivation behind the Garners' decision to pursue these claims against the Poveys in the 
first instance, and then to require the Poveys to respond to the Complaint rather than continue with 
the stand down agreement while issues related to the easement were worked out with the owners of 
the property has been a mystery to the Povey Defendants-until now. Given Daniel Garner's 
revelation to the Neigums of the true motivation for this action, the Plaintiffs' conduct in this case 
makes perfect sense. This court should not condone the use of its processes for such purposes, 
however. An award to the Povey Defendants of all their attorney fees would send an appropriate 
message to these Plaintiffs and others who might be tempted, not to trifle with the jurisdiction of the 
Court. 
C. Povey Defendants are Entitled to Costs as a Matter of Right. 
LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) provides that certain costs must be awarded to a prevailing party as a 
matter of right. Because these costs are awarded as a matter of course to the prevailing party, the 
Court should award Defendant those costs as outlined in the Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin in Support of 
Motion for Costs Including Attorneys' Fees (Exhibit "A"). 
Costs as a matter of right LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C): 
Jun 19/2009 Court Reporter - Deposition of Nola Garner 
5 
$1,057.25 
Jun 24/2009 Court Reporter - Deposition of Daniel S. Garner $1,057.00 
Jun 24/2009 Court Reporter - Deposition of Sherri-Jo Garner $245.50 
Total depositions 2,359.75 
D. Defendants are Entitled to an Award of their Discretionary Costs. 
Defendants are entitled to an award of their discretionary costs under I.R.c.P. 54(d)(l)(D) 
because those costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred during the course of 
this litigation and should, in the interest of justice, be assessed against the Plaintiffs. 
The Supreme Court ofIdaho has found that a party seeking discretionaIY costs under I.R. c.P. 
Rule 54( d)(l)(D) must make an affirmative "adequate initial showing that these costs were necessary 
and exceptional and reasonably incurred." 1 Taking the costs by category, Defendants' legal research 
costs were incurred while researching the unique and complex legal issues in this case including 
whether a party can be liable for breach of warranty in relation to an easement that had never 
appeared in any deed. In addition, the copying costs and facsimile costs are costs that are necessruy 
to practice law in this day and age. Therefore, these costs should be deemed necessary. 
The second part of the discretionary costs analysis requires the Court to find that these costs 
1 Automobile Club Insurance Company v. G. Jackson, 865 P.2d 965, 971 (Idaho 1993); See also, Richard J and Esther E. 
Wooley v. Debest Plumbing. Inc., 983 P.2d 834, 841 (Idaho 1999)( Justice Silak dissent); See also, Fuller v. Wolters, 807 
P.2d 633, 643 (Idaho 1991 )(set aside trial court's award of discretionary costs for failure on the part of prevailing party to 
show that the costs were exceptional, necessary, or reasonable, and for failure on the part of the trial court for not making an 
express fmding v.rith regard to each specific cost item). 
6 
were reasonably incurred. Defendants' legal research costs were reasonably and prudently incurred. 
In addition, it was necessary to make copies of the pleadings and exhibits. Thus, because Defendants' 
discretionary costs were reasonably incurred under these uncommon, exceptional circumstances, the 
Court should make an express finding and award these costs to the Defendants. 
Pursuant to the above-stated rules, Defendants pray that the costs identified and summarized 
in the affidavit of Blake S. Atkin in Support of Memorandum of Costs Including Attorney Fees dated 
November 9, 2009 (Exhibit "A") be taxed as costs against the Plaintiffs in favor of Defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Court should grant all the fees and costs incurred in this case. 
DATED THIS 9th day of November, 2009. 
ATKIN LAW OFFICS, P.C 
Blake S. Atkin 
Attorney for the Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that he caused to be served a true and correct copy of 
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method of delivery designated: 
Gordon S. Thatcher 
Michael Brown 
Thatcher, Beard, St. Clair, Gaflhey 
116 S. Center 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Franklin County Court 
39 West Oneida 
Preston, Idaho 83263 
L U.S. Mail _Hand delivery 
_~_ U.S. Mail _Hand delivery 
DATED this 9th day of November, 2009. 
Blake S. Atkin 
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Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903 
7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, Idaho 83228 
Telephone: (208) 747-3414 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.e. 
837 South 500 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380 
Attorneys for the Povey Defendants 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner, 
husband and wife; Nola Garner, a widow and 
Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Garner 
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Hal 1. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon e. 
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey 1. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees 
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A 
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 
17, 2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. 
Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and 
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First 
American Title Insurance Company, a 
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho 
Certificate of Authority; and First American 
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDA VIT OF BLAKE S. ATKIN IN 
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES 
Case No. CV-08-342 
Judge Dunn 
110 
ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
SS: 
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN ) 
Blake S. Atkin, having been first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am attorney of record for the Povey Defendants in the above entitled matter. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein. 
3. Attached hereto is a printout of the Costs and attorney fees incurred by the Povey 
defendants in this matter. 
4. My normal hourly rate is $450.00 per hour, but in this matter I billed only $200.00 
per hour. As the court can see from perusal of the attachment, I am careful not to bill 
for any work that is not absolutely necessary, and given my number of years litigating 
cases I am able to reduce the number of hours billed by pinpointing the work that 
actually needs to be done. 
5. I am familiar with the rates charged in this community for attorney fees and given the 
nature of this litigation and the level of skill involved and considering the other 
factors set out in rule 54, Idaho rules of civil procedure it is my opinion that the rates 
charged by me and my staff are reasonable. 
6. These costs and attorney fees were all reasonably and necessarily incurred in the 
defense of this matter. 
DATED this 9th day of November, 2009. 
Attorney for the Pavey Defendants 
1" 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me this 9'" day of Novem~~ 
N ry Public 
My Commission expires: ot//O/!tJ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on the _ day of September, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE S. ATKIN IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM 
OF COSTS INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES upon the following by the method of delivery 
designated: 
Gordon S. Thatcher 
Michael Brown 
Thatcher, Beard, S1. Clair, Gaffney 
116 S. Center 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Eric Olsen 
Racine, Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Ryan McFarland 
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Franklin County Court 
39 West Oneida 
Preston, Idaho 83263 
US. Mail _Hand delivery Fax 
US. Mail _Hand delivery Fax 
US. Mail _Hand delivery Fax 
US. Mail Hand delivery Fax 
GARNER V. POVEY 
FEESUSTING 
Working 
Date Explanation Lawyer Hours Rate Amount 
Nov 5/2008 Meeting in Clifton BSA 6.00 200.00 $ 1,200.00 
Jan 29/2009 Research on motion to dismiss standards; JVM 5.50 175.00 $ 962.50 
research on pleadings facts that act as bar 
to complaint 
Feb 2/2009 Reviewing complaint; meeting with client; BSA 6.00 200.00 $ 1,200.00 
preparing motion to dismiss 
Feb 4/2009 preparing notice of appearance and motion MlS 0.80 90.00 $ 72.00 
and memo to dismiss; mailing and copying 
docs. 
Feb 4/2009 preparing notice of hearing on defendants' MlS 0.30 90.00 $ 27.00 
motion to dismiss amended complaint 
Feb 4/2009 faxing notice of hearing to opposing counsel MlS 0.60 90.00 $ 54.00 
and court 
Feb 21/2009 Reply to motion to dismiss BSA 6.00 200.00 $ 1,200.00 
Feb 23/2009 Prep for hearing BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Feb 23/2009 Reply in supp of M to Dismiss legal research JHP 3.10 150.00 $ 465.00 
Feb 24/2009 editing and preparing reply in support of Ml5 1.00 90.00 $ 90.00 
motion to dismiss; faxing and mailing to 
opposing counsel and court 
Feb 25/2009 Prep for hearing on motion to dismiss BSA 5.00 200.00 $ 1,000.00 
Feb 26/2009 Hearing on motion to dismiss BSA 4.00 200.00 $ 800.00 
Mar 3/2009 Affidavits of Ivan Jensen and Ron Kendall BSA 2.00 200.00 S 400.00 
Mar 4/2009 Affidavit of twin lakes BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
Mar 4/2009 legal research on hearsay in idaho for case JHP 0.40 150.00 $ 60.00 
Mar 6/2009 Working on affidavits of Ron Kendall and BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
Ivan Jensen 
Mar 11/2009 Affidavits BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
Mar 30/2009 research legal issues in case relating to answer BSA 4.00 200.00 $ 800.00 
to second amended complaint 
Mar 31/2009 reviewing amended complaint and second MlS 2.00 90.00 $ 1~0.00 
amended complaint for differences 
Mar 31/2009 Research re: warranty of title where not BSA 8.00 200.00 $ 1,600.00 
Apr 1/2009 
Apr 3/2009 
specific easement listed. Answer to second 
amended complaint. 
Answer to second amended complaint 
scanning and emailing copy of Thatcher 
affidavit (100 plus pages) to Blake 
BSA 
MlS 
1'" 
8.00 200.00 $ 1,600.00 
0.30 90.00 $ 27.00 
Apr 3/2009 Answer to second amended complaint and BSA 4.00 200.00 $ 800.00 
affidavits 
Apr 6/2009 Answer to a2d amended complaint BSA 2.00 200.00 $ 400.00 
Apr 13/2009 Preparation of discovery requests BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Apr 18/2009 Discovery requests BSA 2.00 200.00 $ 400.00 
Apr 21/2009 drafting and preparing discovery requests MLS 1.80 90.00 $ 162.00 
and interrogatories for mailing to opposing 
counsel; researching Idaho rules of civil 
procedure for definitions and instructions 
to discovery requests; phone call and email 
to Blake re issues with discovery 
Apr 22/2009 Discovery requests research re: warranty of BSA 5.00 200.00 $ 1,000.00 
title re: easement not described 
Apr 24/2009 editing, scanning, copying and preparing MlS 0.40 90.00 $ 36.00 
discovery (interrogs and req. for 
admissions) for mailingto opposing counsel 
and cert of service to court 
Apr 28/2009 Research re upcoming depos BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
Apr 29/2009 calling court to confirm room for MlS 0.40 90.00 $ 36.00 
depositions; drafting and preparing notice 
of depositions; call to court reporter to 
reserve 
Apr 29/2009 copying, scanning, faxing and mailing out MlS 0.60 90.00 $ 54.00 
notice of depositions to opposing counsel, 
court, judge and court reporter 
May 22/2009 Depos prep BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
May 25/2009 Preparing for depositions BSA 2.00 200.00 $ 400.00 
May 26/2009 Prep for depositions BSA 2.00 200.00 $ 400.00 
May 27/2009 Prep for depos call to counsel re: documents BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
May 29/2009 Prep for depos BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Jun 1/2009 Prep for depos BSA 6.00 200.00 $ 1,200.00 
Jun 2/2009 Deposition of Nola Garner BSA 8.00 200.00 $ 1,600.00 
Jun 3/2009 Deposition of Dan Garner BSA 8.00 200.00 $ 1,600.00 
Jun 8/2009 Drafting motion for summary judgment BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Jun 10/2009 Research re: Summary judgment motion BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Jun 11/2009 Research re: Summary judgment motion BSA 4.00 200.00 $ 800.00 
lib 
Jun 16/2009 
Jun17/2009 
Jun 27/2009 
Research re: Summary judgment motion 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment motion 
BSA 
BSA 
BSA 
1n 
1.00 
2.00 
4.00 
200.00 
200.00 
200.00 
$ 
$ 
$ 
200.00 
400.00 
800.00 
Jun 30/2009 editing and reviewing the mm in support of MlS 0.40 90.00 $ 36.00 
motion for summary judgment 
Jul 7/2009 editing and reviewing the mm in supp of MSJ MlS 0.60 90.00 $ 54.00 
Jul 7/2009 drafting motion in support of motion for MlS 0.50 90.00 $ 45.00 
summary judgment; editing and formatting mm 
in supp of motion for summary judgment 
Jull0/2009 reading through deposition testimony for MlS 0.50 90.00 $ 45.00 
citations to be used in MSJ; inputing 
citations from depositions and west law 
research into MSJ. 
Aug 3/2009 working on placing deposition citations into MlS 0.70 90.00 $ 63.00 
motion and memorandum for summary judgment; 
researching case law on breach of warranty; 
Aug 18/2009 editing and reviewing final draft of motion MlS 2.20 90.00 $ 198.00 
for summary judgment; comparing deposition 
changes to citations In msj; phone calf with 
Blake re same 
Aug 24/2009 call to clients re MSJ MlS 0.10 90.00 $ 9.00 
Aug 25/2009 phone call with client re msj MlS 0.40 90.00 $ 36.00 
Aug 26/2009 phone call with client re MSJ changes MlS 0.30 90.00 $ 27.00 
Aug 29/2009 Review of last draft of sjm BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Aug 31/2009 editing and reviewing final draft of MSJ MLS 4.60 90.00 $ 414.00 
with new additions 
Sep 1/2009 editing and adding in final changes to MlS 3.10 90.00 $ 279.00 
MSJ; scanning, copying and preparing same 
for mailing 
Sep 3/2009 drafting notice of hearing; 5 min; preparing MLS 0.30 90.00 $ 27.00 
fax cover sheets; faxing to all opp counsel, 
court and judge; drafting letter to clients 
re settlement agreement (5 min); 
Sep 15/2009 Stipulation for court - discussions with BSA 2.00 200.00 $ 400.00 
oPPosing counsel 
Sep 16/2009 Drafting settlement letter BSA 2.00 200.00 $ 400.00 
Sep 21/2009 Motion to strike affidavits, opposition to BSA 8.00 200.00 $ 1,600.00 
motion to strike affidavits 
Sep 22/2009 Opposition to motion to amend, opposition to BSA 6.00 200.00 $ 1,200.00 
motion to strike affidavits 
Sep 23/2009 reply sjm BSA 6.00 200.00 $ 1,200.00 
Sep 24/2009 adding deposition citations to motion to MLS 0.70 90.00 $ 63.00 
strike affidavits (30minj; formatting and 
Sep24/2009 
Sep24/2009 
adding deposition citations to opp to mot 
for enlargement of time 
motion to strike affidavits 
replysjm 
JHP 
BSA 
4.60 150.00 $ 690.00 
6.00 200.00 $ 1,200.00 
Sep25/2009 adding citations from depositions to mm in MLS 1.40 90.00 $ 126.00 
opp to motion to strike affidavits; adding 
citations to reply msj 
Sep25/2009 worked on motions and reply's to their 56(f) JHP 6.80 150.00 $ 1,020.00 
motion, motion to amend, reply in supp of 
our MSJ all in preparation for MSJ hearing 
that is coming up beginning of October. 
Sep25/2009 preliminary work on response to interrogatorie AG 1.00 90.00 $ 90.00 
Sep28/2009 reading through depositions for citations MlS 2.60 90.00 $ 234.00 
for mm in opp to motion to strike, mm in opp 
to motion for leave to amend; editing and 
formatting aff of Brad Povey (10 min); 
editing and formatting aff of BSA (15min); 
Sep 28/2009 worked on motions and reply's to their 56(f) JHP 5.00 150.00 $ 750.00 
motion, motion to amend, reply in supp of 
our MSJ all in preparation for MSJ hearing 
that Is coming up beginning of October. 
Sep28/2009 replysjm BSA 4.00 200.00 $ 800.00 
Sep29/2009 editing and reviewing final drafts of mm in MlS 2.00 90.00 $ 180.00 
supp of mot to strike aff of garner and 
povey, motion re same; editing and reviewing 
final draft of mm in opp to mot for 
enlargement of time (15 min); editing and 
reviewing final draft of mm in opp to mot to 
amend 2nd amended complaint (20min) 
Sep 29/2009 reply MM in supp of MSJ plus finalize other JHP 3.50 150.00 $ 525.00 
Povey docs to be filed today 
Sep 30/2009 adding citations to reply mm in supp of msj; MlS 2.50 90.00 $ 225.00 
editing and reviewing same 
Sep 30/2009 Supervising finalization of citations BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
Oct 1/2009 preparing argument folder for hearing on MLS 3.20 90.00 $ 288.00 
10/6; printing cases from west law, all 
pleadings related to 5 motions, etc. 
Oct 1/2009 final research for Reply in Supp of MSJ and JHP 1.00 150.00 $ 150.00 
finalize for filing. 
Oct 2/2009 preparing argument folder for 10/6 hearing MlS 1.70 90.00 $ 153.00 
on msj and other motions; printing cases 
from west law, etc. 
Oct 6/2009 Prep for and attend hearing on msj BSA 6.00 200.00 $ 1,200.00 
Oct 7/2009 editing and reviewing letter to opp counsel; MlS 0.10 90.00 $ 9.00 
scanning, copying and preparing same for 
mailing 
Oct 20/2009 discovery responses- doc requests and JHP 2.00 150.00 $ 300.00 
Oct 20/2009 
interrogs 
editing and reviewing second request for 
production of documents, adding in 
definitions re same; editing and reviewing 
responses to first interrogs from 
plaintiffs, adding in general objections; 
preparing certs of service re discovery above 
MLS 
,21 
1.20 90.00 $ 108.00 
Oct 20/2009 inserting dictation into letterhead for opp MlS 0.20 90.00 $ 18.00 
counsel re stipulated statement; copying, 
scanning and preparing same for mailing 
Oct 24/2009 meet with and prep Niegum affidavits BSA 4 200 $800.00 
Nov 6/2009 prep proposed judgment and cost memo BSA 3 200 $600.00 
Totals: 241.40 $ 42,587.50 
DISBURSEMENTS 
Other 
Jun 19/2009 Court Reporter - Deposition of Nola Garner $ 1,057.25 
Jun 24/2009 Court Reporter - Deposition of Daniel S. Garner $ 1,057.00 
Jun 24/2009 Court Reporter - Deposition of SherrHo Garner $ 24550 
Total Other $ 2,359.75 
Faxes 
Feb 2/2009 Faxes 16 @ 050 $ 8.00 
Feb 24/2009 Faxes 8 @050 $ 4.00 
Apr 29/2009 Faxes 10 @ 0.50 $ 5.00 
5ep 29/2009 Faxes 207 @ 0.50 $ 103.50 
Oct 1/2009 Faxes 87 @050 $ 43.50 
Oct 20/2009 Faxes 20 @ 0.50 $ 10.00 
Total Faxes $ 174.00 
Postage 
Feb 5/2009 Postage $ 351 
Feb 24/2009 Postage $ 5.34 
Apr 7/2009 Postage $ 4.66 
Apr 24/2009 Postage $ 4.52 
Apr 29/2009 Postage $ 6.34 
Sep 1/2009 Postage $ 26.30 
Sep 21/2009 Postage $ 0.44 
Sep 28/2009 Postage $ 0.61 
5ep 29/2009 Postage $ 8.76 
Oct 1/2009 Postage $ 4.68 
Oct 7/2009 Postage $ 0.44 
Oct 12/2009 Postage $ 0.44 
Oct 20/2009 Postage $ 0.44 
Oct 20/2009 Postage $ 3.66 
Total Postage $ 70.14 
long distance 
Sep 19/2009 long distance 2.70 @ 0.20 $ 0.54 
Total Long distance $ 0.54 
Photoco[!ies 
Feb 5/2009 Photocopies 45 @ 0.20 $ 9.00 
Feb 6/2009 
Feb 24/2009 
Apr 7/2009 
Apr 24/2009 
Apr 29/2009 
Sep 1/2009 
Sep21/2009 
Sep 28/2009 
Sep 29/2009 
Oct 1/2009 
Oct 7/2009 
Oct 12/2009 
Oct 20/2009 
Oct 20/2009 
On-Une Research 
Feb 20/2009 
Mar 20/2009 
Apr 20/2009 
May 20/2009 
Jun 20/2009 
Aug 20/2009 
Oct 20/2009 
Overnight ShiQQing 
Oct 20/2009 
Oct 20/2009 
Photocopies 3 @ 0.20 
Photocopies 42 @ 0.20 
Photocopies 24 @ 0.20 
Photocopies 50 @ 0.20 
Photocopies 54 @ 0.20 
Photocopies 940 @ 0.20 
Photocopies 4 @ 0.20 
Photocopies 9 @ 0.20 
Photocopies 312 @ 0.20 
Photocopies 174 @ 0.20 
Photocopies 1 @ 0.20 
Photocopies 1 @ 0.20 
Photocopies 1 @ 0.20 
Photocopies 34 @ 0.20 
Total Photocopies 
On-line Research 
On-line Research 
On-line Research 
On-line Research 
On-line Research 
On-line Research 
On-Line Research 
Total On-line Research 
Overnight Shipping 
Overnight Shipping 
Total Overnight 5hipping 
Disbursements Total 
Fees Total 
Disbursements Total 
Grant Total 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
'5 
$ 
0.60 
8.40 
4.80 
10.00 
10.80 
188.00 
0.80 
1.80 
62.40 
34.80 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
6.80 
338.80 
285.14 
195.22 
73.95 
19.60 
39.08 
252.80 
660.91 
1,526.70 
19.96 
21.46 
41.42 
4,511.35 
42,587.50 
4,511.35 
47,098.85 
EXHIBIT B 
Blake s. Atkin ISB# 6903 
7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, Idaho 83228 
Telephone: (208) 747-3414 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES .. P.C. 
837 South 500 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (80l) 533-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380 
Attorneys for the Povey Defendants 
IN THE SIXfH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
Danie1 S. Gamer and Sherri·Jo Gamer. 
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a "Widow and 
Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola Gamer 
Living Trust, dated July 19~ 2007, 
Pla.int.iffil. 
v. 
Hal 1. Dean and Marlene T. Dean. husband 
and wife, DougJas K.. Viehweg and Sharon C. 
Viehweg, husband and wi.f.e, Je.ffi:ey J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A Neigum, as Trustees 
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A 
Neigum Revocable Trust,. dated September 
17" 2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. 
Neigurn, husband and wife; Brad Povey and 
Leiza Povey. husband and \1V-ue; First 
American TItle Insurance Company. a 
Foreign TItle Insurer with an Idaho 
Certificate of Authority; and First American 
Trtle Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
I ·d 
AFFIDA wr OF BLAKE S. ATKIN IN 
OPPOSmON TO MOTION FOR 
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
Case No. CV..()8..342 
JudgcDtmn 
STATE OF IDAHO . ) 
ss: 
COUNTYOF~ ) 
Blake S. Atkin, having been first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am attorney of record for the PoveyDefendants-in the above entitledma:trer_-- -----
2. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein. 
3. My clients have not owned property in the vicinity of this dispute since October 4. 
2005. 
4. In early November I made a sett1~ offer, to .the Garners on behalf ofllie poveys. I 
got no respoose to that settlement offer. 
5. Sometime later that year. I orally renewed my settlement proposal Again I got no 
response. 
6. In November 2008, I urged Plainti:f&· CQuosel to agree to a stand stitl between his 
clients and mine so that his clients could attempt to resolve the dispute with people 
who did own the servient estate without nmning up unnecessary fees be.t\'\I-een two 
parties who could not settle the dispute over the right of way. 
7. Plai.ntiffi;' counsel agreed with the proYiso that When notified, the Poveys would 
answer the complaint within 20 days. 
8. In January, I was informed that the Garners insisted on an answer to the Complaint by 
the Poveys. 
9. I again made a settlement offer for which r got no response. I suggested that 
settlement needed to be accomplished with dispatch because of the growing attorney 
fees bill being faced by both the Garners and the Poveys. 
2 
vHE-£.v£.-B02 
10. On April 2, 2009 I made a wri~n settlement offer to the Garners and stated that if 
settlement had not occurred by A,prillS, 2~. the Poyeys would have no choice but 
to move fof'\i\la!d to protect their interests. I got no response. 
1 L On April 29, 2009, I noticed the depositions of Nola Gamer. D~~I_~f, __ ~4 ______ _ 
~_,' ••••• _ ....... _ •• , •• _ .• _. __ ~~_''>. ..... _" ...... "' _ -> •• ~·n -< •• ~.~. ._ ••• "' •• '. _ ,. •••••• _-"'- -- ,_ ... "., "... • .... " ".,- •• ,' • -
Sherri-Jo Gamer. 
12 I received no communication from the Garners about settlement or otherwise.. 
13. On the eve of the depositions" I received a phone call from counsel for one of the 
other Defendants. 
14. He told me that the dates of fue depositions was not 'convenient and asked if I 'WOuld 
reschedule ~ 
J 5_ I normally like to accommodate such requ~ but iliis one coming so soon before 1he 
deposition~ I did not feel it was fair to the witnesses., the court :reporter, or to my cHent 
to reschedule the deposition so I refused. 
16 • .Based on the results of my discovery, 1 filed a motion for summary judgment on 
, 
September 1, 2009. 
17. Two days later I received the first settlement offer the Plaintiffs ever made in this 
case. 
1 it We countered 1hat o.ffi:r, OOt the parties have not been able to settle the matter. 
DATED this 2! day ofSeprember, 2009. 
ftt£.f;~-
lake S. Atkin 
Attorney for the Povey Defendants 
3 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me this.d?1. day of September .. 2009. 
~ Notary blic 
·'MyCommission expires:/oJ:7&7'~ -_."_ ... 
4 
gtRTMCATE OF §lRVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _ day of September. 2009, I caused to he served. a true and 
correct ropy of AFFIDA vrr OF BLAKE S. ATKIN IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME upon the following by the method of delivery designated: 
Gordon S. Thatcher 
Thatch~ Beard,. 81. Clair. Gaffuey 
116 S. Center 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg. Idaho 83440 
Eric Olsen 
Racine, Olson Nyc Budge & Bailey 
P_O_ Box 1391 
Pocatello. Idaho 83204-1391 
Ryan McFarland 
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
P_O. Box 1617 
B~Idaho 83701~1617 
Franklin County Court 
39 West Oneida 
Preston, Idaho 83263 
U.S. Mail _Hand delivery Fax 
U.S. Mail _Hand 'delivery Fax 
U.S. Mail _Hand delivery Fax. 
U.s. Mail _Hand delivery Fax 
5 
EXHIBIT C 
Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903 
7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, Idaho 83228 
Telephone: (208) 747-3414 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.e. 
837 South 500 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380 
Attorneys for the Pavey Defendants 
IN mE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
FRANKLlN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner, 
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY J. NEIGUM 
Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Garner 
Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007, Case No. CV-08-342 
Plaintiffs, Judge Dunn 
v. 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene 1. Dean., husband 
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. 
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A Neigum, as Trustees 
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A 
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 
17, 2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. 
Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and 
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First 
American Title Insurance Company, a 
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho 
Certificate of Authority; and First American 
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
SS: 
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN ) 
Jeffrey 1. Neigum, having been first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein. 
2. In the deed given us by Brad Pavey, a right of way was created for Dan Garner to 
access his property on the west side of the canaL Had Brad not created this roadway, 
we would have created our own road because we felt it would be rude to go so closely 
to the Dean home and we did not feel it was safe to go so closely to the Dean's home 
where small children migpt be h~.I.4 
A pprox i ,no te y "f Y€(.I.{"S tiff It 
3. For ~n years after we bought our property, the Garners never used either the 
northern road that goes past the Dean home, nor the new road created in our deed. 
4. Suddenly, Dan Gamer started to use both roadways on a frequent basis. When I 
asked him why he had started using the roads, he told me that he had a personal 
vendetta against Brad Pavey and was hoping to make us mad at Brad so that we 
would sue him. 
5. He even told me some of the details about the trouble between him and Brad Povey. 
He told me that Brad had intervened with Brad's father (the grandfather of Dan 
Garner"s wife, Sherri-Jo,) to keep ~im from selling to Dan and Sherri-Jo the Troy 
Grave's dairy. That intervention by. Brad had. made Dan and Sherri-Jo very angry 
with Brad and that is why Dan wanted to make us mad so that we would sue Brad. 
6. I do not feel that Brad Povey did anything wrong in selling us the property, nor did he 
do anything that resulted in us being sued by Dan Gamer. I feel we were embroiled 
2 
1~ 
in this lawsuit because Dan Garner wanted to get even with Brad Povey for a 
completely unrelated event. 
7. About one month after Doug Viehweg bought his property I installed a couple of steel 
posts on the boundary between our property and the Viehweg property. Putting in 
these posts mad$nan angry because he said it made it hard for him to maneuver farm 
equipment up the new road. I removed the posts about a month ago as part of the 
settlement with the Garners. 
8. I remember the day Dan Gamer got stuck with the backhoe on the new roadway. It 
occurred after Viehwegs had bought their property because I took pictures that I 
forwarded to the Viehwegs of the damage Dan had done. 
DATED this 4 Lf day of October, 2009. 
. . ~­
Of:.-<{-'" '" fu f"-
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me this .;.. t day of S~et', 2009. 
ELVA K. ATKINSON 
NOTARY PUBUC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
3 
Notary Public 
My Commission expires: {( _ 4j- II. 
~o [b @r\ 
I ~I NO:V; 3 20091~ 
I :RA~KL1N COUN~ CLERK! 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner, 
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and 
Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Garner 
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Hal 1. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. 
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey 1. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees 
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A 
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 
17, 2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. 
Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and 
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First 
American Title Insurance Company, a 
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho 
Certificate of Authority; and First American 
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. CV-08-342 
Judge Dunn 
Judgment is hereby entered against Plaintiffs and in favor of Defendants Brad and Leiza 
Povey, no cause of action. 
DATED this 13 day of November, 2009. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of November, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of Defendant Brad and Leiza Poveys' proposed Judgment upon the following by the 
method of delivery designated: 
Gordon S. Thatcher 
Thatcher, Beard, S1. Clair, Gaffney 
116 S. Center 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Facsimile: (208) 359-5888 
Eric Olsen 
Racine, Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Facsimile: (208) 232-6109 
Ryan McFarland 
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Facsimile: (208) 954-5236 
Franklin County Court 
39 West Oneida 
Preston, Idaho 83263 
Facsimile: (208) 852-2926 
Judge Stephen S. Dunn 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Facsimile: (208) 236-7208 
_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery X Fax 
_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery X Fax 
_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery X Fax 
_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery X Fax 
X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery X Fax 
Blake S. Atkin 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
Michael W. Brown, ISB No. 8017 
343 E. 4th N. Suite 223 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Tel: (208) 359-5885 
Fax: (208) 359-5888 
jeff@beardstclair.com 
mbrown@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO 
Daniel S. Garner and Sheni-Jo Garner, 
husband and wife; Nola Garner, a widow; 
and Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola 
Garner Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon 
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as 
Trustees of the Jeffery 1. Neigum and 
Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust, 
dated September 172004; Jeffery J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband 
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey, 
husband and wife; First American Title 
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title 
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of 
Authority; and First American Title 
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-342 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL S. 
GARNER 
Second Affidavit of Daniel S. Garner - Page 1 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
County of Franklin 
I, DANIEL S. GARNER, having first been sworn, depose and state: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen, am competent to testify, and do so from personal 
knowledge. 
2. From 1987 to the commencement of this lawsuit, I regularly and consistently used the 
Northern Roadway to access my property on the Westside of the Twin Lakes Canal for a variety 
of purposes, including, but not limited to, hauling gravel and transporting equipment related to 
agricultural endeavors. 
3. When the Troy Graves dairy went up for sale, I had no interest in becoming dairyman. 
The dairy was in poor condition and not economically appealing to me. Also, my physician 
advised me not to participate in the type of physical labor required on a dairy. This advice from 
my physician further reinforced my decision not to purchase the dairy. 
4. I have never suggested to Mr. Neiguim that my use of the road was for the purpose of 
provoking him to sue Brad Povey, nor did I suggest explicitly or implicitly to Mr. Neiguim that I 
had a score to settle with Brad Povey. 
5. I filed the above captioned lawsuit because I was facing the possibility of losing year-
round access to my property. I named the Poveys as defendants in this lawsuit because their 
actions led to my access being in jeopardy. I did not sue the Poveys for any vengeful or 
vindictive purpose. 
6. I have regularly used the original access road throughout my ownership of property lying 
west of the Twin Lakes Canal. I did not "suddenly" begin to use the road on a more frequent 
basis based on a personal vendetta I held against Brad Povey with the intent to cause the 
Second Affidavit of Daniel S. Garner - Page 2 
..,11 
Neigums to become angry with him. I did not believe my use of the Neigum driveway would 
anger the Neigums because their deed contained a description of an easement for me in it. 
7. The episode in which I became stuck with my backhoe occurred on the Northern 
Roadway. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on NovemberJ:i, 2009. 
I' • 
Notary Public for State of Idah 
Residing at rr-c·ulKl.u~ J)) 
My Commission Expires: I / O~ \1 D 
(SEAL) 
~(//////////'~'''///'//'/' . .F//////'////////( 
~ , 
~( LINDA W HAMPTON )~ 
~ NOfary Public ~< 
)( State of Idaho ,< 
~ ~ 
)" F.!'.!'.!'.'.!'.!'''~· F.!' .I'.I.I'.!' "'..- j.> /'.>.!'".!' .1''''''", j.l'''..!'> ~ 
Second Affidavit of Daniel S. Gamer - Page 3 
1"'" 
CERTRIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho, I have my office in Rexburg, 
Idaho, and on November __ ,2009, I served a true and correct copy of SECOND AFFIDAVIT 
OF DANIEL S. GARNER upon the following by the method of delivery designated: 
Blake S. Atkin 
837 South 500 West 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Fax: (801) 533-0380 
Franklin County Courthouse 
39 W. Oneida 
Preston, ID 83263 
Fax: (208) 852-2926 
Judge Stephen S. Dunn 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center/P.O. Box 4126 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Fax: (208)236-7012 
Michael W. Brown 
ICJ U.S. Mail ICJ Hand-delivered ID1 Facsimile 
ICJ U.S. Mail ICJ Hand-delivered ICJ Facsimile 
ICJ U.S. Mail ICJ Hand-delivered ICJ Facsimile 
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney, Attorneys 
Attomey for Plaintiffs 
Second Affidavit of Daniel S. Gamer - Page 4 
